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DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

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DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES:

A LOOK AT THE RECORD

PART III

March 1984

A history of party differences
on 121 key Senate votes:
End of 2nd Session, 97th Congress;
1st Session, 98th Congress

Prepared by the Staff of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee

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HIGHLIGHTS

For three years, the White House and the Republican majority have controlled the Senate. The agenda and the priorities have been theirs. Their majority status has allowed them to push their programs through, and to reject the alternatives we proposed.

From the beginning, we have sought to work with the Majority. For three years, our goals have been clear and consistent: to restore balance to oftentimes extreme policies, to inject fairness to average Americans into the Majority's program, to aggressively build a better economic future for our people in an increasingly competitive world, and to work for a more secure peace.

While our efforts have most often been rebuffed, we point with pride to the contributions we have made in the last year:

—We helped to pass a bipartisan social security package, successfully ending a two-year struggle to prevent the benefit reductions proposed by the Majority.

—We succeeded in enacting a limited jobs bill, and in extending unemployment insurance benefits. We also fought to provide health care and mortgage relief for the jobless, but were unable to prevail over the Majority's opposition.

—We proposed a comprehensive set of proposals, "Jobs for the Future," to help America meet the long-term economic challenge of international competition, regional economic imbalances, and the ever accelerating pace of structural change in the American economy.

—We fought for more adequate funding for education, and in the end, partially prevailed over the opposition of the Majority.

—We strove to instill a measure of fairness to average Americans into the President's tax program, and to help staunch the hemorrhaging federal deficits, by proposing to put a cap on the amount of the tax cut for higher income taxpayers. In this, our efforts were rebuffed.

—We fought to protect America's precious natural heritage, and the health and safety of her people, from the radical policies of EPA and James Watt's Department of the Interior. James Watt chose to resign his post, rather than face losing a vote of confidence on a resolution offered in the Senate by Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd.

—We succeeded in imposing some limits on the duration and mission of American troops in Lebanon by forcing the Administration to accede to congressional powers under the War Powers Act.

INTRODUCTION

This document is the third in a series which catalogues the history of party differences on key Senate votes. Parts I and II reviewed the first and second sessions of the 97th Congress (1981 and 1982). Part III looks at the final months of the second session of the 97th Congress, as well as the first session of the 98th Congress. During the period covered by this document more than 80 votes were cast on key issues where two-thirds or more of the Democrats found themselves opposed by two-thirds or more of the Republicans. These votes represent the philosophical center of each party. They illustrate both the differences between the two parties and the nature of the Democratic alternatives.

Read together with Democratic Alternatives: A Look at the Record, Parts I and II, this document chronicles our response to the economic, social, and national security policies of the Reagan Administration. Throughout the last three years, our goals have been clear and consistent: to restore balance to oftentimes extreme Administration policies, to inject fairness to average Americans into Administration programs, to aggressively build a better economic future for our people in an increasingly competitive world, and to work for a more secure peace in a world which grows ever more dangerous.

A Restoration of Balance

The American people are not extremists. They want a government which reflects a balanced, common sense approach. Democrats believe that a sense of balance has been sorely missing from the course set by the Majority party during the last three years:

—The Administration promised a balanced budget, but instead embarked on the "river boat gamble" of supply-side economics, a gamble which put millions of Americans out of work and created huge deficits that threaten to choke our economy and mortgage our future. Despite painfully deep cuts in domestic spending, $200 billion deficits stretch "as far as the eye can see," in the words of OMB Director David Stockman.

—The Administration promised "a restoration of balance," but instead gave us an unprecedented transfer of wealth from average working Americans to the wealthy.

—The Administration promised to provide a healthy environment and to protect America's natural resources. Instead they brought us the radical policies of EPA and James Watt's Interior Department, where short-term gains by big business were more important than the long-term health and safety of American families and the conservation of America's irreplaceable natural resource heritage.

—They promised a comprehensive military strategy based upon "sober analysis," but they have given the Pentagon a blank check, throwing more money at it than it can spend, and emphasizing extravagant procurement at the expense of combat readiness.

A Recommitment to Fairness

The American people are a fair people. They expect their government to deal with them in a fair and even-handed manner. But fairness to average Americans has been prominent by its absence from the Administration program during the last three years:

—Under the policies of this Administration, the rich have been getting richer, the poor have been getting poorer, and the middle-class, at best, has been treading water.

—Their tax program has been little more than a windfall for the rich.

—In 1983, as a result of the Administration's tax program and budget cuts, households with incomes of $80,000 or more gained an average of $13,700. Households with incomes between $20,000 and $40,000 gained only $740. Households with incomes under $10,000 actually lost $310.

—These budgets have not only hurt the poor; they have also heavily burdened the middle-class. The dream of a college education has become harder to achieve for the 300,000 students who lost Pell grants and other financial assistance; for the 400,000 fewer students who receive guaranteed student loans; and for the 250,000 students who lost their social security survivors' education benefits.

—Working Americans have little to show for the pain and suffering they have endured as a result of these budget cuts and the recession. More than a year after the country began the long climb out of the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression, unemployment is still about one percent higher than it was when Mr. Reagan took office.

Democratic Senators believe that all Americans should have a fair chance to apply their energy and talent to better themselves. We believe that middle income Americans should be relieved of unfair tax burdens. We believe that older Americans should have affordable health care and financial security. We believe that basic civil rights for all of our citizens should be protected.

Building A Better Economic Future in an Increasingly Competitive World

As Democrats, our goal is economic security for American workers. We must prepare our nation to compete. Government must work with business and labor leaders to build and retain world-class industries, to increase productivity, and to make the economy more flexible so that it can adapt to changing economic conditions.

We reject the claim that government should be a passive bystander, doing nothing as the winds of change sweep across our land. We reject both the rigidity of bureaucratic planning and the current policy of aimless drift. Our nation can—with business, labor and government working together—make itself ready for an uncertain future. Democratic Senators believe that government can help to make America work.

A More Secure Peace in an Ever More Dangerous World

In a dangerous world, the management of our nation's defense and foreign policy should be clear-headed and our goals clearly defined. We need steady hands at the helm. However, the Administration's defense and foreign policies continue to lack coherence and are characterized by extreme rhetoric that raises world tensions, alienates our allies, and threatens to move us perilously close to the brink of war in a nuclear age.

Democrats want to make sure there is a future. However, we believe that the future can be secured only through the prudent blend of the strong diplomatic and defense tools at our disposal. We support the use of diplomacy to help reduce world tensions and prevent acute crises. Lebanon and the crisis in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union are but two examples of the failure to conduct foreign policy with a prudent blend of diplomatic and military tools.

Democrats support a strong national defense and arms control policy that will lead to a safer world for future generations of Americans. In so doing, we seek to rebuild vital conventional armed forces that this Administration continues to neglect. The problem of waste in the Pentagon has become a national scandal. Overpricing of spare parts and the apparent unwillingness of the current management of the Department of Defense to correct these abuses is but one example of the threat posed to what has been a strong national consensus in support of increasing our conventional readiness and modernizing elements of our strategic nuclear forces.

Competence in the management of our foreign policy remains a critical issue. Since this Administration came into office three years ago, we have had two Secretaries of State, two Directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (including the incumbent who, when he took his job, did not have any experience in this area), and three National Security Advisers to the President. There is not one single top Administration official who has had much, if any, experience in dealing with the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact our chief START negotiator, Edward Rowney, acts as if an agreement with the Soviet Union is the farthest thing from his mind.

In sum, the world today looks much different than it did three years ago. Nuclear arms control negotiations with the Soviets, both at the Euromissile and strategic levels, have been suspended; the United States, for the first time in our history finds itself bogged down in Lebanon and in direct confrontation with an Arab state; and the Central American crisis, far from being defused, teeters on the

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brink of an all-out regional war. The issue of competence and effective management calls into question the confidence with which the American people can face the future.

The White House and the Senate have been controlled by the Republicans for the last three years. This Majority party status gave them an opportunity to slam their program through in 1981, and to generally frustrate our efforts as the Minority party to enact many of our legislative priorities. But we continue to try. We know that the pressure we have applied has caused the Majority to compromise on many key issues such as Social Security, help for the unemployed, and increased support for education and training. As the Minority party we will continue to fight the extremes of the current Administration, to push for fairer governmental policies, and offer constructive alternatives designed to secure a prosperous and safe future for the American people.

OVERVIEW

From the beginning, Democrats in the Senate expressed a willingness to work with the President and the new Republican majority in the Senate. Although deeply skeptical of the radical new direction of supply-side economics, we tried to join, broadly speaking, in giving the President's program a chance. That was what the country asked for: "Give the President's program a chance." We offered proposals to make it more workable, and less extreme. We tried to target the budget cuts more fairly. We tried to make the tax cuts more equitable, and more fiscally prudent. Our efforts were rebuffed by the President and his party marching in partisan lockstep.

The Senate has a long and proud tradition of bipartisanship. But during 1981 and most of 1982, that tradition was virtually abandoned by the President and his party. In the process, the Senate was polarized; Democrats were frozen out of the decision-making process; and the traditional give and take between the parties, along with its moderating balance, was tossed aside. The 97th Congress was the most partisan in memory. Rather than work with us, the Majority chose to ignore, frustrate, and oppose almost every measure suggested by the Minority to correct the excesses of their program. Democratic amendments were summarily and perfunctorily voted down or tabled with little, if any, debate on the merits. In the face of this unprecedented partisanship, Senate Democrats were more unified in 1982 than in any recent Congress—to be exact, since 1955, according to figures released by the Congressional Quarterly.

The Lame-Duck Session of the 97th Congress

The lame-duck session of the 97th Congress opened against a backdrop of mounting national problems, which the Administration and the Majority in the Senate had tried for months to ignore. Although Mr. Reagan had campaigned for office in 1980 saying "It's time to put America back to work," the President's radical experiment with supply-side economics plunged America into the grips of the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression. In November of 1982, when the lame-duck session began, unemployment stood at 10.7%, the highest level in 40 years. A month later, unemployment had climbed still higher to 10.8%, and more than 12 million Americans were jobless.

But the President and the Majority in the Senate turned their eyes and ears from the plight of those whose jobs had been sacrificed on the altar of tight money and high interest rates. Throughout

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the year, the Administration had resisted virtually every effort to provide relief to the recession's increasing toll of victims. At one point, the President went so far as to complain that news reports persisted in exposing the human price which was being paid for the President's policy of fighting inflation with unemployment, saying:

> You can't turn on the evening news without seeing that they're going to interview someone else who's lost their job, or they're outside the factory that laid off workers and so forth.... Is it news that some fellow out in South Succotash someplace has just been laid off, that he should be interviewed nationwide?

During the November 1982 elections, the American people registered a complaint of their own against the unfairness of the Administration's policies toward the average citizen. Democrats swept to control of 34 statehouses. The Democratic margin in the House was increased by 26 votes. And in the Senate, in a year where 19 Democratic incumbents were seeking re-election and only 11 Republicans, the Democrats held their own.

Shaken by the election results, Republican Senators realized that they must do something and joined with Democrats during the lame-duck session to pass a highways/infrastructure repair bill. Although hardly designed as a jobs bill, the measure at least held out the hope of putting some Americans back to work. But the Administration insisted that the new program be paid for by raising the gasoline tax paid by average Americans, despite the fact that during the winter of 1982 fewer and fewer Americans could pay their bills.

During the debate on the gas tax/highway repairs bill, the Majority joined to defeat an amendment offered by Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd to delete the gas tax increase, and raise the needed revenues instead by delaying the third installment of the tax cut due the following July for upper income taxpayers. The Byrd amendment would also have established an emergency jobs program and extended unemployment benefits for those jobless workers who had used up their benefits without being able to secure employment. The Senate Majority also turned down efforts by the Minority to provide a tax credit for low-income families with children to help offset the adverse impact of the gas tax increase on those who could least afford it.

During the lame-duck session, Republicans joined, once more, to defeat a proposal to create an emergency jobs program to put jobless Americans to work. Unwilling to provide jobs for the unemployed, the Majority also showed its unwillingness in two separate votes to provide additional weeks of jobless benefits—although in the end, they were forced to bow to pressure from Democrats and the public at large to extend unemployment insurance benefits. The Majority even voted against a Democratic amendment to provide an emergency $50 million fund to operate soup kitchens and emergency shelters for the homeless and the unemployed—yet another position which Republicans were eventually forced to reverse in 1983.

The 1st Session of the 98th Congress

When the new Congress convened in January to listen to the President's State of the Union address, they heard President Reagan declare that "America is on the mend". Senate Democrats saw the picture differently. On January 27, in a speech on the Senate floor, the Senate Democratic Leader, Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, presented his own view:

> ...the state of our nation's economy is deeply troubled. We are in the grips of the deepest and most severe recession since World War II. Twelve million of our citizens are jobless.
>
> Our nation desperately needs a change of course. We must act decisively to meet the human emergencies caused by this recession. We must put into place the fiscal and monetary policies which can turn the corner on this recession. And we must embark on a major cooperative effort by government, business, and labor to meet the longer term challenges posed by the profound structural changes sweeping our economy.
>
> ...the human side of the question is the one that, for me, is overriding.
>
> Every morning and night for the past several weeks, the nation's television viewers have been exposed to the true state of the Union....
>
> ...There, we have seen the tents in Texas housing families who, two years ago, were members of the middle class in other cities in our country. There, we see the reports of the increases in suicides, in battered spouses, and in battered children. There, we see the interviews with the men and women bravely holding on—with their fingernails—to their dignity.
>
> As Senators, we hear more of this. We meet the real State of the Union in our mail pile, on the street back home, and in visits with deeply concerned constituents...
>
> ...the nation may well be "on the mend," as the President said last night. But an Administration that still has not developed an understanding of what is fair and what is not, is not—I am sorry to say—likely to help it along the way very quickly.

Senator Byrd went on to promise that for their part, Senate Democrats would offer alternative solutions to the pressing problems confronting the nation. He said:

> We will propose means of meeting the emergency human needs created by this recession and for turning around our troubled economy. We will offer proposals to help us meet the long-term economic challenges of international competition, regional economic imbalances, and the ever-accelerating pace of structural change in the American economy. We undertake this task in a constructive spirit. We welcome the opportunity to work with our colleagues on the other side of the aisle and with the President to put in place the policies and programs which are so sorely needed to restore this nation's economic health.

This document records that we met the challenges laid down a year ago by Senator Byrd. In rollcall vote after rollcall vote, we offered measures designed to help put Americans back to work, to provide health insurance for the jobless and their families, to extend unemployment benefits, to help those temporarily unable to meet their mortgage payments, and to stop deep and unfair budget cuts in Medicare. In nearly every case, these proposals were summarily voted down on party line votes.

There were, to be sure, a few instances of bipartisan compromise. A limited jobs bill was passed in the early days of the 98th Congress, although only after Democratic calls for a more adequate measure were rejected out of hand by the White House. A bipartisan Social Security package passed both Houses and was signed into law, successfully ending the two year struggle by Democrats to stop the Administration's all-out assault on Social Security. Bipartisan cooperation also provided the margin of support needed to pass 10 of the 13 regular appropriations bills into law.

But these rays of bipartisanship were few and far between.

Tax Fairness and the Budget

Bipartisan efforts to control the hemorrhaging federal deficits—the legacy of the Majority's reckless policies of seemingly unlimited defense spending increases, enormous tax cuts for the rich, and the recession itself—proved fruitless in the face of the President's intransigent opposition to any modification of his program. As the deficit projections broke record after record, the President continued to insist that he would block any attempt to increase defense spending at a more moderate pace, or to limit the amount of the tax cut going to those in upper income brackets. Rather than modify the huge tax breaks going to the wealthy under his program, the President proposed a standby income tax surcharge and an excise tax on oil, a tax which would have meant higher home heating bills for millions of hard-pressed citizens.

In the final weeks before the third installment of the tax cut was scheduled to take effect (on July 1, 1983), Democrats undertook a last ditch effort to restore a measure of fairness to the President's tax program, and to help staunch the flow of red ink from the Treasury by proposing to put a cap on the amount of the tax cut for higher income taxpayers. Under the bill, which passed the House on a party line vote, every taxpayer would still get a tax cut. Ninety percent would receive their scheduled tax cut in full. Only ten percent would have their tax cut capped—and even these taxpayers would still get approximately a $700 tax cut. The bill would have saved $38 billion over five years; eighty-nine percent of the revenue would have come from those earning over $50,000 a year. Despite the obvious fairness of the tax cap proposal—and the equally obvious need to stem the $200 billion deficit—the Majority voted overwhelmingly to defeat the Democratic bill.

The Budget

In May, the Senate succeeded—just barely—in passing a compromise, bipartisan budget over the President's vehement objections. The budget passed only after six tries, however, and only after moderate Republican Senators defied the President, leader of their party, to vote for the compromise measure.

When the President's efforts to torpedo the budget itself failed, he turned his attention to preventing the legislation needed to implement the budget plan from being enacted. Repeated efforts to involve the President in devising a compromise budget plan were rebuffed by a President seemingly oblivious to the enormous deficits his policies had created. In frustration, the Senate voted down the debt ceiling bill—thereby threatening to cut off the government's borrowing authority—in an effort to send a message to the President that his continuing refusal to compromise was unacceptable. But the President remained steadfast in his intransigent position. In the end, he was successful in stopping the Senate in its tracks. As the Congress adjourned *sine die*, the stalemate over the budget remained unbroken. The President remained on the sidelines throughout, unwilling to accept responsibility for the deficits—which even his own Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers admitted stemmed from the Administration's policies—and equally unwilling to join in responsible, bipartisan efforts to bring the deficits under control.

Working for A Better Economic Future

Democrats also kept their promise to address the nation's long-term structural economic problems. As the 98th Congress convened, the recovery from the country's worst recession in 50 years was still in its infancy, born only after the Federal Reserve turned away from the Administration's long-standing policy of tight money and high interest rates. It was an effort led by Senate Democrats to enact the Balanced Monetary Policy Act of 1982, requiring the Federal Reserve to bring interest rates back into their traditional relationship with inflation, which was largely responsible for the change. In February of 1983, Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd established a task force, chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy and charged with recommending a program to increase the competitiveness of the American economy. The group met regularly for nine months and presented a far-reaching program of policy initiatives, entitled "Jobs for the Future," which was unanimously endorsed by the Senate Democratic Conference.

These proposals represent our alternative to the aimless drift of the President's policies, which promise to mortgage our economic future to an ever-increasing mountain of national debt. In just four short years, the Administration projects it will add $846 billion to the federal debt—more than the entire debt accumulated under all previous post-war administrations. By the end of President Reagan's first four years in office, it is estimated that the per capita debt—the debt for each man, woman and child in this nation—will reach $7,733. By 1987, the President's policies will cost $60 billion each year in increased interest payments alone.

After paying this enormous price, we might expect an improvement in our long term prospects. But no such improvement is in sight. Instead, our deficit with our trading partners continues to worsen, reaching $69 billion last year and projected to reach $100 billion this year. Deficits of $200 billion stretch, in OMB Director David Stockman's words, "as far as the eye can see." Slashed education and research budgets jeopardize our ability to excel in the industries of the future. Basic industries are being destroyed by our dramatically overvalued dollar and the absence of a coherent trade policy.

Programs designed to ease the adjustment and adaptation by our firms and communities to a rapidly changing economic world have been abandoned.

The program endorsed by the Democratic Caucus contains 22 specific recommendations in six vital areas:

1. A Council on Economic Competitiveness and Cooperation to foster business/labor/government cooperation.
2. Programs to accelerate the development and commercialization of new products and processes, and to provide strong support for basic research.
3. Financing programs to improve investment in plant and equipment.
4. Trade programs to support the marketing of domestically produced and internationally traded goods and services.
5. Adjustment programs to facilitate the adaptation of workers, communities and industries to changing markets and technologies.
6. Education and other human resources programs to increase the creativity and productivity of U.S. workers.

During this year, the Minority will work to enact these recommendations into law. In some areas we have already begun. In March of 1983, the House passed legislation to increase support for math and science education. The bill was never brought to the floor in the Republican controlled Senate. That same month, during the Senate debate over the budget, Democrats sought to restore funding for vital education programs which had been deeply cut during the past two years. Four times, their efforts were turned down by the Majority until finally, on the fifth rollcall vote in two days, enough Republicans joined with the Democrats to pass a compromise amendment.

But when it came time to enact appropriations to give life to the budget plan, solid Majority opposition prevented the Democrats from succeeding in two separate votes in their attempts to increase funding for these programs. This despite the fact that 1983 was a year in which the crisis of confidence in our nation's public schools reached new heights, after several commissions and blue-ribbon panels issued alarming findings about the state of America's educational system. As President Reagan's own National Commission on Excellence in Education, put it bluntly:

> The educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a people.

Protecting America's Natural Heritage

While much of the year was consumed by the debate over the budget and foreign policy, congressional Democrats also found themselves engaged in a running battle to protect America's precious natural heritage from the radical policies of EPA and James Watt's Interior Department. In late 1982, a concerned House launched an investigation into allegations that EPA had manipulated the "Superfund" toxic waste clean-up program to protect big business and advance the political interests of Republican candidates for office. The House hearings unearthed a scandal which ultimately led to the resignation of Anne Gorsuch Burford and 16 other EPA officials, and to the conviction of one of those officials, Rita Lavelle, on charges of perjury. The hearings were widely televised, and the spectacle which they spotlighted deeply shook the confidence of the American people that EPA would place the public's long-term health and safety above the pleas of special interests and big business.

Meanwhile, at the Interior Department, Secretary James Watt's stewardship of the nation's vast publicly-owned natural resources and lands proved equally controversial. The GAO charged Watt with selling coal leases at fire-sale rates. Because of his failure to respond to the congressional concern over his coal-leasing policies, the Minority in the Senate tried unsuccessfully to force a temporary suspension of further coal sales. Although the amendment failed in the face of Majority opposition, the suspension was adopted in the House and ultimately became law. Watt was forced to appoint a Commission to review the Department's policies on coal leasing. In announcing the Commission's appointment, Watt remarked that its membership was comprised of "a black, a woman, two Jews and a cripple." That remark was the last in a series of comments from James Watt that had outraged the American public and demonstrated a singular lack of fitness for public office. On September 23, 1983, Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd introduced a resolution calling upon the President to ask for Mr. Watt's resignation. Rather than face losing a vote of confidence in the Senate, James Watt left office.

When the President nominated his close personal advisor, William P. Clark, to become the new

Secretary of the Interior, Senate Democrats offered an amendment to place the Senate on record that Watt's policies should be revised by the new Secretary to ensure that they conformed to congressional mandates and could regain the public's confidence. The amendment was rejected in the face of overwhelming Republican opposition.

Defense and Foreign Policy

The United States since World War II traditionally has successfully captured the high ground on arms control, particularly as it relates to the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. Throughout this period, Democrats have been instrumental in forging a bipartisan support for nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

Beginning with President Dwight Eisenhower, whose Administration negotiated the Antarctic Treaty with the Soviet Union to create a nuclear-free and demilitarized zone in Antarctica, the policy of the United States has been fairly consistent.

The Eisenhower Administration also initiated discussions with the Soviet Union to control nuclear testing. The Kennedy Administration followed through on these initial discussions and the Limited Test Ban Treaty was ratified in 1963.

Under the Johnson Administration, the Outer Space Treaty banning weapons of mass destruction was ratified in 1968, and the Treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America was negotiated.

The Nixon Administration continued the tradition of three previous presidents with the Seabed Arms Control Treaty which was ratified in 1972, the ABM Treaty and the SALT I interim agreement in 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1971.

The Administration of Gerald Ford negotiated the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Vladivostok Accords, the latter of which established a new framework which set the stage for SALT II negotiations.

The Carter Administration negotiated the SALT II Treaty, ratification of which was withheld in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Throughout the post-World War II period, Democrats have been committed to policies directed at reducing the threat of nuclear war between the two superpowers, limiting the nuclear arsenals of both sides, restricting the threat posed by nuclear testing, and discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.

With the advent of the present Administration, the primary issue of concern has been whether or not those currently controlling our government are committed to achieving realistic and verifiable nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Public speculation that then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig was considering a nuclear "demonstration shot" over Europe in order to influence potential aggressive Soviet behavior, and recent published reports stating the President admitted to a group of Congressmen his belated discovery that most Soviet intercontinental missiles were land-based, have only served to call this commitment into question.

The Administration's commitment to arms control was called into question further with the nomination this year of Kenneth Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Although the nomination was approved on April 14 by a vote of 57-42, some 83 percent of the Senate Democrats opposed Adelman after the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations failed to report the nomination favorably by a vote of 8 to 9. Senate Democrats expressed legitimate concern that Mr. Adelman lacked the stature, qualifications, and commitment to arms control necessary to be the Director of ACDA. During his confirmation hearings, Adelman demonstrated an unacceptable understanding of vital arms control issues. Democrats believed that in order to restore the credibility of the Reagan Administration's commitment to arms control, the ACDA nominee must be of greater experience and stature than Adelman. Some 92 percent of the Senate Republicans disagreed and voted to confirm the nominee.

Senate Democrats have forged a general consensus during the first three years of the current Administration on broad national defense policy goals. These goals include, first, a pursuit of essential modernization of weapons systems, combined with a balance between hardware procurement and readiness. Second, that in light of the soaring deficits and the waste and mismanagement in the Pentagon a more prudent annual real growth rate in defense expenditures would be 4-5 percent, rather than the 7-10 percent sought by the Administration.

The programs proposed by the Reagan Administration unfortunately have lacked balance and prioritization. Every conceivable weapons system or gleam in Secretary Weinberger's eye became eligible for the taxpayers' dollars. By requesting funding for so many expensive hardware systems, particularly in the strategic area, the out-year spending requirements can very well "bleed dry" other critical defense needs such as readiness. Included on Weinberger's supermarket shopping list are two new strategic bombers, three new strategic missiles, theater nuclear cruise missiles, and an expressed desire to begin looking at a new variety of space-based strategic systems. Yet, as these new systems move from the research and development phase into the procurement stage, cost over-runs and mismanagement may threaten U.S. military preparedness even further.

The problem of waste in the Pentagon has become a national scandal. Overpricing of spare parts, and the apparent inability or unwillingness of the current management at DOD to correct these pricing abuses, now threatens the national consensus that supports strengthening our national defense.

Democrats have offered, and pushed through the Congress, a number of proposals to remedy this management crisis now engulfing the Pentagon. Included in these initiatives have been (1) the establishment of an independent Inspector General's Office for the Pentagon, (2) upgrading and reforming procurement measures, and (3) investigations into the causes of the current financial management crisis. Unfortunately, all these efforts have been opposed strongly by the Administration.

Continuing pressure is required to correct the mismanagement at the Pentagon in order to build a more efficient and stronger national defense posture. The Senate Minority will continue to press the Department of Defense to establish realistic priorities among the numerous hardware systems now under development. For example, Democrats will oppose the diversion of funds for the most advanced of American technologies—the Stealth bomber—to a less capable system such as the B-1 bomber.

The Minority does not believe that knee-jerk military responses are a substitute for a coherent foreign policy which relies upon a judicious blend of diplomacy and military force projection. There are occasions when the deployment of military force, and the commitment to use such force, is important to the achievement of our foreign policy goals. However, the crisis in Lebanon has demonstrated that military force is not any substitute for a coherent and knowledgeable policy.

In the December 12, 1983, edition of the Washington Post, House Republican Whip Trent Lott was quoted in an Evans and Novak column as saying the following about the crisis in Lebanon: "I'm not so much worried about where we are, as where we are headed." That is the very question the Democrats raised on September 29, 1983, when they opposed giving the Administration carte blanche for the continued deployment of U.S. marines in Lebanon in the absence of the President's providing the Congress with a clear statement of our objectives in that country and how those objectives could be achieved.

By a straight party line vote of 55 to 45, the Senate Majority defeated a substitute to the Lebanon resolution offered by Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd which would have required the President to abide by the War Powers Resolution (currently the law of the land) by submitting a report to the Congress explaining the circumstances necessitating the introduction of U.S. troops into Lebanon, the constitutional and legislative authority for their introduction, and the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or their involvement. In addition, the Minority's alternative called for describing the specific goals of U.S. policy in Lebanon, the specific roles and missions of the U.S. forces in Lebanon, and the specific criteria that were being applied to determine when the marines had accomplished their role and mission.

Between the time the Republican-controlled Senate voted on September 29, 1983, extending U.S. participation in the multinational peacekeeping force by 18 months and February 26, 1984, when the Marines were withdrawn, 264 Americans had lost their lives in Lebanon. However, in order to recoup from the damage the Administration suffered as a result of its failed policy, the Secretary of State went on the attack blaming Congress for the Lebanon debacle.

In blaming the Congress, George Shultz charged, on March 5, 1984:

"...The congressional debate over the deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon 'just totally took the rug out from under U.S. interests' thereby leading the Syrians to doubt U.S. resolve.

"...congressional reluctance to deploy U.S. forces where casualties are likely has undercut the credibility of military power as an instrument of U.S. policy."

Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd responded quickly by noting the Secretary of State "indulged in an exercise of self-deception and delusion over American policy in Lebanon which was nothing short of astounding."

Senator Byrd stated "this was just another example of this Administration's attempt to rewrite history for a failed policy." He noted how fragile the policy must have been "...if simply debating it would somehow destroy it...."

The Democratic Leader pointed out that American policy had failed in Lebanon because the assumption upon which it was grounded proved unworkable. "Neither the leadership of President Gemayel nor the viability of the Lebanese armed forces was up to the task of building a strong coalition...."

Senator Edward Zorinsky, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pointed out that the Secretary should be reminded that the eighteen months authorized by Congress for the deployment of U.S. forces in Lebanon had not run out when the President acted to withdraw the troops.

"If the Administration wanted to keep U.S. marines in Beirut, the War Powers Act is not in its way. A more powerful indictment of the functioning of democracy might be that it let us get into Lebanon rather than it forced us out."

Senator Zorinsky stated the Secretary of State should look at the real problem in Lebanon, which was a failed policy from start to finish. "At the beginning of our Lebanon fiasco, the Administration introduced U.S. troops into Lebanon with no clear idea of what mission they were intended to accomplish or how they should proceed. Consequently, it should come as no great surprise at the end of our engagement in Lebanon, that we are faced with an unmitigated disaster."

Senator Claiborne Pell, ranking Democrat on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, pointed out that it was a presidentially appointed Commission, headed by retired Admiral Robert Long, that criticized the Administration for its overemphasis on a military presence in Lebanon and recommended that greater priority be given to a diplomatic solution.

Senator Pell noted that the President very forthrightly took responsibility for the Beirut tragedy that claimed the lives of 264 U.S. servicemen. "The Administration should be just as forthright in accepting responsibility for U.S. policy in Lebanon instead of looking for scapegoats."

Senator Alan Cranston, also a Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, said the failure of Administration policy in Lebanon had been extremely costly.

"We have lost lives.

"We have squandered resources.

"We have weakened our prestige."

Senator Cranston pointed out that the debate in Congress over the proper role of U.S. military forces in the Lebanese civil war was an essential part of our democratic form of government.

"To suggest that this debate should have been muzzled is to strike at the very root of representative government where powers are shared by the Executive and Legislature."

Senator Byrd summed up the views of his Democratic colleagues when he noted:

"Any policy which cannot withstand the scrutiny and examination of the highest respresentative body of this land—and the body which under the Constitution is the only body that can declare war—is not going to stand the test of time, but will, by definition, be basically flawed and will fail."

The militarization of U.S. foreign policy also is demonstrated graphically by the phenomenal growth in our overseas military programs under this Administration. Since this Administration came into office, grant military aid has grown by 179 percent, and economic aid tied to our security interests has increased by 37 percent. When Democrats joined with Republican Senator Charles McC. Mathias to limit grant military aid to a 10 percent increase in fiscal year 1984 over the amount provided in fiscal year 1983 (rather than an 87 percent increase), they were defeated 46-37, with 83 percent of the Majority voting against the initiative.

Attempts to make even modest cuts in the Administration's foreign aid requests of $100 million and $89 million and transfer those resources to fund vitally needed domestic soil conservation programs were defeated by Senate Republican majorities of 83 percent and 78 percent on each vote.

As the first session of the 98th Congress drew to a close, it was widely observed that this was a Congress which had failed to address the major issues confronting the nation. It is true that bipartisan efforts to pass a major Social Security compromise, a limited jobs bill and most of the regular appropriations bills were successful. (It is a sad state of affairs, indeed, when legislative success in the Senate is measured by the fact that we passed a goodly number of appropriations bills when, prior to 1980, the Senate always passed a like number of bills.) But despite repeated Democratic efforts, the Republican controlled Senate failed to respond except in the most limited way to the human emergencies caused by the recession, to the crisis facing American education, and to the need to propose an aggressive agenda to help America compete in a rapidly changing world economic order. Bipartisan efforts to enact a budget that would make headway against the deficits were ultimately sabotaged by the White House, which steadfastly refused to acknowledge responsibility for the record-breaking flow of red ink created by its economic policies or to participate in meaningful efforts to bring the deficits under control.

A look at the public laws enacted by this Congress makes the point graphically. Of 215 bills enacted, 53 percent were of a non-substantive nature—either administrative, or designed to commemorate an event or a person, or dedicating a day, week, or month to honor some worthwhile cause. This compares to the first sessions of the 95th and 96th Congress, when only 17 percent and 26 percent, respectively, of all public laws enacted were non-substantive in nature.

In the chapters that follow, the record of the two parties during the last months of the second session of the 97th Congress and the first session of the 98th Congress are laid out in detail. The votes have been organized into the following chapters:

- The Budget
- Tax Fairness
- U.S. Interest Rates and the World Economy
- Help for the Jobless
- Building a Better Economic Future: A Democratic Blueprint
- Education
- Keeping Promises to Older Americans
- Protecting our Natural Heritage and Ensuring Energy Security
- Foreign Policy
- National Defense
- Crime
- Civil Rights
- Labor
- Immigration

Appendix I contains a list of all party line rollcall votes cast during the period covered by this document, including those which we have not had time to detail in this volume, to aid those who wish to engage in further research.

Appendix II contains a description of each rollcall vote referred to in this document.

Appendix III contains a listing which shows public laws from 1977 to 1983 which were of a non-substantive or administrative nature. This Appendix has been printed as a separate document.

Copies of all three volumes of Democratic Alternatives: A Look at the Record may be obtained from the Democratic Policy Committee Publications Office, SH-512, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510, (202) 224-4201.

THE BUDGET

INTRODUCTION

The prevailing theme of the Democratic alternatives to the Reagan Administration's economic and budget policies has been, from the beginning, to invest in our nation's future and to instill fairness and balance. The Minority has tried to insure that those who are less able to take care of themselves are not cast adrift and that common sense prevails in the allocation of limited resources among competing national priorities.

The tax and spending cuts pushed through Congress by the Administration clearly demonstrated the bias of the White House and its allies in the Senate and House toward the wealthy and indifference to the less fortunate. This year, as a result of the tax cuts enacted to date, a household with income below $10,000 will receive an average tax reduction of less than $50, while a household with an income above $80,000 will realize a tax cut averaging over $7,500. When the effects of the spending cuts, which fell most heavily on the poor, are also taken into account, a household making less than $10,000 will suffer a net loss of several hundred dollars this year. But the household making more than $80,000, will get a net gain of over $7,000.

The impact of these inequitable policies was magnified when Americans were hit with the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 1930's. Millions of workers suddenly found themselves out of a job. The Minority kept up the pressure to redress both the profound bias of the Majority's programs toward the wealthy and indifference to the unfortunate victims of recession. Beginning early in the year, in a series of votes, detailed in later chapters, Democratic Senators sought to correct these inequities and add fairness to the budget. Republican Senators, however, at one time or another, voted against amendments to add funds for programs to provide health insurance for the unemployed, job training, extended benefits for the unemployed, and mortgage assistance.

Some might argue that the budget cuts, even if unfair, were an acceptable price to pay if they allowed the federal government to balance its books. Yet today, we find ourselves further from that goal than ever before in our history. For at the same time the Administration was pushing its spending cuts, it was knocking the foundation out from under a stable revenue base and giving the Pentagon a virtual blank check.

In fact, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office found that the Majority's tax and spending policies of the first three years, as enacted, actually added $240 billion to the cumulative deficits through FY 1985. The $192 billion in domestic spending cuts enacted by Congress were totally overwhelmed by the $323 billion in red ink used to write the Reagan-Kemp-Roth tax cut, by the $79 billion increase in military spending, and by the $30 billion in "finance charges"—the added interest costs on the money borrowed to finance this deficit spending.

Even the Administration's chief economic adviser, Martin Feldstein, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, agrees that "the emperor has no clothes"—that the cause of the $195 billion deficit accrued in FY 1983 and the $200 billion plus deficits that face us for the foreseeable future are a result, not of domestic spending gone wild, but of massive tax cuts and runaway defense spending. But his sound judgment has been called into question by those in the White House, from the President on down, who persist in the myth that tax cuts and Pentagon spending are "cost free."

The Minority recognized the need for a responsible budget that would restore fairness and balance while reducing the deficits that threaten to prevent millions of Americans from returning to work, to put American products at a competitive disadvantage in the world marketplace, and to abort the recovery from the worst recession in 50 years.

But in May, shortly after the Senate Budget Committee-reported a budget that would have moderated the President's massive planned military spending increases, and required action to restore the revenue base, the Majority leadership quickly shelved the Committee budget at White House insistence. For the second year in a row, the Senate was asked to reject the Budget Resolution only recently reported from its own Budget Committee, and give its approval to a hastily conceived Republican substitute offered by the Majority Leader Howard Baker and written behind closed doors without consultation or so much as a passing concern for the views of the Democratic minority.

Once again, the statutory deadlines established by the Budget Act were pushed aside, so that the President and the Majority in the Senate could scramble to improvise a budget without regard to the traditional bipartisan process of open debate and deliberation. Three times in May 1983, Democrats voted against a partisan Republican budget offered by Senator Domenici and endorsed by Senator Baker which would have increased military spending and reduced revenues compared to the bipartisan budget reported by the Budget Committee, resulting in massive deficits.

Democrats twice proposed alternatives, in 1982 and 1983, to reduce the burgeoning deficits by reducing or capping the final phase of the Reagan-Kemp-Roth tax cut. These efforts are described in detail in the chapter on Tax Fairness. They were turned aside by the combined opposition of the White House and the Majority party. It is indeed ironic that the party which swept into the White House and control of the Senate in 1980, pledging a balanced budget would propose a budget, with the highest deficits in the history of the Republic.

Yet, when the Senate eventually succeeded in narrowly passing a bipartisan budget, despite the opposition of the White House, the President turned his attention to trying to torpedo the legislation needed to implement the budget. The frustration of the Senate in attempting seriously to engage the President in deficit reduction efforts showed in October, 1983, when the Senate turned down the debt ceiling bill, thereby temporarily suspending the government's ability to borrow new funds to finance the President's mounting deficit spending.

The President, however, remained unmoved, and, in the end, his intransigence was successful in stopping the Senate in its tracks and derailing congressional efforts to develop a meaningful, bipartisan deficit reduction package. Along the way, the President also succeeded in dealing a serious blow to the budget reconciliation process—the procedures that Congress uses to achieve spending savings. Thus, the White House not only halted deficit reduction efforts in 1983, but has crippled the very means by which future deficit reductions can be achieved.

THE RECORD

1) Chiles motion to table the Domenici-Baker substitute amendment to provide for a two-year budget resolution which would increase revenues by $2.6 billion in FY 1984 and $5.7 billion in FY 1985; increase real defense spending by 7.5% in FY 1984; projects deficits of $204.0 billion in FY 1983, $192.4 billion in FY 1984, and $186.3 billion in FY 1985; and increases the public debt limit to $1.384 trillion in FY 1983, $1.620 trillion in FY 1984, and $1.857 trillion in FY 1985. (Vote No. 85—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   98% of the Democrats voted to table the amendment.

   87% of the Republicans present opposed tabling.

   The amendment was tabled, 52-48.

   May 12, 1983.

The amendment projected higher deficits than the Committee reported budget, which had deficits of $163.3 billion in FY 1984, $147.0 billion in FY 1985, and $133.2 billion in FY 1986. The amendment also provided for 7.5% real growth in military spending versus the 5% growth contained in the reported budget.

The Domenici-Baker budget represented a continuation of the Administration's policies of large increases in Pentagon spending while ignoring the revenue hemorrhage caused by the Kemp-Roth tax cut in 1981. Thus, this budget did virtually nothing to stem the tide of red ink and would have added $473 billion to the public debt in just two years, thereby further mortgaging our future with ever increasing finance charges that buy us nothing in return. The budget also rejected the bipartisan approach of the Committee's reported budget in favor of a partisan measure drafted by Republicans in a closed caucus.

With its increase in defense spending and avoidance of any meaningful effort to restore the government's revenue base, the Domenici-Baker budget was a continuation of the failed policies that have brought us the largest deficits in our history. Further, it avoided the leadership on deficit reduction that must be shown by the Congress, since the deficits are too dangerous to the economy to be left to a President who remains committed to the very policies that generated the deficits in the first place.

2) Domenici-Baker, et al, modified substitute amendment which provides for a two-year budget with 7.1% real growth in defense in FY 1984 and 5% in FY 1985, revenue increases of $3.5 billion in FY 1984 and $6.4 billion in FY 1985, projects deficits of $193 billion in FY 1984 and $186 billion in FY 1985. It also makes technical changes in the cost-of-living adjustments to retirement programs and provides for three amendments adopted earlier on the Senate floor. (Vote No. 102—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   100% of the Democrats voted against the amendment.

   81% of the Republicans present voted for it.

   The amendment was rejected, 43-56.

   May 19, 1983.

This amendment was similar to the earlier Dominici-Baker amendment, providing for higher military spending and lower revenues than in the Committee reported bill. It still refused to deal realistically with the deficit issue in that it was limited to two years and ignored the need to shore up the weakened revenue base. Wall Street and business investors, after seeing what two years of Reaganomics has wrought, need reassurance that Congress will exert some common sense and change the failed policies of the previous two years.

3) Gorton-Weicker, et al, substitute amendment that provides for 6% real growth in defense in FY 1984, 5.5% in FY 1985, and 5% in FY 1986; provides for revenue increases of $9.9 billion in FY 1984, $13.7 billion in FY 1985, and $51 billion in FY 1986; projects deficits of $178.6 billion in FY 1984, $167.7 billion in FY 1985, and $130.1 billion in FY 1986. (Vote No. 103—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   70% of Democrats voted for the amendment.

   70% of the Republicans opposed it.

The amendment was defeated, 48-52.

May 19, 1983.

This amendment represented a bipartisan compromise with moderate Republicans on the two major items in contention—lower deficits and the rate of defense spending growth. By providing for a three-year budget that showed dramatically lower deficits—lower than the President's budget or the Domenici-Baker substitute—the amendment would have reassured the financial markets that Congress was serious about lowering deficits and controlling federal spending. It also attempted to allay the President's fears about higher taxes by providing a substantially smaller revenue increase than called for in the House-passed budget or the Committee-reported budget.

The amendment continued the efforts by Congress to restrain federal spending through budget reconciliation. It required the Congress to achieve spending savings of $13.8 billion in existing programs over three years and revenue increases of $73 billion. The spending cuts were modest in respect to past efforts and would largely have been achieved by delaying cost-of-living adjustments in federal retirement programs to make them consistent with the changes made in the Social Security program in the spring, and by restraining federal pay increases. These changes would have allowed for equitable treatment of federal employees, retirees and Social Security recipients. The revenue increase could be achieved largely with modest efforts to restore fairness to the Kemp-Roth tax cut of 1981, such as delaying the third year of the tax cut, which would have raised about $70 billion over three years.

With the defeat of the partisan Domenici-Baker amendment, this amendment represented the best chance of fashioning a bipartisan compromise budget that would reduce the staggering deficits facing the country, increase the possibility of long term, stable economic recovery, and preserve the budget process.

4) Domenici-Baker substitute amendment that is identical to the previous Domenici-Baker amendment with the exception of a technical change in the reconciliation instruction. (Vote No. 107—98th Congress, 1st Session).

100% of the Democrats voted against the amendment.

80% of the Republicans voted for it.

The amendment was defeated, 43-57.

May 19, 1983.

This amendment was merely a vehicle for another vote on the Domenici-Baker amendment in the wake of the defeat of a compromise amendment offered by Senators Gorton and Weicker. Subsequent to the defeat of this amendment, the Senate reconsidered the Gorton-Weicker bipartisan budget and passed it.

In addition to striving for a sound, common sense, fair budget, the Democrats also tried to get the President into the budget act. Since every key element of the President's budget was rejected, first by the Budget Committee and then on the floor, the White House remained out of the game. Instead of offering to work together with the Congress on a reasonable compromise budget, the President has chosen to sit on the sidelines and throw obstacles in the way of those who seek meaningful deficit reduction. He has refused to admit that his policies of the first two years have resulted in the huge deficits now confronting us and he rejects outright any suggestion that we must repair the revenue base before any significant deficit reductions can be achieved.

In fact, because of his obstinate resistance to any revenue measure, it is unclear whether he truly believes in the balanced budget his campaign statements advocated. This Administration is apparently unwilling to make the effort, hard though it may be, to put action behind the words of the balanced budget amendment he advocates.

Even members of his own party have been rebuffed in their attempts to work out an acceptable and significant deficit reduction package. Late in the session, Senator Dole, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, was told that the President opposed any deficit reductions that raised revenues, even though Dole was trying to balance his deficit reductions with an equal mix of revenue increases and spending reductions.

These deficit reduction efforts continued right up to adjournment of the first session of the 98th Congress, but ultimately were unsuccessful because of the President's intransigence. He single-handedly stopped the Senate from enacting any major deficit reduction measure, even the one preliminarily agreed to in the first budget resolution. When it became clear that no congressional move could overcome the roadblock at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, the Congress adjourned, with the renewed prospect of $200 billion plus deficits far into the future.

5) Ford appeal of the ruling of the Chair that the Ford amendment (requiring the President to submit a balanced budget for each fiscal year or explain why such budget is not balanced) is out of order as legislation on an appropriations bill. (The question is: "Shall the ruling of the Chair stand?") (Vote No. 353—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   91% of the Republicans voting supported the Chair (agreed that the Ford amendment requiring a balanced budget was out of order).

   97% of the Democrats voting opposed the ruling (felt the Ford amendment should be voted upon).

   The decision of the Chair was sustained (the Ford amendment was ruled out of order), 42-40.

   November 10, 1983.

Using the procedural vote to prevent action on the substance of the amendment, the Republicans avoided a direct vote on whether the President should be required to submit a balanced budget. Democrats believed that the President cannot remain on the sidelines in the effort to achieve a balanced budget. Further, the President, by virtue of his endorsement of a constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget and the vast resources of the Office of Management and Budget at his disposal, is in the best position to propose a budget that is in balance.

Yet the Majority supported this cop-out as if to say, "It's all right for us to talk about a balanced budget, just don't require us to propose one." Words will not balance a budget, only action will. The President should be required, like most mayors and governors, to propose a budget that is in balance. The country may never recover from a seemingly endless series of record deficits if Republicans believe that the President should not have to submit a balanced budget of his own.

6) Hatfield motion to table the Armstrong-Long amendment that increases the public debt ceiling by $225 billion on a quarterly basis and gives the President the power to impound funds if he is unable to keep spending within the quarterly allocations. (Vote No. 367—98th Congress, 1st Session).

79% of the Democrats voting supported the tabling motion.

70% of the Republicans voting opposed the tabling motion.

The motion was tabled, 49-46.

November 16, 1983.

The effect of this amendment would be to give the Administration unprecedented power to impound funds and clearly abdicate the constitutional obligation of Congress to oversee federal spending. But an additional concern of the Minority was that the amendment would mean further large cuts in domestic programs that have already borne the brunt of the Majority's budget cuts. Given this Administration's unfair budget policies, this amendment would only heighten the inequity of the spending reductions, in all likelihood focusing them on those programs, such as nutrition, education, health, and others, while letting Pentagon spending continue unabated. And, of course, it would do nothing to replace the billions of dollars doled out to the rich in the 1981 tax cuts.

TAX FAIRNESS

INTRODUCTION

In 1983, the Minority in the Senate carried on its fight to restore fairness and balance to the federal tax system. Over and over again, Democrats fought to temper the disastrous Reagan tax program enacted in 1981. While a strongly united Republican majority in the Senate made the Democratic fight all the more difficult, it also made the record all the more clear. Beyond question, on the issue of tax fairness, Democrats consistently represented and battled for the common interest and the common man.

Throughout 1981 and 1982, Senate Democrats repeatedly attempted to modify the Reagan tax program. On numerous occasions, Democrats offered amendments which would have distributed the tax cuts more fairly and made the third year of the tax cuts contingent upon reductions in federal deficits and interest rates. The purpose of those efforts was to try to instill a sense of fairness and balance which was clearly lacking in the President's program.

By 1983, though most Democratic initiatives had been overwhelmingly rejected by the Republican majority in the Senate, the rightness of those efforts had become inescapably clear. Following its enactment in 1981, the Reagan tax program had done little more than shower the wealthy with tax breaks, all the while draining the federal treasury of much-needed revenues and sending the federal government deeper and deeper into debt.

Thus, when Congress convened in January 1983, the Minority in the Senate again set its sights on trying to instill some sense of fairness and balance to the 1981 tax cuts. However, the Majority continued to reject all Democratic initiatives on taxes. In response to threats from the White House to veto any modifications to the President's tax cuts, they maintained their commitment to the Reagan tax program. As a result, the Senate failed to pass any major modifications in the President's program in 1983.

This failure carried with it significant, but distressing consequences. In July, the third and final installment of the Reagan individual tax cuts went into effect, without any modification. As a result, after three separate reductions in individual income tax rates, the tax liability of a family with an income of $100,000 had been permanently slashed by $5,822 a year. In contrast, a family earning $20,000 had received an annual tax cut of only $464. Such was, and remains, the Majority's definition of tax fairness.

The failure to enact any modifications in the President's tax program also meant a continuation of the tremendous revenue loss set in motion by the 1981 tax cuts. During the debate on the tax cuts, the President and his supporters argued strongly that the tax cuts would not result in any revenue loss to the federal government. The "supply-side" gospel of the time was that increased economic activity, spurred by the tax cuts, would actually increase federal revenues, and thereby lower the federal deficit.

The much-heralded boost in economic growth, however, failed to materialize. Instead, economic activity declined as the American economy plunged into the longest recession in post-war history. In February 1983, the Congressional Budget Office reported that the combined impact of the tax cuts and the recession had lowered projected federal revenues for fiscal years 1982 through 1985 by a staggering $861 billion. And as this revenue hemorrhage continued unchecked, the President's promise to balance the federal budget was washed away in a sea of red ink.

By the beginning of 1983, the relationship between the Majority's tax policy and deficits had become obvious—lower revenues resulting from the 1981 tax cuts were clearly a major reason for rising federal deficits. Yet, throughout the year, the Majority chose to bury their heads in the sand, refusing to lend any support to Democratic efforts to modify the President's tax program. In the end, therefore, Democratic efforts to restore fairness and balance to the federal tax system were rejected by the Republican-controlled Senate.

It should be noted that there was one tax issue on which Senate Democrats and Republicans were united in 1983: the issue of withholding on dividend and interest income. In 1982, desperate to restore some of the revenues given away a year earlier, the Majority included the withholding of dividend and interest income in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) against the strong opposition of Senate Democrats. In 1983, when confronted by an enormous public outcry against withholding, the Majority reversed itself, and voted with the Minority for its repeal. Ironically, it was the only significant piece of tax legislation enacted during the first session of the 98th Congress.

THE RECORD

1) Byrd, et al, amendment striking the five-cent per gallon gas tax increase and partially delaying the third year tax cut for persons with incomes between $50,000 and $65,000, and fully delaying the third year tax cut for persons with incomes over $65,000, thereby raising approximately $24 billion; adding a one-year $5.3 billion emergency jobs creation program; and preserving creation of a mass transit trust fund and the five-year extension of the Highway Trust Fund. (Vote No. 406—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

   96% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

   98% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

   The amendment was rejected, 44-53.

   December 14, 1982.

While the primary focus of this amendment was the structure of the emergency jobs bill under consideration in the Senate, an important part of the amendment addressed the issue of how such a jobs bill would be financed. This Democratic amendment, which was offered as a more progressive alternative to the gas tax increase endorsed by the White House, would have fully financed the emergency jobs program by simply delaying the third year tax cut for higher-income taxpayers.

The fundamental fairness of the amendment was beyond question. The gas tax increase would have imposed a disproportionate burden on lower- and middle-income taxpayers. These were the same taxpayers who had received little, if any, benefit from the tax cuts enacted in 1981. Senate Democrats believed that to ask these taxpayers to sacrifice again, while allowing the wealthy to continue to receive an overflow of benefits from the tax cuts, was unacceptable.

As a responsible and fair alternative to the gas tax increase, this amendment would have delayed the final installment of the Reagan tax cuts, scheduled to take effect in July 1983, for higher-income taxpayers. Although these taxpayers had already received generous benefits from the first two installments of the Reagan tax cuts, the much-heralded economic boom which was supposed to follow those tax cuts had failed to materialize. In fact, it was as a direct result of the overwhelming failure of those tax cuts that an emergency jobs bill was even necessary.

Senate Democrats believed that it was only reasonable, in light of the tremendous tax cuts higher-income taxpayers had already received in comparison to lower- and middle-income taxpayers, that a delay in future tax cuts for the wealthy was the best way to finance a very important emergency jobs program.

Adherence to the Administration's tax program by the Majority, however, doomed this amendment to defeat.

2) Bentsen amendment modifying the third year tax cut by changing the effective date from July 1 to April 1, 1983, reducing the individual tax rate reductions from 10 percent to five percent, and deferring the remaining five percent of the rate reductions until there is no deficit in the annual federal budget, thereby reducing projected deficits for FY 1984-87 by $76 billion. (Vote No. 407—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

89% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

98% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 40-54.

December 14, 1982.

This Democratic amendment was offered as a "mid-course correction" to the Administration's tax program, and was designed to stimulate economic recovery and help reduce the massive federal deficits projected for the years ahead.

By advancing the effective date of the final installment of the individual tax cuts, scheduled for July 1983, to April 1st, the amendment would have provided a more timely stimulus to an economy mired in a devastating recession. In addition, the advancement of the effective date of the tax cut would have offset much of the immediate effect of reducing the size of the rate reductions from 10 to five percent. In other words, reducing the size and moving forward the effective date of the third year tax cut would have improved the timing of the tax cut without significantly reducing its economic impact in 1983.

However, with respect to the years beyond 1983, delaying the final five percent reduction in tax rates would have greatly reduced runaway projected federal deficits. Clearly, the tax cuts enacted in 1981 were excessive, and were a major cause of the record-breaking federal deficits projected for as far as the eye could see. When combined with the Administration's tremendous increases in defense spending, the tax cuts had completely overwhelmed the savings achieved in non-defense spending, and the net effect was an unprecedented surge in federal deficits. Senate Democrats offered the amendment as a way to stop the dangerous drain on revenues which was sending federal deficits sky-high.

Despite the economic and budgetary merits of this alternative approach to tax reduction, the strongly unified Majority in the Senate rejected the amendment, thereby preserving the President's unfair and unbalanced tax plan.

3) Dole motion to table the Riegle-Bradley amendment exempting working families, with children, who earn less than $10,000 per year, from the five-cent per gallon gas tax increase, by application of an earned income credit. (Vote No. 458—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

93% of the Democrats voting opposed the tabling motion, thus supporting the amendment.

92% of the Republicans voting supported the tabling motion, thus opposing the amendment.

The motion to table was agreed to, 50-42.

December 19, 1982.

This amendment represented an attempt by Senate Democrats to correct the regressive nature of the gas tax increase, and the burden it would have placed on working families with low incomes, by increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit for such families by approximately $25 a year per family.

In 1982, working families with incomes below $10,000 were already struggling to get by at or below a bare subsistence level. (In 1982, the official poverty level for a family of four was $9,862.) For such low-income families, simply attaining basic necessities, such as gasoline, consumes a very large share of their income. Without question, the five-cent per gallon increase in the gas tax would have imposed another burden on many "working poor" families.

This amendment was offered in an effort to help those families. The Minority believed that the small revenue losses associated with the amendment ($65 million in 1984, decreasing $5 million each year thereafter through 1986) were well justified. In the minds of most Democrats, it was far better to forego those revenues than to tax away the hard-earned dollars of families already struggling to work their way above the poverty level.

Furthermore, the gas tax bill already contained provisions extending exemptions from the gas tax for certain vehicles, such as taxis and buses, and adding new exemptions for carpools and certain alcohol fuels. Senate Democrats contended that there was certainly equal, if not greater, merit in extending an exemption to the working poor.

However, the overwhelming unity of the Majority in opposition to the amendment assured its defeat. By voting more than 11 to 1 in favor of the motion to table, Senate Republicans killed the amendment.

4) Kasten-Hollings, et al, amendment deleting the 10 percent withholding requirement on interest and dividends and requiring statements to be filed by the taxpayer with respect to interest, dividends and patronage dividends. (Vote No. 247—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

   84% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

   81% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

   The amendment was rejected, 48-49.

   July 22, 1982.

5) Bill (H.R. 2973) repealing the provisions contained in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) requiring the withholding of tax on payments of interest, dividends and patronage dividends at the rate of 10 percent, effective July 1, 1983; and, requiring improved information reporting and backup withholding for those who have failed to correctly report interest income in the past. (Vote No. 157—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   90% of the Democrats voting supported the bill.

   100% of the Republicans voting supported the bill.

   The bill passed, 86-4.

   June 16, 1983.

In 1982, Republicans in the Senate were desperate to recapture some of the revenues which had been given away under the Reagan tax cuts in 1981. One component of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) would have required that financial institutions withhold 10 percent of all interest and dividend payments. The Hollings-Kasten amendment, which was overwhelmingly supported by Senate Democrats, would have replaced the proposed withholding requirement with a more stringent reporting requirement.

Democrats argued that the withholding requirements would have discouraged savings and imposed significant costs upon financial institutions—costs which inevitably would have been passed on to consumers. Furthermore, the Treasury Department admitted that less than one-third of the revenues which would be raised by withholding would come from increased taxpayer compliance, with the balance coming from early payment of taxes.

The Hollings-Kasten amendment would have repealed the withholding requirements included in TEFRA. In place of withholding, the amendment would have made mandatory the optional reporting requirements contained in the bill. However, an overwhelming majority of Senate Republicans, desperately in need of new sources of revenue to offset the tremendous tax giveaways enacted in 1981, stood firm against this sensible alternative to interest and dividend withholding, and the amendment was rejected.

In 1983, though the substance of the issue had remained unchanged from the year before, the politics of the issue had changed greatly. A tremendous public outcry against interest and dividend withholding forced the Majority to reconsider their earlier position. As public sentiment against withholding grew stronger, Republicans in the Senate began to align themselves with the position held by the Minority the year before.

As this shifting of positions increased, it became clear that interest and dividend withholding would be repealed. After nine party-line votes on a variety of details, such as the precise nature of the reporting and backup withholding requirements which would be substituted for the original withholding requirements, an overwhelming majority of Senate Democrats and Republicans voted to repeal the interest and dividend withholding requirements enacted as a part of TEFRA.

(See Vote Nos. 38, 57, 58, 59, 61, 154, 155, and 156 for a more complete history of the effort to repeal interest and dividend withholding.)

6) Bill (H.R. 1183, Tax Rate Equity Act of 1983) modifying the July 1983 individual tax rate reductions contained the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 to limit the maximum reduction available to taxpayers in 1984 to approximately $700; expressing the sense of the Congress that in view of the threat posed to economic recovery by projected federal deficits, the revenue gains resulting from enactment of this legislation should be applied to reducing federal deficits and deficit projections; and providing that the individual income tax changes be accompanied by a reduction in fiscal 1984 outlays in an amount at least equal to the additional revenues to be collected. (Vote No. 174—98th Congress, 1st Session).

91% of the Democrats voting supported the bill.

94% of the Republicans voting opposed the bill.

The bill was defeated, 45-55.

June 29, 1983.

This bill, offered and supported by Democrats in the House and Senate, represented an effort to help reduce runaway federal deficits by restoring some of the revenues given away to the rich under the Reagan tax plan. The bill would have placed a cap of approximately $700 on the amount any taxpayer could have received from the final installment of the tax cuts enacted in 1981. Without seriously impinging on the tax cuts to be received by lower- and middle-income taxpayers, the $700 cap would have begun to return some balance to the federal tax system and the federal budget.

The first two installments of the individual tax rate reductions had been little more than a windfall for the rich. As a result of the tax cuts which went into effect in 1981 and 1982, the tax liability of a family of four with an income of $100,000 had been permanently slashed $3,454 a year. On the other hand, a family of four earning $20,000 a year had received an annual tax cut of only $300.

The tremendous unfairness of the Administration's tax program only would have been made worse if the scheduled final installment of the three-step tax plan was allowed to go into effect without any modification. The final tax cut in the Reagan program, scheduled to take effect in July 1983, would have permanently reduced the tax liability of a family of four with an income of $100,000 by a staggering $2,368 a year. In sharp contrast, a family of four earning $20,000 would have received a tax break of only $164 a year.

Adding a cap to the July 1983 tax cut still would have permitted a reduction in everyone's taxes, but would have made the distribution of the tax cut much more equitable. Under a cap of approximately $700, 90 percent of all taxpayers would have received exactly the same tax cut as they were scheduled to receive under the tax bill enacted in 1981. Only a family of four with an income in excess of $45-47,000 would have received a tax cut proportionately less than the 10 percent rate reduction scheduled. Even then, they still would have received a sizeable tax cut.

By insuring that every taxpayer would receive a further reduction in taxes in 1983, a cap would not have diminished the ability of the July tax cut to stimulate economic recovery. Even with a $700 cap, the July tax cut would have injected $24 billion into the American economy in FY 1984, thereby providing a direct stimulus to the economy during the early stages of recovery.

At the same time, a cap on the July tax cut would have helped reduce the huge deficits built into the President's budget, without imposing any new taxes on the American people. A $700 cap would have restored $6 billion in revenues in FY 1984 and $20.8 billion between FY 1984-86. It was the clear intent of the bill's supporters, as stated in the bill itself, that all revenues raised would be used to reduce projected federal deficits. In this way, a cap would have helped keep interest rates on a downward path by reducing the astronomical federal deficits projected for the years ahead, thereby promoting sustained economic recovery.

Although the bill passed in the House, as with other Democratic attempts to restore fairness and balance to the federal tax system, blind adherence by the Majority in the Senate to the President's tax program doomed this bill to defeat.

U.S. INTEREST RATES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

1) Domenici motion to table the Bradley amendment stating the sense of the Congress that the world economic recovery is being retarded by high U.S. interest rates and that the President and representatives of the other major industrial countries meeting at the Williamsburg Economic Summit should pursue a coordinated economic expansion to insure a worldwide economic recovery. (Vote No. 79—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   91% of the Democrats voting opposed the tabling motion.

   100% of the Republicans voting supported the tabling motion.

   The amendment was tabled, 47-32.

   May 6, 1983.

This Administration has consistently refused to acknowledge the complicated realities of the world economy. It has preferred the simplicities of supply-side economics, monetary restraint, and a "head-in-the-sand" attitude toward the relationships between the U.S. economy and those of other nations. The result was, first, the most serious recession in the United States in fifty years, second, a budget deficit that "stretches as far as the eye can see," and, third, an unbalanced recovery. Although the unemployment rate may ultimately return to the level of 1980, the imbalance will bring the recovery to a premature end.

The most significant evidence of the imbalance is the disasterous balance-of-payments deficit - a merchandise trade deficit of $69 billion in 1983 and an even higher figure this year.

The trade imbalance is a result of a number of factors, including many that stem from Administration failures. Chief among them is the budget deficit, a result of the failure of supply-side economics. Second is the high interest rates, a result of the budget deficit and excessively tight monetary policy. Third is the impact of the high interest rates and the overvalued dollar which makes U.S. goods internationally less competitive. Fourth is the fact that the recovery in the international economy is trailing ours. The bottom line is that exports are not growing while imports are; thus, the merchandise trade deficit is growing.

On May 6, Senator Bradley proposed an amendment to avoid that situation by obtaining an internationally coordinated economic expansion and lower U.S. interest rates. Every single Republican (47) voted for tabling the amendment and 91% (all but three) of the Democrats present and voting voted against tabling the amendment.

HELP FOR THE JOBLESS

INTRODUCTION

During the final months of the 97th Congress, including the "lame-duck" session, and the first session of the 98th Congress, Senate Democrats continued their effort to help the victims of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. Repeated efforts to provide adequate help to the laid-off worker and his or her family generally were rebuffed by strong Republican majorities in three areas: (1) providing adequate unemployment insurance benefits; (2) providing temporary public jobs for those unable to find private employment; and (3) other forms of aid, including health benefits to those families who previously had employer-related health insurance but lost it when they were laid off.

It should be noted that the Senate Majority did permit some limited assistance legislation to pass in late 1982 and in 1983—including a modest Supplemental Compensation UI program passed in August of 1982, which Democrats had to fight to expand even marginally; the so-called bipartisan "Jobs Bill" Supplemental Appropriations Bill passed in the early spring of 1983 after unemployment reached 10.8 percent; and an 18-month extension of the Supplemental Compensation program passed in October, 1983 (which, as originally proposed by the Administration, would have reduced benefit duration for recipients significantly). However, in virtually all cases, proposals of this sort advanced by the Senate Majority, or agreement to Democratic proposals, came only after it became apparent that more nearly adequate Democratic proposals were likely to prevail in the absence of an alternative. Even when this occurred, and assistance legislation was allowed to move through the Senate, the Majority consistently sought the smallest possible, cheapest packages, and diligently fought Democratic efforts to make the proposals more nearly adequate.

THE RECORD

A. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE—Final Months of the 2nd Session of the 97th Congress

1) Metzenbaum, et al, amendment to the First FY 1983 Continuing Resolution to suspend, until the national unemployment rate falls below 8.7 percent, the two changes made in the 1981 Reconciliation Act governing state eligibility for the

> Extended Benefits unemployment insurance (UI) program, and to set the expiration of the Supplemental Compensation UI program adopted as a part of the 1982 tax bill (TEFRA) when the national unemployment rate drops to or below 8.7 percent. (Vote No. 366—97th Congress, 2nd Session).
>
> 91% of the Democrats voting voted for the amendment.
>
> 87% of the Republicans voting voted against the amendment.
>
> The amendment was defeated, 47-51—with Senator Metzenbaum voting against in order to preserve the right to move to reconsider.
>
> September 29, 1982.

The Metzenbaum amendment was offered to make two important changes in unemployment insurance legislation. Under provisions adopted as a part of the Reconciliation Act of 1981, the ability of states with high unemployment to qualify for the second "tier" of unemployment benefits—Extended Benefits—was made more difficult in two respects. First, the percentage of insured unemployment they must have to qualify was raised, and, second, the definition of the "insured unemployment rate" (or IUR) was changed to exclude a number of the unemployed, thus making it harder to achieve a high rate. Consequently, at the time the amendment was offered, fewer than half the states qualified for the Extended Benefits program, and all but seven or eight were projected to lose eligibility for the program in the final quarter of 1982. The Metzenbaum amendment suspended these changes until national unemployment fell to 8.7 percent in order to enable more states to qualify for the second tier of benefits while the economy was sinking to its recession depth and unemployment was soaring to a post-war high. (The national unemployment rate at that point was 9.8 percent.) In addition to those states that previously had lost or later would lose eligibility because of the change in the definition of the IUR, on October 1, 1982 the following nine states lost eligibility for Extended Benefits solely because of the 1981 increase in the qualifying IUR percentage level—but would not have lost eligibility if the Metzenbaum amendment had prevailed: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Utah. The following 29 states lost eligibility for Extended Benefits at least at one point in the following 12-month period because of the percentage IUR threshold change; passage of the Metzenbaum amendment would have prevented that loss: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

Also, after 9 months of pressure from Senate Democrats, Senate Republicans finally agreed to establish a Supplemental Compensation UI program—a third "tier" of benefits—for the long term unemployed as a provision of the 1982 tax legislation (TEFRA). This program was set to expire six months later (March of 1983), however, at a time when unemployment was projected still to be at a post-war high. The second part of the Metzenbaum amendment extended the duration of this program until national unemployment fell to 8.7 percent.

(NOTE: A similar amendment was offered to the First FY 1984 Budget Resolution. See Vote No. 71 of the 98th Congress—No. 6 in this chapter.)

2) Dole motion to table the Levin, et al, amendment to the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 extending Federal Supplemental Compensation UI benefits for an additional 2 to 5 weeks, depending on state insured unemployment rates (IURs), at a cost of $700 million. (Vote No. 415—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

   93% of Democrats voting voted against the motion to table.

   83% of Republicans voting voted for the motion to table.

   The motion to table was defeated, 47-50.

   December 16, 1982.

3) Baker, et al, motion to close debate on the Baker amendment as a substitute for the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. (Vote No. 416—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

   84% of Democrats voting voted against the motion.

   77% of Republicans voting voted for the motion.

   The cloture motion was rejected, 48-50.

   December 16, 1982.

In December of 1982, the national total unemployment rate shot up to 10.8 percent, its highest level since before World War II. In August, the Congress had enacted a modest supplemental unemployment benefits program (as a part of the 1982 tax bill—TEFRA). However, that program provided fewer weeks of supplemental benefits than were provided in the two most recent serious recessions—when unemployment never reached such catastrophic levels. When the Levin amendment was offered, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that over 1 million jobless workers had exhausted all available unemployment benefits in the past two months but still could not find work, and 2 million others would lose their benefits before the end of March. The Levin amendment added five weeks of benefits for the 28 states that then qualified for the second "tier" of unemployment benefits—Extended Benefits—and had insured unemployment rates (IURs) above 4 percent—raising the number of weeks of FSC benefits available to them to 15; added five weeks of benefits to the 11 states with IURs between 3.5 and 3.99 percent—raising the total number of weeks of FSC benefits available to them to 13; and added two weeks of benefits to the 11 states with IURs below 3.5 percent, for a total of 8 weeks of FSC benefits.

Led by the Senate's Republican leadership, most Senate Republicans voted for the Dole motion to table, but Democrats were able to marshal sufficient support to defeat the motion. At this point, the Republican leadership sought to close debate on the "Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982" to which the Levin amendment had been offered by invoking cloture, which would have made further consideration of the amendment impossible because it was a "nongermane amendment" not allowed after cloture is invoked. Democrats resisted this effort successfully. Knowing that they faced defeat if their opposition to the Levin amendment were continued, the Republican leaders offered a compromise providing additional weeks of FSC benefits to all states (but slightly fewer weeks than under the Levin amendment). With the blessings of the Republican leadership, the revised amendment then passed overwhelmingly, and ultimately became law.

4) Dole motion to table the Ford-Robert C. Byrd, et al, amendment to the Second FY 1983 Continuing Resolution to provide up to 10 weeks of Supplemental Compensation UI benefits for railroad workers with less than 10 years experience, in order to correct the inadvertent repeal of Extended Benefits for railroad workers in the 1981 Reconciliation Act. (Vote No. 449—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

   95% of Democrats voting voted against the motion to table.

   87% of Republicans voting voted for the motion to table.

   The motion to table was accepted, 47-46.

   December 18, 1982.

5) Ford motion to table the Hatfield motion to reconsider the vote by which the Senate narrowly tabled the Ford-Robert C. Byrd, et al, amendment to the Second FY 1983 Continuing Resolution to provide up to 10 weeks of Supplemental Compensation UI benefits for railroad workers with less than 10 years experience (see No. 4 immediately above—Vote No. 449). (Vote No. 450—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

   98% of Democrats voting voted against the motion to table.

   88% of Republicans voting voted for the motion to table.

   The motion to table the Hatfield motion to reconsider was accepted, 47-45.

   December 18, 1982.

Also during the "lame-duck" session, Democrats took the lead in seeking to provide adequate unemployment insurance for railroad workers who are covered by their own UI system. Legislation in 1981 inadvertently had made it impossible for railroad workers to receive Extended Benefits—the second "tier" of UI benefits—regardless of the level of unemployment. United Republican opposition defeated this Democratic effort backed by 95% of voting Democrats.

B. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE—98th Congress, 1st Session

6) Domenici motion to table the Metzenbaum amendment to the First Concurrent Budget Resolution for FY 1984 instructing the Finance Committee to report legislation to suspend the 1981 Reconciliation Act provision that ceased counting recipients of Extended Benefits to determine a state's Insured Unemployment Rate or IUR (used to determine state eligibility for Extended Benefits and the number of weeks of Supplemental Compensation for which a state is eligible), and to remove the requirement that a state's IUR in some cases be higher than the average of the two previous years in order to be eligible for Extended Benefits. The amendment also increased the funding level for income security programs by a total of $3.75 billion in budget authority and $8.68 billion in outlays for FY 1983-86. This amount was added to fund the second "tier" of UI benefits—Extended Benefits—in the approximately 23 to 29 states the amendment would make eligible for Extended Benefits. The Budget Resolution assumed these states would lose eligibility during FY 1984 if the amendments were not enacted. (Vote No. 71—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   75% of Democrats voting voted against the motion to table.

   98% of Republicans voting voted in favor of the motion to table.

   The motion to table was approved, 63-34.

   May 5, 1983.

Congressional Budget Office projections showed that virtually all states would become ineligible for the second "tier" of UI benefits—Extended Benefits—in the last quarter of FY 1983 and the first quarter of FY 1984, as a result of changes in state eligibility criteria made in the Reconciliation Act of 1981 (increasing the percentage of insured unemployment necessary to qualify, and removing from the insured unemployment calculation those persons receiving extended benefits) and of the requirement that, under some circumstances, states, regardless of their current levels of insured unemployment, had to have levels higher than the average of the previous two years in order to qualify for the program. The amendment was considered at a time when the national total unemployment rate was 10.2 percent and was projected to remain above 9 percent until well into FY 1984—catastrophic unemployment by all historical standards. Senator Metzenbaum's amendment instructed the Finance Committee to remedy two of these three problems, and provided sufficient funding in the income security budget category to pay for the benefits which would continue to be paid as a result. Virtually unanimous Republican opposition defeated the amendment by tabling it.

(NOTE: A similar amendment was offered to the First FY 1983 Continuing Resolution in the final months of the 97th Congress. See Vote No. 366—No. 1 in this chapter.)

7) Moynihan-Byrd-et al amendment to the Federal Supplemental Compensation Amendments of 1983 making several changes in unemployment insurance programs to provide more benefits to the long-term unemployed. (Vote No. 275—98th Congress, 1st Session).

76% of Democrats voting voted for the amendment.

94% of Republicans voting voted against the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 34-59.

September 29, 1983.

The Supplemental Compensation UI program (the third "tier" of benefits) was scheduled to expire on October 1, 1983. Knowing that unemployment was too severe to enable them to allow the program to expire, the Republican leadership brought legislation to the Senate floor extending the program for 18 months, but sharply reducing the number of weeks of benefits provided to the long-term unemployed. Senators Moynihan, Byrd, and other Democratic Senators proposed a package amendment to make the extension of this program more nearly adequate to meet the needs of the growing number of long-term unemployed victims of the Reagan Recession. The amendment (1) allowed states to determine the number of weeks of Supplemental Compensation benefits for which their long-term unemployed workers were eligible based on their total unemployment rates as well as their insured unemployed rates if the total unemployment rate were more advantageous; (2) providing 7, 9, 12, or 14 weeks of benefits to states, based on the severity of their unemployment, rather than the 6, 8, 10, or 12 weeks provided in the Committee's bill; (3) adding 4 weeks of additional benefits for those who previously had exhausted all UI benefits available to them, including Supplemental Compensation; (4) extending the program for 9 months instead of 18; and (5) requiring the Secretary of Labor to conduct a study and report to Congress on alternatives to use of the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR) and Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) as the benefit-level determinants in the UI system. The Majority voted overwhelmingly against the amendment, assuring its defeat.

8) Byrd, et al, amendment to the Federal Supplemental Compensation Amendments of 1983 to provide additional weeks of UI benefits to those who exhausted all available UI benefits, including Supplemental Compensation, between April 1 and October 1, 1983—in each state the additional benefits would equal three-fourths of the number of weeks of benefits a new FSC beneficiary would be able to receive in that state, up to a maximum of 8 weeks. (Vote No. 276—98th Congress, 1st Session).

87% of Democrats voting voted for the amendment.

92% of Republicans voting voted against the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 37-54.

September 30, 1983.

Following the defeat of the Moynihan-Byrd package amendment, Senator Byrd offered a simple amendment to provide additional weeks of unemployment benefits to the most distressed of the millions of unemployed persons in the nation: those who had been unemployed for so long that they had exhausted all unemployment benefits available to them, including Supplemental Compensation. Most of these persons had been unemployed for a year or more without being able to find work—at a time when the number of such persons was the highest since the Great Depression. Ninety-two percent Majority opposition to this amendment assured its defeat.

C. JOB CREATION—Final Months of the Second Session of the 97th Congress

9) Goldwater motion to table the Kennedy, et al, amendment to the First FY 1983 Continuing Resolution, appropriating approximately $1 billion to employ temporarily, for a maximum of 6 months, unemployed workers to repair the nation's deteriorating public buildings, roads, and bridges, with 15 pecent of the funding to be allocated for Youth Employment and Training Programs. (Vote No. 372—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

71% of Democrats voting voted against the motion to table.

90% of Republicans voting voted for the motion to table.

The motion to table was approved, 60-37.

September 29, 1982.

As the Continuing Resolution was being considered, the recession was entering its most destructive period—with unemployment above 9 percent and on its way later in the year to 10.8 percent—the highest level since before World War II. Over 10 million persons were unemployed. The Kennedy amendment appropriated sufficient funds to employ approximately 200,000 unemployed Americans for up to 6 months each to rebuild the decaying infrastructure of the nation, including its roads, streets, parks, schools, bridges, and public buildings. To that point in the recession, the Reagan Administration had adamantly resisted any proposal for providing public employment as a last resort for the long-term unemployed, and Congress had not established such a program. The Kennedy amendment was tightly drawn to assure that problems such as had existed in previous jobs programs would not recur: (1) it provided jobs limited to 6 months in duration; (2) expenses for administration and supplies were limited to no more than 35 percent of total funding; (3) no individual's compensation from federal funding could equal more than $5,000; (4) all employment funded by the amendment had to be applied to rebuilding the infrastructure rather than on general public services; and (5) priority in employment was to be given to the long-term unemployed in areas of high unemployment.

10) Robert C. Byrd, et al, amendment to the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 which consisted of a package substitute for the highway and mass transit construction and financing portion of the bill. The amendment (1) eliminated the 5 cent/gallon increase in the gasoline tax and derived revenues from partial delay of the third year of the Kemp-Roth tax cut for persons with incomes between $50,000 and $65,000, and full delay of the cut for three years for persons with incomes over $65,000 (raising approximately $24 billion in revenues); (2) established a $2 billion labor-intensive community public works program channeling funds through the Community Development Block Grant program; (3) extended federal

supplemental compensation unemployment benefits from two to five additional weeks depending on a state's rate of insured unemployed, at a cost of $700 million; (4) increased funds for several existing labor-intensive programs in a manner designed to spur employment: (a) public housing improvement ($400 million); (b) displaced worker retraining ($200 million); (c) senior citizen employment ($100 million); (d) abandoned mine reclamation ($37 million); (e) reforestation ($100 million); and (f) agriculture export credits ($750 million); (5) provided a $1 billion program for water and sewer system rehabilitation and construction; and (6) preserved the Committee's provisions for creation of a mass-transit trust fund and construction programs and a five-year extension of the Highway Trust Fund and construction programs. (Vote No. 406—97th Congress, 2nd Session.)

96% of Democrats voting voted for the amendment.

98% of Republicans voting voted against the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 44-53.

December 14, 1982.

11) Appropriations Committee amendment striking the House appropriation (in the Second FY 1983 Continuing Resolution) of $1 billion to supplement the Community Development Block Grant program to be used to create jobs in local development projects in cities and urban counties. (Vote No. 431—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

69% of Democrats voting voted against the Committee amendment to strike the House appropriation.

98% of Republicans voting voted for the Committee amendment to strike.

The Committee amendment was accepted, 62-32.

December 17, 1982 (Session of December 16, 1982).

12) Domenici-Baker-Dole, et al. amendment to strike the entire Title of the Second FY 1983 Continuing Resolution containing the "Jobs Package" added in the House, consisting of a package of appropriations totaling $1.163 billion to various public works and services program that would result in increased public and private employment and economic stimulation. (Vote No. 438—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

84% of Democrats voting voted against the amendment.

76% of Republicans voting voted in favor of the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 46-50.

December 17, 1982 (Session of December 16, 1982).

In December of 1982, the nation's economy was hitting rock bottom of the most severe recession since the Great Depression. President Reagan had adamantly refused to take any steps beyond allowing the most limited additional unemployment benefits to aid the nearly twenty million unemployed, underemployed, and discouraged workers in the nation, but was willing to endorse the recommendations of his Secretary of Transportation that the nation's highways and mass transit systems badly needed additional support in order to make necessary progress and halt decay of existing facilities. The Republican congressional leadership latched onto this proposal, presented to the "lame-duck" congressional session as a "jobs-creation program," despite the President's denials that it would create many jobs for the unemployed and considerable evidence that it would result in few jobs for those not already employed by the contractors who would obtain most of the contracts for work under its provisions. The Minority devised a package amendment to replace the regressive 5 cent/gallon increase in gasoline taxes to support the highway and transit proposal with a delay of the third year of the Kemp-Roth tax cut for the wealthy. It also added to the provisions pertaining to mass transit and highway repair and trust funds several measures to establish or increase support for existing labor-intensive programs that would result in significant employment opportunities for the unemployed. It also provided additional unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed who still would be unable to find any kind of work. The Majority united in opposition to this Democratic initiative, and it was defeated.

Once this package amendment was defeated, Senate Democrats made a last-ditch effort to provide some employment opportunities for the unemployed before the adjournment of the 97th Congress. Three days later, when the Second FY 1983 Continuing Resolution came before the Senate, Senate Democrats sought to prevent acceptance of a Senate Appropriations Committee amendment deleting $1 billion in funds for the Community Development Block Grant as a portion of the House's "Jobs Package" attached to that legislation. Senate Democrats intended, if they succeeded in retaining the $1 billion, to seek to provide for its expenditure in accord with the provisions of the special labor-intensive community public works employment program which had been one component of their package jobs amendment to the Surface Transportation Amendments of 1982. 98 percent Majority opposition (i.e., support for the Committee's motion to strike the $1 billion) thwarted this Democratic effort.

Later on the same day, the Senate Majority Leadership sought to eliminate from the Continuing Resolution the entire remainder of the House "Jobs Package"—$1.163 billion for an array of programs designed to increase public and private employment for public works and services and to provide various forms of assistance to the victims of the recession. This was too much for even a number of Majority Senators—and in a helpful display of bipartisanship 24 percent of the voting Republicans joined 84 percent of voting Democrats to defeat this gutting amendment.

D. JOB CREATION—98th Congress, 1st Session

13) Levin-Byrd, et al, amendment to the Jobs/Supplemental Appropriations Bill (H.R. 1718) to provide 208,000 new jobs through the addition of $1.665 billion to the Senate-reported bill for jobs creation (Community Development Block Grants, $1

billion; Older Americans Employment, $75 million; Summer Youth Employment, $100 million; and Economic Development Administration, $100 million), emergency food and shelter (humanitarian assistance through private charities–$50 million, and municipal emergency shelter programs–$50 million), and emergency shelter programs ($50 million), and emergency health care (Maternal and Child Health, $120 million; Community Health Centers, $70 million; and Preventive Health Services, $100 million). (Vote No. 16—98th Congress, 1st Session).

82% of Democrats voting voted for the amendment.

96% of Republicans voting voted against the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 34-53.

March 11, 1983.

During the time between the adjournment of the "lame-duck" session of the 97th Congress and the convening of the 98th Congress in January 1983, the Reagan Recession had reached its greatest depth. National unemployment was higher than at any time since before World War II as the Great Depression was being overcome by the Roosevelt Administration. The political pressure to take active steps to create work for some of the unemployed, and to provide humanitarian assistance to partially ameliorate the terrible effects of the recession on individuals and families became so great that the Reagan Administration announced it would support a package of additional appropriations for existing programs that would have these purposes—much like the package it categorically had condemned in December.

The House of Representatives passed such a bill. When it was acted on by the Senate Appropriations Committee, however, several of the House provisions were deleted. Senate Democrats prepared an amendment, supported by the Democratic Caucus, to provide additional funds to local governments for use on public works and community improvement projects that would generate new jobs, additional funds for employment of older Americans, economic development projects that would create jobs, and badly needed food, shelter, and emergency health care assistance for the victims of the recession. The amendment would have increased the amount of the Senate Committee's bill by $1.665 billion.

Republicans, however, knowing they would be able to vote in favor of the more limited and less helpful underlying bill endorsed by the Reagan Administration, united to defeat the Democratic amendment, with 96 percent of attending Republicans voting against it.

14) Baker motion to table the Quayle, et al, amendment to the FY 1984 Labor/HHS/Education Appropriations Bill increasing outlays by $115 million per year for programs principally targeted on economically disadvantaged youth under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)—restoring approximately one-third of the Committee-approved $319 million cut from current (FY 1983) funding. (Vote No. 281—98th Congress, 1st Session).

85% of Democrats voting voted against the motion to table.

81% of Republicans voting voted for the motion to table.

The motion to table was approved, 50-44.

October 4, 1983.

Responding to President Reagan's budget request, the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended a $319 million cut from the FY 1983 appropriations for the Job Training Partnership Act, bipartisan job training legislation passed unanimously by the Senate in 1982 and signed into law with great fanfare by President Reagan as the worthy successor to CETA in which the Administration would invest the bulk of its efforts to better equip the workforce for available jobs. Several Republican Senators, led by Senators Quayle and Hatch, joined with Democratic Senators in decrying the folly of establishing a brand new program, invested with great hope in the rhetoric of the President and others, and then proceeding to slash its funding before it even was operational. The Quayle amendment sought to restore only one-third of the Committee's cut. Nonetheless, 81 percent of the Majority rejected this small but important amendment.

E. OTHER AID FOR THE UNEMPLOYED—"Lame Duck" Session of the 97th Congress

15) Committee amendment striking $50 million the House appropriated as a portion of the Second FY 1983 Continuing Resolution to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to transmit to a board of private non-profit human services agencies (the United Way, the Salvation Army, the National Council of Churches, the National Conference of Catholic Charities, the Council of Jewish Federations, and two other such agencies chosen by the United Way) for their immediate use in carrying out an emergency food and shelter program for the destitute. (Vote No. 432—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

93% of Democrats voting voted against the Committee amendment to strike.

80% of Republicans voting voted for the Committee amendment to strike.

The Committee amendment to strike the $50 million was rejected, 43-52.

December 17, 1982 (Session of December 16, 1982).

The House added this provision to the Continuing Resolution because it concluded that tens of thousands of persons—including many families whose breadwinners were laid off as a result of the recession—had been made homeless and destitute when their unemployment benefits were exhausted before they were able to find any work. At a time when federal funds for all manner of human services and financial assistance programs had been cut at the President's request, most governmental agencies at all levels were without the capacity to provide needed help. For this reason, and because it was felt the private non-profit assistance agencies were better able to "gear-up" to provide such assistance rapidly, and that such agencies could undertake this mission without setting in place bureaucracies that would be difficult to dismantle when the need diminished, providing federal funds for this purpose to private, non-profit organizations was favored by the House. The Senate Appropriations Committee proposed an amendment to strike this proposal, but Democratic proponents of the House amendment argued in the Senate that new precedents should be established to respond quickly and effectively to the national disgrace of an estimated 250,000 to 1 million homeless people. Many of these persons were the "new poor" who were trapped between the shortage of jobs and the welfare laws in the majority of states that do not allow able-bodied persons to receive aid regardless of their financial plight. Senate Democrats argued that the offer made by the voluntary private-sector organizations to aid in the needed response should be accepted. (Even though the Senate accepted this provision in the bill, it ultimately was deleted from the conference report, as were all other provisions of the House's "jobs package" that composed Title II of the bill, because President Reagan pledged to veto the Continuing Resolution and thereby shut down the federal government if Congress sent it to him with those provisions. Early in 1983, another bill was passed by the Congress containing a virtually identical provision, which became law.)

F. OTHER AID FOR THE UNEMPLOYED—98th Congress

16) Kennedy-Riegle amendment to the First Concurrent Budget Resolution for FY 1984 (as a substitute for a Dole, et al, modified amendment) increasing the funding level for health by adding $900 million in FY 1983 and $2.7 billion each in FY 1984 and FY 1985 for health insurance for the unemployed. (Vote No. 72—98th Congress, 1st Session).

78% of Democrats voting voted in favor of the Kennedy-Riegle amendment.

98% of Republicans voting voted against the Kennedy-Riegle amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 36-63.

May 5, 1983.

At the time the amendment was proposed, the Congressional Budget Office had estimated that over 10 million unemployed Americans and their dependents had lost their health insurance benefits due to the loss of their jobs during the recession—a consequence often far more catastrophic both financially and in terms of health than the purely economic reversals these persons suffered. Most such families were ineligible for Medicare because of age and for Medicaid because of the exclusion in most states of all non-elderly two-adult households, regardless of financial status. Proponents of the amendment argued that failure of Congress to provide some health benefits for these people, in addition to being inhumane, would result in greater costs for society than the program proposed in terms of higher infant mortality and deterioration of public health of the work force. (It should be noted that the Kennedy-Riegle amendment was a substitute for a Dole amendment which added $1.8 billion over the same three-year period for establishing a much more limited program for the same purpose.

Proponents of the Kennedy-Riegle proposal noted the Congressional Budget Office's estimates that providing health care insurance only for all unemployed workers who were eligible for unemployment insurance, and their families, would require approximately $6 billion a year—and that although the $6.3 billion total over a three-year period included in the Kennedy-Riegle amendment was insufficient, it was far more nearly adequate than the amount in the Dole, et al, first degree amendment. After the Kennedy-Riegle amendment was defeated, the Dole, et al, amendment passed by a vote of 90 to 9.)

(NOTE: Although the Majority supported an allocation for this purpose in the budget, it refused to support real funding for the program when an amendment to provide it was offered in November. See Vote No. 352, 98th Congress—No. 19 in this chapter.)

17) Garn motion to table the Heinz-Riegle amendment to the FY 1984 HUD Appropriations Bill authorizing $500 million in loan guarantees for a mortgage relief program for unemployed homeowners. (Vote No. 165—98th Congress, 1st Session).

72% of Democrats voting voted against the motion to table.

84% of Republicans voting voted for the motion to table.

The motion to table prevailed, 55-39.

June 21, 1983.

Proponents of the amendment declared that Congress urgently needed to address the mortgage default problem of involuntarily unemployed homeowners. As of March 31, 1983, approximately 445,000 home loans were past due, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, with 60,000 loans in foreclosure. The program in the amendment was targeted to areas with the highest mortgage delinquency rates to assure the maximum cost-efficiency and effectiveness of the program, and only mortgagors who have exhausted all other reasonable financial remedies would be eligible. It would be self-financing with all potential losses being covered by reserves accumulated from the loan guarantee fee, ensuring that the federal deficit would not be increased. Existing personnel would handle its administration. In an attempt to overcome any reservations about the program, supported in the Banking Committee on a bipartisan basis, the authorization period was reduced from two years to one year, and budget authority cut from $750 million to $500 million.

18) Moynihan, et al, amendment to the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1983 increasing the authorization of entitlements for local governments for the General Revenue Sharing program (GRS) for each of the next three fiscal years from $4.5667 billion to $5.0170 billion—a $450 million increase placing funding at the level contemplated in the First Concurrent Budget Resolution. (Vote No. 260—98th Congress, 1st Session).

71% of Democrats voting voted for the amendment.

98% of Republicans voting voted against the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 30-64.

September 21, 1983.

19) Bradley, et al, amendment to the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1983 increasing the authorization of entitlements for local governments for each of the next three fiscal years (FY 1984 through FY 1986) from $4.5667 billion to $4,7917 billion—a $225 million increase (or half of the addition authorized by the First Concurrent Budget Resolution for FY 1984). (Vote No. 261—98th Congress, 1st Session).

78% of Democrats voting voted for the amendment.

92% of Republicans voting voted against the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 36-58.

September 21, 1983.

The bill that emerged from the Finance Committee proposed to extend the General Revenue Sharing (GRS) program for three years at precisely the same dollar level as provided for the program for each year since 1977, despite a 40 percent decline in the purchasing power of the dollar over that same period. Democratic proponents of increasing this funding argued that this would be poor policy even if local governments were experiencing fiscal stability. Instead, of course, state and local governments have experienced dramatic reductions in federal assistance of all kinds over the past two years at the same time their revenues were being decimated by the recession and the demands for services by the unemployed and other disadvantaged were mushrooming. Most local governments have found it necessary to make reductions—often drastic and harmful reductions—in the services they provide in order to stay fiscally solvent at precisely the time when those services were most needed. Amendment proponents noted that Congress earlier accepted the necessity to increase funding for the program when it included a $450 million increase for the program in the First FY 1984 Budget Resolution, and that revenue sharing is one of the most effective vehicles for making a federal investment in communities currently in great need of assistance. (It should be noted that some supported the increase because it would trigger a provision in the bill—later deleted by voice vote—to revise the allocation formula with respect only to the newly increased funding and target those funds to areas hardest hit by the recession and unemployment.) After the Moynihan amendment was defeated, with 98 percent of the voting Republicans voting against it, the Bradley amendment providing a funding increase half the size of that allowed in the Budget Resolution (and half the size of the Moynihan amendment) also was defeated, with 92 percent of the voting Republicans voting against it.

20) Riegle appeal of the ruling of the Chair that the Riegle, et al, amendment to the First FY 1984 Continuing Resolution, which appropriated $500 million for health care benefits for the unemployed, with that funding to be available only if a program authorizing such benefits is enacted into law, is out of order as legislation

on an appropriations bill. The question on which the Senate voted was: "Shall the ruling of the Chair stand?" (Vote No. 352—98th Congress, 1st Session).

79% of Democrats voting voted not to sustain the ruling of the Chair.

87% of Republicans voting voted to sustain the ruling of the Chair.

The ruling of the Chair was sustained, and the amendment was out of order, 47-36.

November 10, 1983.

As the Congress entered the final days of the first session of the 98th Congress, anticipating being out of session from November 18, 1983, to January 23, 1984, Democratic proponents were hopeful a compromise could be achieved allowing legislation to be enacted providing health benefits to the unemployed, despite substantial Republican objections. If this were to occur without funds having been appropriated for its implementation, it was conceivable the program would sit idle until Congress returned in late January, 1984, and could process an appropriations bill for this purpose. Senator Riegle, et al, proposed an amendment adding implementation funds to the Continuing Resolution for FY 1984, contingent on the enactment of enabling legislation. A Republican Senator raised a point of order that the Riegle amendment was legislation on an appropriations bill—not allowed under Senate rules—in order to avoid directly voting on the merits of the Riegle amendment. The Chair ruled that the point of order was valid, and Senator Riegle appealed the ruling to a vote of the Senate. A vote in favor of the Chair was a vote to prevent the contingency funding for health benefits for the unemployed.

BUILDING A BETTER ECONOMIC FUTURE:
A DEMOCRATIC BLUEPRINT

The last third of the Twentieth Century will be characterized by sweeping economic change. Unprecedented changes in products, production methods, and communications technology ensure that our children will see more change in the last quarter of this century than our grandparents did during the first half. Our nation's future depends upon our ability to understand and adapt to the new environment.

During previous periods of change the American economy has adjusted in a fashion which ensured that workers moved into more productive jobs. There are disturbing indications that this time we have begun to lose ground.

—During the past decade, **average unemployment rates** have steadily increased; between 1960 and 1973, the average rate was less than five percent; since that time, it has been over seven percent.

—Average **real wages,** which had grown sixty percent between 1948 and 1973, have fallen eight percent since 1973.

—The U.S. share of **world trade** has fallen from 19.6 percent in 1951 to 12.6 percent in 1981.

—Our **foreign trade deficit** was $69 billion in 1983. Some experts believe that the deficit will approach $100 billion in 1984.

—Unemployment and economic distress have been **unevenly distributed** and the gaps are widening. Many cities have regularly experienced unemployment more than double the national rate and more than triple the rates of the most well-off areas; some states now regularly register double-digit unemployment figures.

—Productivity growth slowed after 1967 and has failed to rebound sufficiently. While the productivity growth of our most important competitors also slowed, they were able to maintain rates of increase.

In February of 1983, Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd appointed a task force charged with recommending a program to increase the competitiveness of the American economy. After nine months of deliberation, the group presented a comprehensive package of proposals which were unanimously endorsed by the Senate Democratic Caucus. These proposals represent our alternative to the aimless drift of present policy.

We propose positive alternatives to our current situation. Through cooperation, we believe that problems can be identified earlier so that import relief will not be the only recourse. By emphasizing retraining and adjustment, we seek to ease the transition and reduce the resistance to change in industries where competitiveness cannot be restored. By requiring that trade relief be conditioned upon a realistic, hardheaded plan for adjustment and modernization, we put the focus on competitiveness.

We recommend new economic policies and organizational arrangements which can provide a foundation for sustained economic growth. They hold out a realistic promise for improvement because they are specifically designed to meet the twin challenges of international competition and rapid technological change; they build on our economic strengths; and they respond to both the lessons of the 1970's and the failures of the Reagan Administration.

The proposals put forward by the Senate Democratic Caucus are summarized in the following pages:

I. The Council on Economic Competitiveness and Cooperation

We recommend the creation of a Council on Economic Competitiveness and Cooperation, composed of 20 representatives of government, business, labor, and the public. The Council would be a permanent, independent agency in the executive branch. The non-governmental members would serve six-year terms, in order to provide continuity from administration to administration. The Council's role would be advisory. It would have no power to override regulations or change law.

The Council will discharge two major responsibilities. First, the Council will be a forum within which the nation's industrial strategy will be debated and formulated. The second major responsibility for the Council will be to establish, after a request from the private sector, advisory working groups to analyze and consider responses to problems that affect individual industries and geographic regions. For instance, an advisory group might represent a mature industry facing severe international competition. Following common agreement on the facts, it may become clear what management, labor, and government must each do if international competitiveness is to be regained. Initiatives could include investment, job security, profit sharing, work practices, wages, training, government regulations, and temporary trade relief. The Council would then recommend, to the President and Congress, specific steps that the government should take with the understanding that the private parties would keep their reciprocal commitments.

II. Innovation

Innovation in process and product technology is at the heart of our ability to compete. Democrats believe that important initiatives are needed to ensure that the nation remains on the cutting edge of technological change.

We propose:

1. Clarifying Antitrust Laws to Encourage Joint R&D

Clarifying the application and interpretation of the antitrust laws should create a "zone of certainty" within which private companies can make decisions with regard to cooperative R&D without significant risk of adverse antitrust action.

2. Making the R&D Tax Credit Permanent

3. Conducting Competitive Assessments and Targeting Strategic Technologies

4. Technology Extension Centers located at state universities, modeled after the Agricultural Extension Service, to help assure effective transfer and utilization of new technology.

5. A new organization should be established to foster technological innovation. The agency would be responsible for interagency coordination and for encouraging and assisting all federal agencies to stimulate innovation in the industrial sectors related to their missions.

III. Education/Human Resources

In the challenging era we face, nothing is more important than making the proper investments in people. During his term in office, the President has asked Congress to repeal the federal education program for handicapped children; to cut vocation and adult education by nearly half; to approve budget reductions that would mean some 2.5 million disadvantaged elementary school children would no longer be able to receive the acknowledged benefits of the program; to eliminate upwards of one million students from the Guaranteed Student Loan program and to cut funding for the Pell Grant program by 42 percent.

Democrats believe it is time to return to policies which reflect our ideals and our best traditions by "wagering on people".

We propose:

1. Funding for the Title I program would be increased to allow for participation of disadvantaged young people in our secondary schools.

2. A Youth title in a new Vocational Education Act would bring about a more specific targeting of public vocational education policy and would make the plight of the disadvantaged youth, including the high school dropout, a top vocational education priority. In addition, the Adult Basic Education Act should be strengthened to increase participation in basic skills programs for those no longer enrolled in a school system.

3. We should increase funding to upgrade instruction in science, mathematics, computer utilization, and foreign languages. This program would focus resources on teacher training, retraining, and in-service upgrading of skills. Through the use of computers, both as a subject of instruction and a tool for instruction in all areas of the curriculum, we will be providing our children with the skills and familiarity with information processing which they will need to participate in the economy and society of the future. Steps must be taken to ensure that computer learning is provided equally to both boys and girls at all socioeconomic levels.

4. We propose: (1) enactment of a new education program to aid America's gifted and talented students at the elementary and secondary level; and (2) a Federal Merit Scholarship Program at the college level to reward students of exceptional academic aptitude and achievement.

IV. Adjustment/Training

Our proposals are designed to increase the efficiency and equity of adjustment by individuals, communities, and industries.

We propose:

1. Modifications to the Unemployment Insurance System

Program funds would be used to obtain employer information on current and projected job openings and the training qualifications required to fill the openings. In addition to the improvements in the labor market exchange, states would be encouraged to make their U.I. systems more effective adjustment mechanisms.

2. The following are additions to the Job Partnership and Training Act:

   a. A new student loan program would provide loans to adults for part-time education and training courses.

   b. A job counselling and placement service would be provided for large scale plant closing where advance notice of at least 60 days has been given.

   c. Training for small business concerns using both new technology (i.e., computer-based training) and the community college system as the delivery mechanism.

3. Employment would be provided in both the private and public sectors for unemployment insurance exhaustees who live in communities with above average unemployment rates and declining industrial employment. Eligible persons would have to be either over 55, or heads-of-household with children, and not have a working spouse.

4. Communities with declining industrial employment and/or experiencing large scale plant shutdowns would be eligible for financial assistance to establish tripartite organizations to deal with the adjustment problem.

V. Financing Development

Democrats believe that public policies can foster a more favorable investment climate for firms who want to produce more competitive products, adopt more efficient production methods, and create new career opportunities.

We propose federal support for state and regional economic development finance institutions. These institutions would lend to or invest in businesses according to the state's own development strategies.

VI. Trade

For 50 years, since President Roosevelt first proposed a reciprocal trade agreements program to Congress, Democrats have supported an open and fair international trading system. During Democratic administrations, international trade has been opened up, producing new and better jobs for Americans while increasing consumers' purchasing power. But just as Democrats were willing to confront the need for change in trade policies in 1934 by proposing the reciprocal trade agreements program, we are again willing to confront change in the international trade environment by designing new approaches.

We propose:

1. Tying adjustment to import relief

2. Speeding up the finding of injury

3. We recommend a broad effort to renovate the GATT with particular emphasis on improving and standardizing procedures under which countries may take import relief (safeguard) action, and in extending the commitment to open markets to services, finance, and certain aspects of trade in high technology products—sectors where American firms have substantial export capacity, but are often stymied by the absence of effective international agreements.

4. Export Promotion

More recognition should be given to the growing purchasing power of the developing countries and our ability to meet their new needs. We are unparalleled in the technology of agricultural production and distribution; our health technology is unsurpassed; so is our capacity to find and develop energy resources. The United States is the leader in telecommunications and educational technology. The relevant cabinet agencies, working with the Agency for International Development, should seek ways to expand our comparative advantage and our exports in these areas. This is the ultimate "positive-sum" game: our workers obtain high value-added employment providing goods and services that assist in the development of the world's fastest growing market.

This year, Senate Democrats will work to enact these recommendations into law. We anticipate that a vital debate over the future direction of our economy and the role of the government will take place next year. The question, in the Twentieth Century, is not whether the federal government will intervene in the market. That question was answered emphatically 50 years ago by the New Deal—the response to the original Republican argument that the federal government had no need to be concerned about the economic well-being of Americans.

Today's question is where, when, how, and to what ends will the government intervene:

Where: Will political expediency call forth intervention or will we intervene where private sector incentives are weak; for example, to provide information, support R & D, and invest in human resources?

When: Will the government find a way to anticipate problems or at least identify them early, or will we be condemned to responding to crisis situations?

How: Will the government intervene to encourage competitiveness and recognize the inevitability of change, or will the government act to throw up barriers in an effort to freeze the status quo?

To What Ends: Will the government intervene in the economy to enrich the lives and opportunity of all Americans; or will the government serve as it has in this Administration, as an instrument to further the interests of the wealthiest citizens, at the expense of others?

EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

1983 was a year of reckoning for America's education system. While trouble signs had been seen for some time, it wasn't until 1983 that the American public was awakened to the crisis in American education. An almost uninterrupted flow of reports by commissions, by foundations, by the print and broadcast media, and by state and local governmental associations throughout the year all brought the same alarming message, perhaps best stated in its April report by President Reagan's own National Commission on Excellence in Education: "The educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a nation and as a people." According to the consensus opinion, the crisis is apparent in virtually every measure of the performance of our schools, in the commitment and competency of teachers, in student SAT scores, in truancy and dropout rates, and in the number and frequency of crimes of violence in the schools.

The experts agree that the crisis seems most acute in the important core curricula areas and in advanced science and math education.

The same reports heralding the crisis also set forth volumes of recommendations for a remedy. At the core of these recommendations was the recognition that to effect a remedy would cost money. More money must be spent, and be spent more wisely, in order to provide the necessary improvements in our educational system.

States from California to Florida enacted legislation creating bold new science and math programs. Other states began looking at their educational financing structure and basic core curricula. Tennessee, Florida, West Virginia, Mississippi, Arkansas, and others have enacted laws that will bring fundamental system-wide improvements, including increased revenues.

The First Session of the 98th Congress, too, was the scene of many efforts to provide more adequate funding for already enacted federal education programs, to enact legislation providing for a federal-level forum to assess the various reports and develop recommendations for implementing long-range solutions, and to create new federal assistance for science and math programs.

There were intermediate successes in these areas. The Democratically controlled House easily passed the math/science bill in early March 1983. It was never brought to the floor in the Republican controlled Senate. So, too, was the fate of the Democratically sponsored National Summit Conference on Education. Early in the summer the Minority tried unsuccessfully to attach the Summit Conference as an amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill. Later, it was introduced as a free-standing bill. It passed the House, but it was never called up by the Majority for action on the Senate floor.

The House and the Senate passed a budget resolution containing significant increases (over the President's requested budget) in funding for federal education programs. The House also went on record in support of raising the authorization levels for these programs so the money could be appropriated to fund the programs as passed in the budget resolution. But when it came time to appropriate the increased education monies, neither the House nor the Democrats in the Senate could ultimately persevere over Republican opposition and the veto threats of President Reagan. While the budget resolution does not require presidential signature, appropriations bills do. These veto threats were especially disturbing to members of Congress trying to enhance funding for federal education programs. For, while the President in Washington talked of vetos, he mounted an extensive public relations campaign telling people around the country of his Administration's strong concern for America's education system.

The final legislative products in the appropriations areas contained some, but not enough, according to America's educators, of the needed increases for federal education programs.

THE RECORD

1) Rudman amendment to the First Budget Resolution for FY 1984 (S. Con. Res. 27) increasing the funding level for education by $400 million in each of FY 1984-86. (Vote No. 74—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   95% of the Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

   91% of the Republicans voting supported the amendment.

   The amendment was agreed to, 50-46.

   May 5, 1983.

The vote on the Rudman amendment was one of the first in a series of votes surrounding Democratic-led efforts to increase funding levels for education programs in the FY 1984 budget. The

Rudman amendment was offered in an effort to diffuse support for the original Hollings amendment (see below) which would have increased funding by $1.5 billion. Because it was an effort to diffuse support for the higher levels, those supporting the higher levels voted against the Rudman amendment.

The President's FY 1984 budget proposal had requested a total of $13.2 billion funding for education programs. This request was considerably below the funds required to restore education spending to its 1980 level when adjusted for inflation, and was even below the levels needed to fund the programs at current services levels of $15.10 billion in FY 1983. The House of Representatives had passed an education budget for FY 1984 of $16.3 billion. The Senate Budget Committee reported a proposal calling for $14.9 billion--a figure that was $7.2 billion less than the funds required to restore education spending to its 1980 level when adjusted for inflation.

Senator Hollings, aware that a complete restoration of funds for education programs was not realistic given budget constraints, offered an amendment cosponsored by Senator Stafford, to increase funding by $1.5 billion.

The Rudman amendment, which was essentially a Republican leadership amendment, was offered to diffuse support for the Hollings amendment. The majority of funds in the Rudman amendment would have gone to fund an important new math/science program at levels similar to the Hollings amendment. It would have meant fewer funds for compensatory education of disadvantaged children and student financial assistance than the Hollings amendment and, therefore, fewer opportunities for American youth to improve themselves in order to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

The Rudman amendment was agreed to, 50 to 46. But, because of a fluke in the draftsmanship, the success of the amendment did not affect the pending Hollings amendment.

2) Domenici motion to table the Hollings-Stafford, et al, amendment (increasing the funding level for education by $1.5 billion in budget authority in FY 1984, $1.79 billion in FY 1985, and $1.89 billion in FY 1986) to the First Budget Resolution for FY 1984 (S. Con. Res. 27). (Vote No. 75—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   98% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion.

   88% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

   The motion to table was defeated, 46-48.

   May 5, 1983.

The Domenici motion to table was the second attempt to scuttle the Hollings amendment to increase funding for education programs. While the Rudman amendment (see No. 1 above) had been meant as a substitute for the Hollings amendment, a fluke in draftsmanship meant that the Hollings amendment was still viable despite the success of the Rudman amendment. The vote on the motion to table clearly delineated those who support more adequate funding for education from those who do not. Forty-two of the 43 Democrats present and voting were joined by six of the 51 Republicans present and voting to defeat the motion. Forty-three Republicans and one Democrat voted for the motion.

3) Hollings motion to reconsider Vote No. 75 (the Domenici motion to table) by which the Senate failed to table the Hollings-Stafford, et al, amendment to the First Budget Resolution for FY 1984 (S. Con. Res. 27). (Vote No. 76—98th Congress, 1st Session)

   98% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion.

   85% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

   The motion was rejected 42-46.

   May 6, 1983.

The morning after the defeat of the Domenici motion to table the Hollings amendment (see No. 2 above), Senator Hollings offered a motion to reconsider the tabling motion in order to establish the Senate's desire for an up and down vote on the Hollings amendment. This motion to reconsider was defeated 42 to 46, once again putting on record those who clearly supported more adequate funding for education.

Senator Hollings was joined in voting against his motion by 38 of the other 39 Democrats present and by seven of the 48 Republicans present. Forty-one Republicans and one Democrat voted for the motion.

4) Hollings motion to table the Domenici amendment (as a substitute for the Hollings-Stafford, et al, amendment) increasing the education funding levels for FY 1984-86 by only $400 million per year above the levels reported in the First Budget Resolution (S. Con. Res. 27). (Vote No. 77—98th Congress, 1st Session)

   95% of the Democrats voting supported the motion.

   85% of the Republicans voting opposed the motion.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 45-43.

   May 6, 1983.

After the clear vote not to table the Hollings-Stafford amendment (see No. 3 above), once again the Republican leadership mounted an effort to diffuse support for the Hollings amendment. Senator Domenici offered a correctly drafted substitute for the Hollings amendment. The Domenici substitute was identical to the incorrectly drafted Rudman amendment which had succeeded earlier. (See No. 1 above).

Opponents of the Domenici substitute argued that the Senate, through Vote Nos. 75 and 76, was clearly on record in support of higher levels for education than those proposed in the additional $400 million of the Domenici substitute. The motion to table the Domenici substitute once again put the Democrats on record in support of adequate education funding. Thirty-eight of the 40 Democrats present were joined by seven of the 48 Republicans present in supporting the motion to table.

5) Hollings, et al, amendment increasing the funding level for education by $1 billion in each of fiscal 1984-86 above the levels in the First Budget Resolution (S. Con. Res. 27). (Vote No. 78—98th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

66% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 55-32.

May 6, 1983.

After the defeat of the Domenici $400 million add-on (see No. 4 above), Senator Hollings, in order to stop any more attempts to thwart his efforts to get significant increases in the budget resolution, offered a compromise of his own amendment. The new Hollings amendment provided for increases of $1 billion in each of fiscal years 1984-86 rather than the $1.5 billion, etc., contained in the first Hollings amendment.

The $1 billion Hollings, et al, amendment was agreed to. Thirty-nine of the 40 Democrats present supported the amendment. They were joined by a number of the Republicans present when it was clear that the amendment would pass.

The success of the Hollings, et al, amendment brought funding for education programs in the Senate passed First Budget Resolution to within $400 million of the figure contained in the resolution already passed by the House. The conferees on the First Budget Resolution split the difference between the two proposals leaving the overall figure for education at $16.1 billion. This is roughly $3 billion more than President Reagan's request of $13.2 billion, and $1 billion more than the FY 1983 appropriations of $15.10 billion.

6) Kennedy-Hollings-Pell, et al, amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1983 (H.R. 3069). The Kennedy, et al, amendment appropriated $500,000 for a National Summit Conference on Education. (Vote No. 133—98th Congress, 1st Session)

97% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

96% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 38-48.

June 9, 1983.

The Kennedy, et al, amendment was a direct response to the flurry of recent reports decrying the status of education in American public schools. Supporters of the summit conference noted that the recent reports accurately identified the problems facing public education, but did not provide an outline to remedy these failings. The education summit, which would have included individuals of varied experience and interest in the field of education, could effect a broadly based review to develop the blueprint needed to implement the recommendations of the various reports, in particular the report by the President's National Commission on Excellence in Education.

The Kennedy, et al, amendment appropriated $500,000 for the summit conference, to be held within 90 days, to develop and report to the President, Congress, and the States by January 15, 1984, specific recommendations for action with respect to the findings of the National Commission on Excellence in Education.

The amendment was strongly endorsed by the nation's most important education organizations, including the American Federation of Teachers, the National Education Association, the American Association of School Administrators, the National School Board Association, and the Chief State School Officers. Supporters of the amendment maintained that reports with recommendations were of little value absent a nationwide blueprint for implementing those recommendations.

The Kennedy, et al, amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill was defeated. Thirty-six of the 37 Democrats present voted for the amendment. Forty-seven of the 49 Republicans present voted against the amendment.

The summit conference was later introduced by Senator Kennedy and others as a free-standing bill. Its companion measure in the House of Representatives passed easily on the House floor. The summit conference bill did not make it to the floor of the Republican controlled Senate.

7) Weicker motion to table the Huddleston, et al, amendment to the Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations, 1984 bill (H.R. 3913). The Huddleston, et al, amendment appropriated $50 million for 20-year interest-free loans to aid schools with removing asbestos from their facilities. (Vote No. 279—98th Congress, 1st Session)

80% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion.

94% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion to table was agreed to, 58-35.

October 4, 1983.

The Huddleston, et al, amendment was the first effort to appropriate monies for asbestos removal as provided for in section 6 of the Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980. Since passage of that Act, no monies had been funded for the program.

Proponents of the amendment argued that it was time for the federal government to honor its commitment to aid U.S. school districts in handling the asbestos hazard. Furthermore, the hazard, a very clear and present danger in many, many U.S. schools, was causing a further erosion in funds available for general education because schools were diverting education monies for purposes of removing the asbestos. Coming on the heels of a number of reports decrying the status of American public education, Huddleston and others argued that this diversion of funds could only cause the quality and effectiveness of the education system to suffer more.

While a final report on the problem had not yet been released by the Department of Education, supporters of the amendment argued that data already released from the report, showing that 14,000 schools have asbestos-related hazards, was sufficient to warrant appropriating the funds. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives had appropriated $50 million for the program.

The motion to table the Huddleston, et al, amendment was agreed to with 94 percent of the Republicans present voting to table and 80 percent of the Democrats present voting against the motion to table.

8) Weicker motion to table the appeal of the ruling of the Chair that the Bradley-Hollings, et al, amendment to the Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations, 1984 bill (H.R. 3913) was out of order because it would increase an appropriation not authorized by existing law. The Bradley-Hollings, et al, would have increased appropriations by $559 million for elementary, secondary, and higher education programs. (Vote No. 280—98th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion.

91% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion to table was agreed to, 50-45.

October 4, 1983.

Upon passage of the First Budget Resolution which increased funding for many programs over the levels requested by the Administration, President Reagan declared that he would veto any appropriations bill that came in over his levels. (The budget resolution does not require presidential signature; appropriations bills do and are thus subject to veto.)

With this veto threat paramount in their minds, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported a bill with very few of the increases for education programs provided for in the budget resolution.

Meanwhile, an authorization bill was awaiting conference committee action that would have made the necessary increases in authorizations for education programs as provided for in the budget resolution. But, the Senate Majority failed to appoint conferees. Thus, they could use the lack of the increased authorizations as a procedural tool to thwart efforts to increase the appropriations. (By law, appropriations must be preceded by authorizing legislation. In practice, however, it is not infrequent that appropriations measures are passed without the necessary authorizing legislation.)

Proponents of the Bradley-Hollings, et al, amendment argued that the amendment merely appropriated monies for education in line with, but not up to, the commitment to education evidenced in the Senate-passed First Budget Resolution. They argued that the Appropriations Committee bill would fund education programs at the 1981 level, a 22 percent cut in real dollar value, and $2 billion below the budget resolution levels. Proponents declared that since this amendment was a compromise because it would not increase funding as much as that provided in the budget, it should be supported at a minimum by those who genuinely wanted to improve the educational system in America. To support less would seriously impede the federal commitment to education.

The procedural tool was invoked and a point of order was raised against the Bradley-Hollings, et al, amendment. The Chair ruled the amendment out of order. Proponents appealed the ruling, and Weicker offered the motion to table the appeal. The Weicker motion succeeded. While supporters of the Weicker motion might try to take cover in the procedural maneuvers, supporters of education count this vote as a clear vote by Senators to capitulate to the President and to renege on their commitment to education made in the budget resolution. Forty of the 41 Democrats present opposed the Weicker motion. Forty-nine of the 54 Republicans present supported the motion.

9) Hatfield amendment to the Continuing Appropriations, 1984 bill (H.J. Res 413) striking the House additions for domestic programs. (Vote No. 348—98th Congress, 1st Session).

78% of the Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

90% of the Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 53-36.

November 10, 1983.

In their last effort in the 1st session of the 98th Congress to fund domestic programs, especially education programs, at levels commensurate with those in the First Budget Resolution, the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives successfully added increased spending levels for a number of the programs to the Continuing Appropriations bill for 1984 being debated in November. The House leadership amendment added monies for the major federal education programs, for the school lunch program, for the child nutrition program and other selected domestic programs. The total funding increases amounted to $954 million, none of which was above the approved budget levels.

When the House-passed Continuing Appropriations bill came to the Senate floor, the Republican leadership with Senator Hatfield, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, as point man, moved to strike the House additions.

The debate on the Hatfield amendment to strike was almost identical to the debate on the Bradley-Hollings effort on the regular Labor-HHS-Education bill (see No. 8 above). Proponents of the House additions argued that these increases were necessary, indeed imperative, to fund education programs, child nutrition programs, and the other programs, at adequate levels. They argued that cutting these funds in most cases would represent real cuts in the ability of these programs to meet current services needs. In the instances where these additions brought programs beyond current services levels, they argued that the increases were only partial attempts to restore funding for the programs at the levels operating prior to the enormous budget slashes made in 1981. This was especially true for the school lunch and breakfast program.

Opponents of the House additions argued that the additions would occasion a presidential veto of the bill and that many of the program additions were not authorized by law. (The Senate Republican leadership had steadfastly refused to go to conference on the authorizing bill.)

Thus, the first session of the 98th Congress, because of presidential veto threat and the Republican controlled Senate, ended with very little in the area of increased spending on crucial education programs and other domestic programs directed at serving those in need.

KEEPING PROMISES TO OLDER AND DISABLED AMERICANS

As the 98th Congress convened, there was nothing to guarantee that the harshly partisan battles over social security would not continue to occur—as they had throughout the 97th Congress, when Democrats had fought to protect the social security program from massive cuts sought by the Reagan Administration and their allies in the Congress. But it soon became clear that there had been a major shift in congressional sentiment, apparently as a result of the 1982 elections in which social security had been an important issue.

A year earlier, following successful Democratic efforts to force Republicans to retreat from proposals by the Administration to make more than $88 billion in social security cuts (including deletion of the minimum benefit, among other benefit reductions), President Reagan established a bipartisan National Commission on Social Security Reform in an attempt to defuse the political bomb that this issue had become.

That Commission had been laboring throughout the year with little publicly evident progress; its efforts were threatened when, while it was in its early deliberative stages in mid-1982, Senate Republicans included $40 billion in social security cuts in the proposed congressional budget for FY 1983—but Senate Democrats succeeded in eliminating these proposed cuts as well. Following the 1982 elections, the Commission redoubled its efforts to find reasonable compromises—far removed from the massive benefit cuts previously demanded by the White House. Finally, the Commission submitted a report after both President Reagan and Speaker O'Neill endorsed its major recommendations—as the 98th Congress was commencing work in early 1983.

Consequently, instead of the heated battles, with numerous record votes, that had been fought on the issue of social security in the first year and a half of the 97th Congress, the diligent effort of Senate Democrats, working in concert with the House Democratic leadership and membership, was focused principally behind the scenes during the 98th Congress—to affect the outcome of the Commission's deliberations and the congressional response. Although there was a great deal of skirmishing in meeting rooms and in the Senate Finance Committee, Republicans recognized that major departures from the recommendations of the Commission would doom the effort to bring stability to the program. Consequently, even President Reagan ultimately endorsed the Commission's findings, and the Finance Committee went on to report a bill accurately reflecting the Commission's recommendations in most important respects, and the Senate, when the legislation was on the Senate floor, generally supported on a substantially bipartisan basis the Commission's findings (and the Committee's bill) whenever amendments were offered. On only two occasions were amendments offered that would have had substantial direct or indirect effects on the well-being of the elderly affected by social security, or on the vulnerability of the program to future benefit reductions, in order to satisfy broader federal budget objectives. Undeniably, the Democrats successfully had defended the social security program during 1981 and 1982; the Republicans never mounted a serious challenge to it during the entire first session of the 98th Congress.

But the Reagan Administration was not through attacking programs vital to the elderly. The President's budget request for FY 1984 proposed deep and unfair cuts in the Medicare program—on top of billions of dollars of cuts previously approved by the Congress in 1981 and 1982 (which, while only a fraction of the total sought by President Reagan, nonetheless significantly increased health care costs for the elderly and disabled). During deliberations over the congressional budget, these massive reductions were scaled back, but even so the Majority sought several billion dollars in cuts. Democrats tried to reduce the severity of the impact of those reductions, and to spread them so that they would affect beneficiaries less and program providers, such as physicians and hospitals, more. Some Republicans voted with Democrats or worked with them to obtain reasonable solutions. There was substantial bipartisan support for a novel prospective reimbursement system for hospitals anticipated to save billions of dollars when fully operational—and it was enacted with unexpected ease.

Finally, a number of Democratic Senators played key roles, working with notable bipartisan support, to make fundamental revisions in the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program in response to the disarray the Reagan Administration allowed to overwhelm that program. Unfortunately, these Senators were blocked in their efforts to obtain Senate Finance Committee consideration of legislation for this purpose. Ultimately, in the final hours of the first session of the 98th Congress, when it had become clear that no Committee action would occur until 1984, Senators supporting overhaul of the SSDI program sought to attach reform legislation to the last-minute Supplemental Appropriations Bill conference report. That effort failed in the face of 75 percent Republican opposition—despite the prominent sponsorship of the amendment by several Republican Senators. The record vote shows clearly the difference of support between the members of the two parties in the Senate on this vital issue.

Social Security

1) Bradley, et al, amendment (to the Committee amendment) to the Social Security Amendments of 1981 to provide disability benefits to persons aged 62 and above who are unable to continue to engage in their current occupation or employment because of infirmity or its physical demands, which would become effective in the year 2000 when increases in the retirement age commence, ensuring that such persons will not be adversely affected by increasing the retirement age. (Vote No. 35—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   68% of Democrats voting voted in favor of the amendment.

   100% of Republicans voting voted against the amendment.

   The amendment was defeated, 30-61.

   March 21, 1983.

One of the fundamental options with which to gain financial stability for the social security program that was presented to the Congress by the bipartisan Social Security Commission was to increase the retirement age beginning at the turn of the century. Generally, this recommendation was accepted, even if reluctantly by many Democrats, as feasible. Many Democrats, however, were very concerned about one particular group of individuals: those who, because of deteriorating health or the physical demands of their occupation or employment (where manual labor, occupational strain, or hazards are real threats to their wellbeing), or both, would be unable to continue to work in that occupation or employment until they reach the new retirement age. (In some cases, the problem already exists, in that some persons are unable to continue to work until the current retirement age for these same reasons.) And yet in many cases the disabling or health condition is not sufficiently severe to qualify the individual for benefits under the Social Security Disability Insurance program. Under the Bradley, et al, amendment, such persons could receive 80 pecent of their social security benefits, as under current law, rather than 75 percent as in the Committee bill, upon early retirement if they could demonstrate inability to perform the major work required by the occupation they held during the 10 years prior to the onset of their disability. Program growth or abuse would be limited because of the relatively small eligibility pool of 6 million persons between the ages of 62 to 66. This amendment responds to a concern the Commission itself raised when it issued its recommendations, but the amendment went down to defeat in the face of total Republican opposition.

2) Domenici motion to table the Heinz motion to waive the Budget Act prohibition on considering any matter in the Budget Committee's purview, which would have been necessary in order to consider a Heinz amendment to create separate categories in the federal budget for the social security trust funds, effective in FY 1985, and to remove the Old Age and Survivors Insurance and the Disability Insurance Trust Funds from the unified federal budget beginning in FY 1989. (Vote No. 39—98th Congress, 1st Session).

73% of Democrats voting voted against the Domenici motion to table the Heinz motion.

85% of Republicans voted for the Domenici motion to table the Heinz motion.

The motion to table was accepted, 56-41.

March 22, 1983.

Although this vote, itself, appears to be a highly technical and procedural vote only distantly related to social security benefits or program stability, it actually was of substantial importance. Because the social security trust fund financial activities are integrated in the unified federal budget, their activities affect the overall status of that budget—dramatically so because of the massive size of those trust funds. Consequently, when Administrations or Congresses are seeking to make major adjustments in the overall size of or expenditures in the federal budget, there is a significant temptation to propose social security program alterations in order to achieve these much broader budget objectives. For example, a very large budgetary savings can be achieved by a relatively minor social security program cut because the program affects so many persons. The result is that the social security programs—which are designed to be self-financing through their trust fund revenues—become pawns in macro-budget games played by those wielding the budgetary knife, and their social insurance character is distorted, if not completely forgotten. The stability of the programs is threatened as citizen confidence is threatened in return; this is unnecessary and harmful to both the program and the tens of millions of elderly and disabled persons now depending on social security benefits, and the scores of millions more who are depending on social security when they retire or become disabled. Removal of the programs from the unified budget would not hinder Congress' ability to evaluate the economic effects of social security spending or to establish fiscal policy. Unfortunately, a heavy majority of Republicans chose to vote the other way, to leave the programs in the unified budget. (Ultimately, because the House had accepted a provision virtually identical to the amendment Senator Heinz was seeking to have the Senate consider, the Social Security Amendments of 1983 signed into law after the conference committee resolved differences between the two houses contains such a section. Senators who later voted to accept the Conference Report technically voted in favor of this provision.)

Medicare

3) Baucus, et al. amendment to the First Concurrent Budget Resolution for FY 1984 increasing the funding level for the medical insurance category in order to partially restore Medicare cuts incorporated in the Resolution recommended by the Budget Committee at the recommendation of the Senate Finance Committee: $15 million in FY 1983; $440 million in FY 1984; $593 million in FY 1985; and $748 million in FY 1986. (Vote No. 70—98th Congress, 1st Session).

93% of Democrats voting voted in favor of the amendment.

90% of Republicans voting voted against the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 45-50.

May 4, 1983.

Substantial Medicare cuts had been accepted by the Congress in the previous two years which, while not nearly as severe as those proposed by the Reagan Administration, nonetheless are having a troublesome impact on the impoverished and near-impoverished elderly who depend on Medicare. The Finance Committee proposed several additional cuts to achieve the levels included in the Budget Resolution reported by the Budget Committee. Principal among these was a freeze on physicians' fees reimbursible by Medicare. Proponents of the Baucus amendment asserted that this freeze likely will shift a greater burden of increased health care costs to Medicare beneficiaries because only half of the nation's doctors agree to accept what Medicare pays as full payment (known as "accepting assignment") and the remainder charge their full fees directly to Medicare patients, leaving them to obtain any reimbursement they can from Medicare but to pay the difference out of their own pockets. Proponents of the Baucus amendment held that shifting costs to beneficiaries does little to control costs because most decisions concerning specifics and intensity of medical care are made by physicians rather than by patients, since those decisions require skill and experience. Consequently Congress should not try to achieve savings by shifting costs to the elderly, but should attack the heart of the problem: the desperate need for a fair and comprehensive system to control the upward spiral of health care costs that far exceeds the rate of general inflation.

Social Security Disability Insurance

4) Garn motion to table the Levin-Cohen-Byrd, et al, amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984 comprehensively reforming the Social Security Disability Insurance system, establishing objective standards for eligibility on a nationwide basis, establishing standard procedures for eligibility review and termination, continuing authority for payment of benefits during appeal proceedings, and myriad other adjustments in the program. (Vote No. 375—98th Congress, 1st Session).

80% of Democrats voting voted against the motion to table.

75% of Republicans voting voted for the motion to table.

The motion to table was approved, 49-46.

November 17, 1983.

During 1980, responding to reports that disability payments were being paid to some persons who were not truly disabled, the Congress passed legislation that, among other things, required the

Social Security Administration (SSA), beginning in 1981, to review the status of each SSDI recipient at least once every three years unless the recipient's disability had been classified as permanent. When the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, it evidently saw an opportunity to achieve dramatic savings by instituting these reviews immediately—without taking the time or effort to carefully plan review criteria or train the caseworkers who would make the reviews. Further, evidence is available that SSA officials, in the words of the New York Times, "quietly made clear...that more claims were to be denied."

The result was bedlam. Between March 1981 when the reviews began and June of 1983, 1,134,000 disabled persons' cases were reviewed—with a termination rate that approached 50 percent at some points and hovered around 45 percent for over a year. By June, 1983, 421,000 of those reviewed since March, 1981 had been terminated. Many appealed that decision, and the remarkable proportion of the decisions reversed by Administrative Law Judges raised further questions about the reliability of the SSA's new review process—that is, when the judges could get to the cases. The massive increase in appeals slowed an already overburdened appellate process to a crawl. In September, over 173,000 appeals cases were pending before the Administrative Law Judges—an increase of 60,000 in the backlog in only one year. Some individuals must wait from 6 to 12 months even to get a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge—at which the Judges often have been concluding that termination was unwarranted in the first place. The needless agony and uncertainty caused to the disabled by this situation—most of whom believe they have no prospect of obtaining or successfully holding gainful employment—can be devastating.

Angered by the situation, a number of the states have taken matters into their own hands, either tossing out the SSA eligibility determination and redetermination criteria and substituting their own, or imposing a moratorium on all disability program terminations until adequate criteria are developed and implemented. When coupled with the fact that a number of state disability determination agencies are operating under varying court-ordered criteria, in effect there no longer is a national disability insurance program.

After considerable frustration in efforts to obtain Finance Committee consideration of badly-needed comprehensive Disability Insurance reform legislation, the sponsors of reform legislation in the Senate decided to seek to add the provisions of reform legislation to the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, in the hope that the House would accept the amendment and the vital improvements in the program would be put in place before Congress adjourned for two months. Unfortunately, substantial Republican opposition doomed the disabled to continue to contend with the flawed program at least until Congress returns late in January of 1984 and has time to consider this legislation again.

PROTECTING OUR NATURAL HERITAGE AND ENSURING ENERGY SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several decades, a bipartisan consensus has been developed with respect to the nation's energy policy and the management of the nation's vast publicly-owned lands and natural resources. Energy policy was forged in response to the severe disruptions to the American economy in 1974 and 1979 as a result of politically-motivated decisions by OPEC and events in the Middle East which quadrupled the world price of oil. The resultant economic shocks provided ample evidence of the vulnerability of the American economy to the actions of OPEC and the economic consequences of the political instability of the Middle East.

The congressional response was a balanced energy policy which included measures—such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)—to mitigate the economic shocks of any future oil disruption, and to facilitate the balanced development of energy technologies and resources which could serve as alternatives to imported oil. The more efficient use of energy and the development of renewable energy resources were also central elements of the nation's energy policy.

Unfortunately, since the advent of the current Administration, there has been a concerted effort to dismantle major components of the nation's energy policy. In the Senate, the Majority has supported drastic cuts in funds for energy conservation and the development of renewable energy resources. Planning by state governments and the federal government for energy emergencies has been virtually eliminated. Now the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is all that stands between us and the economic disaster which would result from another oil disruption. Indeed, filling the SPR in a timely manner should be a high priority, especially considering the war between Iran and Iraq, which has raged on for more than 40 months, and which jeopardizes the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, at a time when the world price of oil has fallen to less than $30 per barrel, Republicans have supported a one-third reduction in the SPR fill-rate.

Finally, rather than pursue the carefully balanced development of energy technologies, the Majority has supported massive increases in federal R&D for nuclear energy, while drastically cutting federal research in support of other energy technologies, such as coal.

The bipartisan consensus with respect to the management of the nation's vast publicly-owned natural resources and lands has also fallen victim to extremist policies. For decades there has been broad agreement that public resources and lands should be made available for the long-term benefit of the American people. Public lands should be used for a variety of purposes, including wilderness areas, wildlife habitat, recreation, watershed protection, scenic beauty, the production of minerals and the cutting of timber, and livestock grazing. The management of these resources should assure that the use of such resources by private interests does not destroy their long-term productivity.

During his tenure as Secretary of the Interior, James Watt demonstrated an almost total disregard for the terms of the nation's long-standing consensus on the management of natural resources. In his 30 months in office, James Watt managed to turn the Department of the Interior into a battleground where continual skirmishes were fought between the Secretary and the Congress. For example, the GAO estimated that the federal government received $100 million less than fair market value for coal leases sold during the Powder River Basin coal sale. The Republican majority refused to support Democratic proposals to temporarily suspend future sales to allow time for the Department to re-evaluate and improve its leasing procedures.

Under Mr. Watt's leadership, the Administration's policies also included opening wilderness areas and vast areas of the Outer Continental Shelf to oil and gas exploration and drilling, placing a moratorium on the further acquisition of needed parklands, and placing a moratorium on the further listing of endangered species. These policies represented a total lack of appreciation for the extent to which the American people support the careful management and protection of the nation's natural heritage.

On October 9, 1983, Mr. Watt submitted his resignation rather than face a vote on a resolution introduced by Senate Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd which called upon the President to ask for Mr. Watt's resignation. Mounting concern that the American people would no longer tolerate extremist policies toward the public's natural resources made it clear that Republican Senators could no longer support Mr. Watt, and that the resolution would pass by a wide margin.

In the areas of energy policy and natural resource management, the Administration has chosen to disregard the long-standing broad bipartisan consensus which served as a beacon for policy. As a consequence, they have jeopardized the energy security of the nation. This short-sightedness enhances the nation's vulnerability to energy disruptions as a result of political turmoil in the Middle East, or from other unforeseen events.

THE RECORD

Secretary of the Interior James Watt

1) Hatfield motion to table an amendment by Johnston, et al, to the 1984 Supplemental Appropriations bill expressing the sense of the Senate that previous policies of the Department of the Interior under Secretary James Watt altered well-established programs and caused unprecedented public controversy and litigation. The amendment called on the new Secretary of the Interior, William P. Clark, to take immediate action to insure that the Department's policies conform with the expressed will of Congress and to restore public confidence in the Department's policies by: ending efforts to lease, for energy development, lands under study for possible designation as wilderness; prohibiting intensified commercial development within wildlife refuges; rejecting plans for the sale and disposal of millions of acres of public lands; resuming both needed purchases of lands for National Parks, National Wildlife Refuges, and National Forests and funding for state and local acquisition of parks and recreational lands; and establishing policies for leasing public mineral resources under conditions of careful environmental protection. (Vote 376—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   None of the Democrats voting supported this motion.

   94% of the Republicans voting supported this motion.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 48-42.

   November 17, 1983.

President Reagan nominated National Security Adviser William P. Clark, a longtime, close personal friend, to succeed James Watt as Secretary of the Interior. President Reagan noted during his announcement of the nomination, that Mr. Clark is a "God-fearing westerner, a fourth-generation rancher, a person I trust, and I think he will be a great Secretary of the Interior." Democrats were concerned that with such meager environmental credentials Mr. Clark would simply carry on the misguided policies initiated by his predecessor. In effect, the amendment simply reiterated the terms of the bipartisan consensus with respect to natural resource management, and expressed the sense of the Congress that the terms of this consensus should be respected by the new Secretary.

Coal Leasing

1) Bumpers amendment to the FY 1983 Interior Appropriations bill deleting $2.13 million from the Bureau of Land Management's coal leasing program in order to delay the two major coal sales for fiscal 1983 and 1984 to permit Congress to review changes in the coal leasing program. (Vote No. 404—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

   95% of the Democrats voting supported this amendment.

   88% of the Republicans voting opposed it.

   The amendment was rejected, 47-48.

   December 14, 1982.

In April of 1982 the Department of the Interior held a coal lease sale of 1.6 billion tons of federal coal in the Powder River Basin. The Department's procedures for the sale caused considerable controversy. For example, the Department apparently sold the leases at far below market value by reducing, only days before the sale, the minimum acceptable bid from $94.7 million to $52.5 million. Furthermore, only three of the 13 coal leases attracted more than one bidder, and two received no bid. Finally, the magnitude of the sale raised serious concern about the wisdom of making such massive quantities of coal available at a time when a 25 year supply of federal coal is already under lease. This would only contribute to the currently depressed conditions in the nation's coal industry.

The amendment was the first effort subsequent to the Powder River Basin sale to urge a reconsideration of the Department's coal leasing practices under Secretary James Watt.

2) Bumpers-Jackson amendment to the FY 1983 Supplemental Appropriations bill establishing a temporary suspension of coal leasing until October 1, 1983, in order for the Bureau of Land Management to develop criteria for determining the "fair market value" of coal leases according to the law and the GAO. (Vote No. 138—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   84% of the Democrats voting supported this amendment.

   81% of the Republicans voting opposed it.

   The amendment was rejected, 48-51.

   June 14, 1983.

The GAO conducted a study of the Department of the Interior's controversial Powder River Basin coal lease sale, the largest in the nation's history, and concluded that the federal government received approximately $100 million less than fair market value. This led to charges that the Department held a "fire sale" for federal coal. The amendment proposed the only reasonable way to resolve the issue: suspend future sales to allow time for the re-evaluation of the Department's leasing procedures, and to allow for any necessary adjustments.

Although the Senate rejected the amendment, the final agreement on the Supplemental Appropriations bill contained language establishing a special commission to review and make recommendations with respect to the Department of Interior's practices for establishing fair market value.

On September 20, 1983 the Senate Majority finally agreed, by a vote of 63-33, to a Bumpers amendment to the Interior Appropriations bill imposing a temporary suspension on further coal leasing pending the report of the Commission.

Strategic Petroleum Reserve

1) Bradley-Melcher amendment to the FY 1984 Interior Appropriations bill appropriating an additional $370 million for planning, construction, and administration of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to continue construction of the Big Hill Storage Facility, and an additional $982 million for SPR petroleum acquisition for a fill rate of 220,000 barrels per day instead of 145,000 barrels per day as provided for in the bill. (Vote No. 255—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   95% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

   77% of the Republicans voting opposed it.

   The amendment was adopted, 54-43.

   September 20, 1983.

The United States remains highly vulnerable to politically-motivated oil supply disruptions. Indeed, the oil-rich Middle East remains one of the most politically unstable regions of the world. For example, the bitter war between Iran and Iraq has gone into its fourth year, and there are indications that the fighting may grow more intense. Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini has threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz through which 8 million barrels of oil per day move to Western markets. The conflict in Lebanon has already cost the lives of more than 230 American marines, and the prospects for a peaceful settlement in that troubled nation are uncertain. Signs of unrest appear in other parts of the Middle East as well, such as the bombing of the American embassy in oil-rich Kuwait by Moslem extremists.

When filled to its 750 million barrel capacity, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve remains our best protection against the economic impacts of any future oil disruptions. In 1982, the Senate agreed to fill the SPR at a rate of 300,000 barrels per day, with a minimum of 220,000 barrels per day. This year, the Majority proposed a reduction in the fill rate to 145,000 barrels per day for fiscal year 1984, and a further reduction to 100,000 barrels per day thereafter. The amendment restored the 220,000 barrel per day fill rate.

Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project

1) Bumpers-Humphrey amendment to the FY 1983 Continuing Appropriations bill prohibiting use of funds for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project instead of continuing funding at the level of $227 million as proposed in the bill. (Vote No. 365—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

70% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

67% of the Republicans voting opposed it.

The amendment was rejected, 48-49.

September 29, 1982.

For the first time in the history of the project, the House of Representatives voted to terminate funding. However, the Senate supported the project despite numerous technical and fiscal questions.

During the Senate-House conference it was agreed that funding would continue for the project. However, the Department of Energy was directed to develop and recommend a new financing plan for the Clinch River Breeder Project. The new plan was to include greater private sector participation in the project's financing.

2) Committee amendment to the FY 1983 Continuing Resolution restoring funds for the research and development, design, and construction of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project. (Vote No. 426—97th Congress, 2nd Session)

76% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

73% of Republicans voting supported it.

The amendment was agreed to, 49-48.

December 17, 1982

The controversial Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project has become a focal point of the debate over national energy policy.

Critics have argued that the costs of the Clinch River project have continually escalated. They argue that the project was authorized in 1970 and initial appropriations were provided in 1972. In 1972 the cost of the project was estimated to be $699 million. In 1974, the cost estimate for the project had risen to $1.7 billion. GAO estimates that the total final cost for the project will be $8.8 billion.

Critics have also raised concerns related to the technology itself (e.g., whether the particular technology chosen for the Clinch River project will be obsolete by the time the project is completed;

whether it is wise to move forward with a project which will hasten the coming of the plutonium economy). These and other considerations raise serious questions regarding the commercial value of the Clinch River project.

On October 26, 1983, the opponents of the project appeared to have made their point as the Senate rejected an Appropriations Committee amendment to the 1984 Supplemental Appropriations bill which would have continued funding for the Clinch River project.

FOREIGN POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL

Nomination of Kenneth Adelman to be ACDA Director

1) Nomination of Kenneth Adelman to be ACDA Director (Vote No. 55—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   83% of Democrats voting opposed the nomination.

   92% of Republicans voting supported the nomination.

   The nomination was approved, 57-42.

   April 14, 1983.

The nomination of Kenneth Adelman to replace Eugene Rostow, who was the Administration's original choice to head ACDA but who was subsequently forced to resign, was rent with controversy from the very beginning.

The Adelman nomination only reinforced the perception that the Reagan Administration was not committed to negotiations with the Soviet Union. During the presidential campaign of 1980, then-candidate Ronald Reagan promised that he would move quickly, if elected, to initiate "meaningful strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union." From the very beginning, the Administration was slow, if not reluctant, to implement this campaign promise. In fact, it was only after massive demonstrations were held in Western Europe during the summer of 1981, partially in reaction to Administration assertions that a limited nuclear war was not out of the realm of possibility, that the White House felt compelled to reopen negotiations begun by the Carter Administration on limiting intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. It was only after the nuclear freeze movement in this country gained such momentum, that the Administration felt compelled to initiate START talks with the Soviet Union in July of 1982.

The fact that a Republican Administration would nominate an individual with little, if any, experience in arms control matters raised the specter once again that the Administration was not serious. The issue of the competence of the nominee called into question once again the commitment of the Administration to serious negotiations.

After the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations failed to report the Adelman nomination favorably, by a vote of 8 to 9, the Committee reported the nomination with a recommendation that Adelman not be confirmed by a vote of 14 to 3. It was only the thirteenth time in this century that a Senate committee had recommended that an Executive branch nomination be rejected.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, led by the Democrats, made it clear that Adelman lacked the stature, qualifications, and commitment to arms control necessary to be head of ACDA. Despite the fact that Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd warned that it was the Senate's responsibility under the Constitution to determine the competence of a nominee for a position of high responsibility in our government, Adelman's nomination was rubber-stamped by 92 percent of the Republican Senators.

Lebanon Multinational Force/War Powers

1) Baker motion to table Byrd, et al, extending for another 60-day period the continued deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon and requiring the President to submit a report to the Congress as directed by the War Powers Resolution when U.S. armed forces are introduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. (Vote No. 269—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   100% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

   100% of the Republicans voting supported the motion to table.

   The motion to table was approved, 55-45.

   September 29, 1983.

2) Baker motion to table the Pell-Dixon amendment to shorten the authorized period of participation of U.S. Armed Forces in the Multinational Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon from 18 to six months. (Vote No. 270—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   82% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

   98% of the Republicans voting opposed the motion to table.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 62-38.

   September 29, 1983.

3) Baker motion to table the Tsongas amendment which would modify the finding of Congress that the U.S. was participating in the MNF in order to "restore full control by the Government of Lebanon over its own territory" to state that such participation was in order to "maintain a secure area from which the Government of Lebanon can restore full control." (Vote No. 271—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   93% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

   98% of the Republicans voting supported the motion to table.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 56-42.

   September 29, 1983.

4) Baker motion to table the Levin-Randolph amendment to include in the resolution a declaration instead of a congressional finding that actual or imminent hostilities involving U.S. Armed Forces came into being on August 29, 1983. (Vote No. 272—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   100% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

   100% of the Republicans voting supported the motion to table.

   The motion to table was defeated, 54-45.

   September 29, 1983.

5) Baker motion to table the Eagleton amendment which would limit the actions of U.S. forces in Lebanon to defensive responses to ensure the safety of the MNF and requiring the President to include in his three-month reports to the Congress "the results of efforts to secure the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and to restore full control by the government of Lebanon over its own territory." (Vote No. 273—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   76% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

   100% of the Republicans voting supported the motion to table.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 66-34.

   September 29, 1983.

6) Final passage of the joint resolution providing statutory authorization under the War Powers Resolution for continued U.S. participation in the MNF in Lebanon for an additional 18 months. (Vote No. 274—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   96% of the Democrats voting opposed passage.

   95% of the Republicans voting supported passage.

   The joint resolution was pased, 54-46.

   September 29, 1983.

On August 29, 1983, two U.S. Marines in the Multinational Force in Lebanon were killed when U.S. positions around the Beirut airport came under hostile fire. The event triggered the applicable provisions of the War Powers Resolution (passed over presidential veto in 1973) which require congressional authorization to continue the deployment of U.S. troops in a hostile situation or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

Under the War Powers Resolution, the President is to submit a report to the Congress within 48 hours of such an event setting forth the following:

(a) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(b) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(c) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

Based upon the information and justification contained in the report, it is then up to Congress to determine whether or not to declare war, enact a specific authorization for use of United States Armed Forces, or to extend the 60-day period for which the President can continue the deployment under the law.

The Executive branch maintains that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional because it imposes upon the President's constitutionally-designated responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Democrats maintain Congress is a partner in this process as dictated by the War Powers Resolution and by the Constitution of the United States. As Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd explained:

> Any suggestion that the President of the United States is vested with sole responsibility for the warmaking powers of our government flies completely in the face of the Constitution and the intent of the Founding Fathers. The Constitution is clear that the power to declare war, as well as the power to raise and maintain armies and navies, belongs to the Congress. Under the Constitution, the President is designated as Commander-in-Chief for the purpose of prosecuting wars authorized by the Congress.

The Democratic Leader explained during a September 14, 1983, floor speech that "We should keep in mind that the Founding Fathers constructed a government of intricate checks and balances in order to avoid the abuses they had suffered at the hands of the British monarchs. It was the power of the British sovereign to initiate war on its own prerogative that led to a deliberate decision on the part of the framers of our Constitution to vest powers to declare war in the body most broadly representative of the people."

Just as important as the institutional issue of the warmaking powers of our government for the Democrats, was the issue that the rationale for the continued presence of U.S. Marines in Lebanon had changed dramatically from a year ago. In September, 1982 the Administration claimed that Marines were being sent into Lebanon as part of the MNF until such time as the Government of Lebanon had been able to bring order to Beirut and had been able to bring greater Beirut under its total control. That mission changed a year later when the Administration committed the United States to remaining in Lebanon until all foreign forces had been withdrawn, until a government of national unity had been established, and until such time as the Government of Lebanon could exercise sovereign control over all of its territory.

It was this concern as to what our goals were in Lebanon, in light of a major policy shift on the part of the Administration, which led Democrats to oppose an authorization which would give the

President carte blanche indefinitely. In addition to the normal reporting requirements contained in the War Powers Resolution, the Democrats stated, in their alternative to the open-ended authorization, that the President should provide Congress with information describing the specific goals of U.S. policy in Lebanon, the specific roles and missions of the U.S. forces in Lebanon, and the specific criteria that were being applied to determine when the U.S. forces had accomplished their role and mission.

Democrats were also concerned that the role of the U.S. forces in the MNF had changed from that of peacekeeping, to one of siding with one of the players in what was essentially a Lebanese civil war. By committing ourselves to supporting the government of President Amin Gemayel and siding with the Lebanese Army in its efforts to gain control of the Chouf Mountains, U.S. forces became directly involved in hostilities with the Druze militia. Our role as a neutral peacekeeping force had changed. The U.S. was now directly involved on the side of one of the participants in an internal dispute.

However, on a straight party-line vote, the Republican controlled Senate rejected the alternative by the Democrats which required the President to provide Congress with information critical to making an informed judgment on authorizing the continued presence of U.S. Marines in Lebanon.

Failing that, Democrats attempted to shorten the authorized period for participation of U.S. Armed Forces in the MNF from 18 to six months. That amendment was defeated, largely along party lines as well.

Democrats could not support granting to the Executive branch carte blanche to deploy U.S. forces in a hostile situation in the absence of a sufficient justification from the President. Once again, Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd framed the argument:

> ...the Administration has not provided sufficient justification as to the national interests served by an open-ended commitment of U.S. combat forces in Lebanon. It has not provided preponderant evidence which would warrant risking the lives of American men and women in a foreign land.
>
> Those parents back in our home states may be asking us, months from now, why their children had to die. They will be asking us what purpose was served, what goal was achieved, what vital national interest was at stake which required the sacrifice of young American lives. And our answers had better be a lot more meaningful than the mere assertion that the President wanted 18 more months.

Unfortunately, 264 U.S. servicemen have been killed in Lebanon since the 18-month extension was approved by the Senate on September 29, 1983. The information the Democrats were seeking with their alternative, in order to determine whether the continued U.S. presence was justified, still has not been forthcoming.

Foreign Aid

1) Domenici motion to table the Melcher amendment to the First Budget Resolution, 1984 (S. Con. Res. 27) transferring $200 million in fiscal 1984 budget authority and $100 million in fiscal 1984 outlays from the International Affairs Function to fund soil conservation programs in the United States. (Vote No. 83—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   73% of the Democrats voting opposed the tabling motion.

   83% of the Republicans voting supported the tabling motion.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 56-41.

   May 10, 1983.

2) Domenici motion to table the Melcher-Randolph-Pressler amendment to the First Budget Resolution, 1984 (S. Con. Res. 27) transferring $89 million from Foreign Aid to fund soil conservation programs in the United States. (Vote No. 105—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   67% of the Democrats voting opposed the tabling motion.

   78% of the Republicans voting supported the tabling motion.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 57-43.

   May 19, 1983.

3) Leahy amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1983 (H.R. 3069) reducing foreign aid by $376 million. (Vote No. 132—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   89% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

   85% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

   The amendment was defeated, 39-45.

   June 9, 1983.

4) Baker motion to table the Mathias, et al, amendment to the fiscal 1984 Continuing Appropriations (H.J. Res. 413) reducing grant military assistance from $697 million to $421 million, which would still provide a 10 percent increase over appropriations for FY 1983. (Vote No. 354—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   78% of the Democrats voting opposed tabling.

   83% of the Republicans voting supported tabling.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 46-37.

   November 11, 1983.

While the Republican Administration has slashed vitally needed domestic programs directed at assisting the poor, the disabled, the elderly, the young, and programs directed at conserving our natural resource base, the first three years of the Reagan Administration has seen a phenomenal growth in foreign aid requests.

Democrats believe that foreign aid should be held to the same standards to which the Administration has held domestic programs. If the times do require austerity in federal expenditures, then austerity measures should be applied across the board. However, Republican Senators have consistently disagreed with Democrats on this issue.

In addition, Democrats are concerned over the militarization of U.S. aid programs during the course of the present Republican Administration. While economic assistance directed at alleviating hunger, disease, poverty, and illiteracy in the developing world has increased by a total of 5 percent over the past three years, grant military aid has increased by 179 percent, foreign military sales loans by 75 percent, and security supporting assistance (which is tied to countries which the U.S. determines to be strategically important to us) has increased by 37 percent. For example, during fiscal year 1982, grant military aid totaled $178.5 million. In the fiscal year 1984 continuing resolution considered by the Senate, $697 million was made available for military aid.

Democrats supported limiting grant military assistance in fiscal 1984 to $421 million 10 percent growth over the 1983 level of $384 million. Democrats noted that even a 10 percent growth in this program was much higher than the rate of growth the Senate approved in the Defense Appropriations bill, which was 4.5 percent.

However, Republicans held the line in steadfast support of the President's desire to spread military largess around the world.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

Strategic Weapons Systems

1) Tower motion to table the Nunn-Hatch-Johnston, et al, amendment shifting $888 million from multiyear procurement of the B-1 bomber to finance conventional force modernization programs. (Vote No. 190—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   77% of Democrats voting supported the amendment and opposed the motion to table it.

   87% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment and supported the motion to table it.

   The amendment was rejected and the motion to table accepted, 56-41.

   July 14, 1983.

The purpose of the amendment was, first, to establish a more sensible balance between the modernization of our strategic weapons systems and the necessity of a vigorous readiness program for our conventional forces.

Secondly, the amendment was designed to enforce a better regime of cost-consciousness in our major weapons programs.

The B-1B does not meet the statutory definition of stability of design with a fixed and determined cost which is required for multiyear procurement. The B-1B requires redesigning of at least 20 percent of the airframe, 30 percent of the offensive radar, and 40 percent of the defensive avionics. Second, the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimated the B-1's true cost would be $4 billion higher than the official estimate while the GAO claims the overrun will be as much as $20 billion. The production schedule proposed under MYP funding is unrealistic. The schedule calls for production of 1 B-1B in 1982, 7 in 1983, 10 in 1984, 34 in 1985, 48 in 1986 and 0 in 1987. It is unlikely, however, that Congress would be able so precipitously to halt production of a weapons program that will employ over 50,000 workers. Instead, Congress would bow to the considerable constituency supporting the program and continue production well beyond 1986. In this manner, the B-1 could delay the Stealth program, which is the only bomber that everyone is confident could penetrate Soviet defenses in the 1990's. The amendment would provide a more realistic bomber production schedule of 1, 7, 10, 31, 36, and 15, respectively for fiscal 1982-87. Therefore, it would allow a smoother transition from the B-1 to eventual production of the Stealth bomber. Accepting the Air Force cost estimates, a rescheduling of productionwould add $1.5 billion in cost to the B-1B program for a total program cost of $22 billion. The Air Force cost estimates, however, are based on illusory economies that are unlikely to be achieved. In contrast, this amendment would realize a net $1 billion in savings in the overall defense budget by correcting serious underfunding of important conventional weapons, including 3 F-15 fighters, 120 M-1 tanks, 16 AAH-64 helicopters, and 238 Patriot air defense missiles and funds for a fleet oiler and an amphibious assault ship.

Production of New Nerve Gas Weapons

1) Tower motion to table the Pryor amendment to prohibit the production of lethal binary chemical munitions (nerve gas) and related production, facilities, equipment and precursor chemicals. (Vote No. 184—98th Congress, 1st Session) (Similar vote, No. 342, on November 8, 1983).

   70% of Democrats voting supported the amendment and opposed the tabling motion.

   67% of Republican voting opposed the amendment and supported the tabling motion.

   The amendment was rejected and the tabling motion was agreed to, 49-49, with Vice President Bush voting to break the tie vote.

   July 13, 1983.

The amendment emphasized that money has already been appropriated for production facilities, but there is no reason to end our 14-year moratorium on building chemical weapons. The U.S. would be served better by resuming bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons, which the Administration has failed to pursue for two and a half years. The current 200,000 tons of U.S. chemical munitions provide adequate deterrence to Soviet attack and incentive for the Soviets to negotiate an arms control agreement. The Secretary of Defense has issued a report concluding that metal deterioration of the current inventory is not serious and that the military utility of both the 155 millimeter and 8-inch shells has not been seriously degraded. In order to enhance deterrence, the U.S. should establish a credible doctrine for retaliatory use of chemical weapons, which does not currently exist, and improve its ability to protect people from chemical weapons. These lethal weapons do not kill soldiers, who possess the necessary protection, but a suffering civilian populous. Our NATO allies, in whose countries these weapons would be used, refuse to accept deployment of new weapons; deterrence will not be enhanced without deployment. The cost of the chemical weapons program, which may range between $6 and $15 billion, would divert funds needlessly from other programs. In addition, one of the weapons in question, the "Big Eye" bomb, should be delayed because it has serious flaws and has undergone inadequate testing.

Conventional Force Readiness

1) Tower motion to table the Levin amendment to the Omnibus Defense Authorization Act of 1984 (S. 675) to restore cuts made by the Armed Services Committee in essential combat readiness areas, such as spare parts, Navy flying hours, maintenance operations, conventional (as opposed to nuclear) missiles, and for food and clothing of U.S. combat forces. (Vote No. 194—98th Congress, 1st Session)

   77% of the Democrats voting opposed the Tower motion and supported the Levin readiness amendment.

   100% of the Republicans voting supported the Tower motion and opposed the Levin amendment.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 60-34.

   July 14, 1983.

Most Democrats supported this amendment, which would restore Armed Services Committee cuts in 47 combat readiness areas which are critically important but often neglected. Procurement of strategic nuclear systems is being pursued at the expense of the more basic and necessary conventional forces and military readiness programs. NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, General Bernard Rogers has warned, "We have mortgaged our defense to the nuclear response." If attacked conventionally under current conditions, he added, the U.S. would have to launch a nuclear attack fairly quickly because our conventional combat forces could not be sustained. Readiness and personnel requirements are continually being underfunded in order to afford nuclear systems such as the MX, a weapon which is set to receive twice the amount of budget authority and triple the amount of outlays provided in this amendment in 1984. If either the B-1 Bomber or the MX programs were deleted from the defense budget, proponents pointed out, there would be more than enough funding for these vital restorations provided in the Levin amendment.

Arms Control Missile Testing Pause

1) Kassebaum-Bumpers, et al, amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1984 (H.R. 4185) stating the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose a pause in the testing of new ICBM missiles to the Soviet Union. (Vote No. 339—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   79% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

   79% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

   The amendment was rejected, 42-50.

   November 7, 1983.

Democrats generally favored proposing a testing pause to the Soviet Union in the area of intercontinental missiles. The amendment stated the sense of the Senate that the President should announce the willingness of the U.S. to suspend flight testing for new MIRVed ICBMs while strategic arms negotiations proceed, if the USSR would suspend the flight testing of such missiles, and that any agreement entered into between the U.S. and the USSR providing for mutual suspension of the flight testing of new MIRVed ICBMs, should provide for reliable means of verification.

The amendment would also keep the United States in an advantageous position regarding solid fuel missiles. While the U.S. Minuteman force is composed of solid fuel rockets, the deployed Soviet ICBMs are all liquid fuel. Solid fuel permits higher reliability and substantially quicker reaction time. The new Soviet missiles undergoing testing, however, are solid fuel. Placing a verifiable pause on such testing, therefore, is advantageous to the American position.

Democrats argued this was a sensible arms control proposal which tested the sincerity of the Administration on the matter of arms control generally.

Strategic Systems: The MX

1) Baker motion to table a Dixon amendment to delay consideration of the MX until the President submits a report to the Congress proposing and containing plans for a basing mode for the MX missile that is either deceptive or mobile. (Vote No. 113—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   81% of the Democrats voting opposed the Baker tabling motion and supported the Dixon Amendment.

   98% of the Republicans voting supported the Baker tabling motion and opposed the Dixon Amendment.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 59-35.

   May 24, 1983.

2) Adoption of the resolution approving the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated in the FY 1983 Continuing Resolution, P.L. 97-377, for MX missile procurement and full-scale engineering development of a basing mode. (Vote No. 114—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   73% of Democrats voting voted for the resolution.

   89% of Republicans voting opposed the resolution.

   The resolution was agreed to, 59-39.

   May 25, 1983.

Most Democrats rejected (See Vote Nos. 218, 219, and 237 which are also pertinent MX votes) the basing of the MX missile in a non-deceptive and non-mobile basing mode, arguing that the addition of this missile to America's strategic arsenal in this configuration was of questionable value. The new MX missile's outdated basing—nearly completely vulnerable to a first strike take-out by Soviet targets—would not add to our counterforce capability. Furthermore, it tends to push us toward a launch-on-warning strategy to save at least a portion of the force from obliteration. Such a launch-on-warning strategy is inherently destabilizing and puts the nuclear forces of the nation in a hair-trigger situation where misjudgments and miscalculations could prove catastrophic.

It was argued that building a vulnerable first strike new missile (1) does not advance arms control, and (2) will be so expensive that even the Administration's stated commitment to Midgetman may not be affordable. Thus Midgetman, sound in concept, could well be indefinitely delayed because of the fiscal problem of funding two new strategic missiles (the MX and Midgetman) in addition to the funding for a third new missile, the submarine-launched D-5 which is generally approved of by Democrats.

Equal Pay Incentive for Recruits

1) Tower motion to table the Melcher amendment to the Omnibus Defense Authorization Act of 1984 (S. 675) permitting the transfer of funds to recruiting activities and out of DOD media and advertising in order to provide military personnel of Grade E-1 with less than four months service with the four percent COLA provided for all other military personnel in the bill. (Vote No. 217—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   72% of Democrats voting opposed the Tower tabling motion and supported the Melcher amendment.

   100% of Republicans voting supported the Tower tabling motion and opposed the Melcher amendment.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 56-26.

   July 25, 1983.

Democrats supported the amendment arguing that the goals for both enlisted and officer recruits have been met, but the quality and caliber of the recruits must be upgraded. It is entirely appropriate to subtract from the Pentagon's $130 million media advertising budget the funds necessary to pay all E-1's the same cost-of-living adjustment as the other grades. E-1's and E-2's are typically on duty up to 60 hours a week and are in for a 3-year hitch. Penalizing new entrants is not the way to attract the kind of people the volunteer military needs. Although the estimated cost of $14 million dollars is modest, this debate is necessary to protect those at the bottom from becoming the scapegoats of efforts to hold down military costs.

Nuclear Freeze

1) Dole motion to table the Kennedy-Hatfield amendment to the Public Debt Limit (H.J. Res. 308) which sets a nuclear freeze as a national goal in the area of arms control. (Vote No. 327—98th Congress, 1st Session)

   73% of the Democrats voting supported Kennedy and opposed the Dole tabling motion.

   87% of the Republicans voting opposed Kennedy and supported the Dole tabling motion.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 58-40.

   October 31, 1983.

Most Democrats supported the arms control freeze concept as a general goal which should be pursued over the long-run for the United States. The specifics of how to achieve such an ambitious long-term goal are the subject of honest disagreement among serious proponents of arms control, but the issue here is whether the nation should, as the most responsible superpower, dedicate itself to the achievement of this goal.

The Kennedy-Hatfield amendment stated that as an immediate arms control objective, the U.S. and the Soviet Union should (1) pursue an immediate and complete halt to the nuclear arms race, (2) decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and (3) give special attention to stabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve; and proceeding from the freeze, the U.S. and USSR should pursue major mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability.

CRIME

1) Thurmond motion to table the Biden-DeConcini, et al, amendment establishing a Director of National and International Drug Operations and Policy with the responsibility for the coordination and direction of all federal efforts by the numerous agencies to stop the flow of drugs; establishing for one year a 16-member Commission on Drug Interdiction and Enforcement to recommend a coordinated national effort to stop the flow of drugs; and appropriating $1 million for these efforts. (Vote No. 317—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   95% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

   75% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

   The motion to table was defeated, 40-53.

   October 26, 1983.

Democrats have maintained that the key to getting a real handle on the problem of violent street crime in this country is to stop the massive flow of illegal drugs which continue to come in unabated. Studies have demonstrated the direct relationship between narcotics and street crime, as addicts must steal to support their expensive habits.

The Minority believes that the Administration's so-called war on drugs has been an abysmal failure, and that drastic new steps are essential to truly be effective. The major failing has been the absence of any clearly-defined national narcotics policy being implemented with a commensurate commitment of national resources in an organized and meaningful fashion. At the present time, a plethora of government agencies separately, and without overall direction or purpose, are all "doing their own thing," without substantial contribution to an overall national strategy.

Our solution to this problem has been legislation which would create a cabinet-level "drug czar" to design and direct the entire federal effort. He would be required to actually formulate and submit to the Congress a detailed national policy, together with his plans for implementation. As distinguished from the current system, this one individual would have the power and the mandate to direct the entire national effort, coordinating strategy among the various agencies—FBI, CIA, State, Customs, Defense, etc.—with the authority to even move manpower around if the need arose.

Legislation creating the "drug czar" position was passed by the Senate as an amendment to an appropriations measure during the last session after the Democrats, with limited Republican support, beat back an effort led by the Republican Senate leadership to defeat the measure. Ninety-five percent of the Senate Democrats voted to create the drug czar office, while only 13 Republicans supported our effort. The provision did not survive the Senate-House conference on the underlying appropriations bill.

Administration opposition to our proposal has been so strong that the President vetoed a major bipartisan crime package in 1982 primarily because it contained a similar "drug czar" provision which had been included by the Democrats in that legislation.

This year, a modified version of our original drug proposal again passed in the Senate and awaits House action.

CIVIL RIGHTS

1) Kennedy amendment sunsetting the immigration bill's (S. 529) employer sanctions provisions if the Comptroller General, in the last report he must file with the Congress (six years following enactment), finds that these provisions have resulted in a widespread pattern of discrimination against U.S. citizens or eligible workers, and if both Houses pass a concurrent resolution confirming such findings within 30 days. (Vote No. 64—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   68% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

   75% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

   The amendment was rejected, 40-51.

   April 28, 1983.

The immigration bill which passed the Senate last year contained a provision establishing criminal penalties for employers who hire illegal aliens. While supportive of this approach, Democrats were concerned that employers might attempt to avoid legal problems by just refusing to hire anyone who "looked like a foreigner," resulting in potentially substantial discrimination against millions of ethnic Americans.

As a consequence of this concern, over two-thirds of the Democrats supported an amendment to the immigration bill which would have terminated the penal provisions if, after a period of several years, it was determined that they were resulting in a widespread pattern of discrimination against U.S. citizens.

The amendment, which failed, was opposed by three-fourths of the Republicans.

In addition to our efforts to protect minority rights on legislation such as the measure described above, Democrats were forced to wage a hard and protracted battle to try to maintain the independence of the Civil Rights Commission against Reagan Administration efforts to fire Commission members who disagreed with Administration civil rights policies. The Administration had fired two of the six members in 1982, and sought to fire three more during the last session. All the Democrats on the Judiciary Committee stood firm in resistance to this effort, and, obtaining the support of two Republican members, were able to force the Administration to back down and to settle for a "compromise" new Commission, with members to be selected from both parties, by both the White House and the Congress. The Administration has nevertheless been able to "stack" even the newly-formulated Commission and thereby wholly undermine the Democratic effort.

IMMIGRATION

Privileges for Non-American "Fat Cats"

1) Bumpers amendment striking the section that gives an immigration preference to qualified immigrants who have invested, or shown their intention to invest, at least $250,000 in a U.S. enterprise, managed by the alien, that would employ four persons not related to the immigrant. (Vote No. 89—98th Congress, 1st Session).

   95% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

   81% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

   The amendment was agreed to, 51-46.

   May 17, 1983.

The immigration bill which passed the Senate last year contained a provision granting a preference status to any would-be "immigrants" who wanted to "invest" at least a quarter of a million dollars in an American business. The Democrats were able to delete this provision, which would have accorded this special privilege to a category of so-called "fat cats," thereby denying limited immigration slots to truly needy and deserving, but less well-heeled individuals.

Ninety-five percent of the Democrats stood together on this successful effort to inject this minimal element of fairness into our immigration quota system.

LABOR

INTRODUCTION

The Davis-Bacon Act, enacted in the 1930's, requires that wages paid to laborers and mechanics with federal funds be at the prevailing local rates of pay. The Act benefits workers by insuring that federal funds will not be used to undercut prevailing local wages. The Act benefits contractors by helping to insure that contractors committed to upholding local labor standards are not placed at a competitive disadvantage with contractors who try to save money by paying low wages. The Act benefits the public by encouraging quality public construction.

THE RECORD

1) Hatfield motion to table the Nickles perfecting amendment (to the Kennedy jobs amendment) to the Continuing Appropriations, 1983 bill (H.J. Res. 599). The Nickles amendment would codify three Administration regulations, raising the threshold from $2,000 to $100,000 for contracts exempt from the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage provisions. (Vote No. 371—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

   84% of the Democrats voting supported the motion.

   71% of the Republicans voting opposed the motion.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 52-44.

   September 29, 1982.

The Nickles perfecting amendment would have effectively gutted the Davis-Bacon Act by excluding all but the larger contractors from coverage under the Act. It also would have changed the formula by which local prevailing wages are determined under the Act, and changed other applications of the Act. Opponents of the amendment viewed it as a serious threat to the Act and to the intent of Congress in passing the Davis-Bacon Act. The motion to table the Nickles amendment was agreed to.

2) Stafford motion to table the Nickles amendment to the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (H.R. 6211). The Nickles amendment would strike the section of the bill which clarifies that the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage rate provisions apply to workers on federal highway 4R (resurfacing, restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction) projects. (Vote No. 457—97th Congress, 2nd Session).

   79% of the Democrats voting supported the motion.

   71% of the Republicans voting opposed the motion.

   The motion to table was agreed to, 48-46.

   December 19, 1982.

In 1981 the Federal Highway Administration ruled that 4R projects were excluded from Davis-Bacon coverage because the Davis-Bacon Act contains language that refers to initial construction. This was done despite the fact that Congress clarified in 1976 that 4R projects were covered by Davis-Bacon. The Surface Transportation Assistance Act reported by the committee deleted the word "initial" to clarify congressional intent, thus returning the interpretation of the Act to the status quo prior to the 1981 ruling.

Senator Nickles offered an amendment to strike the section which deletes the word "initial". The motion to table the Nickles amendment was agreed to.

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

SENATE VOTES WHERE AT LEAST 2/3rds OF DEMOCRATS OPPOSED 2/3rds OF REPUBLICANS DURING THE "LAME-DUCK" SESSION

97th CONGRESS, 2nd SESSION

1982

Vote No.	Subject
	CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1983 (H.J. Res. 599, P.L. 97-276)
365	Bumpers-Humphrey amendment: Eliminates all funding for Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project. (48-49)
366	Metzenbaum, et al, amendment: Suspends, until national unemployment rate falls below 8.7 percent, changes made for determining State eligibility for extended unemployment benefits program and sets expiration of supplemental benefits program when national unemployment rate drops to 8.7 percent. (47-51)
367	Dole motion to table Baker motion to reconsider Vote No. 366. (50-48)
368	Hatfield motion to table Helms amendment: Requires Federal Election Commission to implement regulations prohibiting use of union dues on behalf of political candidates. (62-37)
370	Baker motion to table Hollings amendment: Prohibits funds for procurement of MX missile until President notifies Congress of basing mode chosen. (50-46)
371	Hatfield motion to table Nickles perfecting amendment (to Kennedy amendment—Vote No. 372): Codifies three Administration regulations presently enjoined by U.S. District Court, which would exempt Federal contracts up to $100,000 instead of $2,000 from Davis-Bacon prevailing wage provisions. (52-44)
372	Goldwater motion to table Kennedy, et al, amendment: Appropriates approximately $1 billion to employ temporarily unemployed workers to repair the nation's deteriorating public buildings, roads, and bridges, with 15 percent for Youth Employment and Training Programs. (60-37)
	INTERIOR APPROPRIATIONS, 1983 (H.R. 7356, P.L. 97-394)
404	Bumpers amendment: Deletes $2.13 million from coal leasing program to delay two major coal sales. (47-48)
	GAS TAX—HIGHWAYS—JOBS (H.R. 6211, P.L. 97-424)
406	Robert C. Byrd, et al, amendment (as substitute for Baker amendment): Provides for $5.3 billion jobs program which is paid for by delaying third year of tax cut for persons with incomes over $50,000 which is phased out at $65,000; eliminates 5 cent gas tax. (44-53)
407	Bentsen amendment (to Bentsen amendment): Modifies third-year tax cut by changing effective date from July 1 to April 1, 1983; reduces tax cut from 10 percent to 5 percent; defers remaining 5 percent until there is no deficit. (40-54)
412	Baker motion to table Metzenbaum, et al, modified amendment: Provides that only U.S. steel, cement, and other ferro-alloy may be used in construction and repair of highways and bridges. (51-47)
414	Baker motion to table Pryor amendment: Postpones all tax changes and extensions in bill except for five cent gas tax and postpones truck weight, length, and width changes. (48-37)
415	Dole motion to table Levin, et al, amendment: Extends Federal unemployment compensation benefits for additional 2 to 5 weeks at cost of $700 million. (47-50)

Vote No.	Subject
	GAS TAX—HIGHWAYS—JOBS (H.R. 6211, P.L. 97-424)—Continued
416	Baker, et al, cloture motion on Baker substitute for bill. (48-50)
	CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1983 (H.J. Res. 631, P.L. 97-377)
424	Jackson modified amendment (to the Committee amendment): Prohibits funds for MX missile basing until both Houses of Congress have passed concurrent resolution approving President's basing mode. (56-42)
426	Committee amendment: Restores appropriation for Clinch River Breeder Reactor R&D and construction. (49-48)
431	Committee amendment: Strikes $1 billion in Community Block grants to create jobs in community development projects in cities and urban counties. (62-32)
432	Committee amendment: Strikes $50 million House appropriation for soup kitchens. (43-52)
438	Domenici-Baker-Dole amendment: Strikes Title II $1.163 billion Jobs Package. (46-50)
449	Dole motion to table Ford-Robert C. Byrd, et al, amendment: Provides up to 10 weeks of supplemental unemployment benefits for railroad workers with less than 10 years experience. (47-46)
450	Ford motion to table Hatfield motion to reconsider Vote No. 449. (47-45)
	GAS TAX—HIGHWAYS—JOBS (H.R. 6211, P.L. 97-424)
457	Stafford motion to table Nickles amendment: Strikes Davis-Bacon provisions of bill which require workers on highway projects to be paid prevailing wages. (48-46)
458	Dole motion to table Riegle-Bradley amendment: Exempts working families with children who earn less than $10,000 per year from five-cent gas tax increase. (50-42)

SENATE VOTES WHERE AT LEAST 2/3rds OF DEMOCRATS OPPOSED 2/3rds OF REPUBLICANS

98th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION

1983

Vote No.	Subject
	JOBS/SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1983 (H.R. 1718, P.L. 98-8)
16	Levin-Byrd, et al, amendment: Adds $1.665 billion for jobs creation, emergency food and shelter, and emergency health care. (34-53)
33	Kennedy amendment: Removes requirement that State Medicaid cost containment program must be established by July 1, 1981, in order for State to qualify for lesser reduction in Medicaid entitlement. (28-64)
	SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (H.R. 1900, P.L. 98-21)
35	Bradley amendment (to Committee amendment): Provides disability benefits to those aged 62 and above who are unable to continue to engage in their current job, effective 2000. (30-61)
38	Moynihan motion to table Melcher motion to waive Budget Act in order to permit consideration of Melcher amendment—Vote Nos. 36 and 37. (54-43)
39	Domenici motion to table Heinz motion to waive Budget Act to permit consideration of Heinz amendment to remove social security trust funds from unified budget. (56-41)
48	Stevens-Dole-Baker substitute amendment (for Long, et al, amendment): Provides 1984 social security coverage for Federal employees; directs Congress to enact supplemental civil service retirement program by October 1, 1985; and provides that if Congress fails to enact new supplemental program by October 1, 1985, 1984-hired Federal employees will be covered by both social security and civil service. (45-50)
49	Armstrong amendment: Requires that social security taxes withheld by State and local governments shall be collected by IRS directly. (49-48)
50	Long amendment: Strikes provision which counts interest earned on tax-exempt State and municipal bonds in computing income for purposes of taxation of social security benefits. (44-52)
51	Quayle amendment: Allows those collecting unemployment compensation the option of receiving up to 75 percent of their compensation in vouchers to enhance their being rehired. (53-40)
	NOMINATION OF KENNETH R. ADELMAN TO BE DIRECTOR OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
55	Confirmation. (57-42)
	INTEREST AND DIVIDEND WITHHOLDING REPEAL/TRADE (S. 144)
57	Kasten, et al, motion to close further debate on Kasten, et al, amendment: Repeals withholding of tax on interest and dividends. (34-53)
58	Second Kasten, at al, cloture motion on Kasten, et al, amendment: Repeals withholding of tax on interest and dividends. (39-59)
59	Dole motion to table Melcher amendment (to Baker motion—Vote No. 60): Waives Budget Act to allow consideration of Kasten-Dole compromise amendment (delaying withholding until July 1, 1987) on this and any bill this session. (60-37)
61	Kasten motion to table Long perfecting amendment (to Kasten amendment—Vote Nos. 59 and 60): Repeals, in lieu of delaying until July 1, 1987, withholding of tax on interest and dividends scheduled to take effect on July 1, 1983. (55-40)

Vote No.	Subject
	IMMIGRATION REFORM (S. 529)
64	Kennedy amendment: Sunsets employer provisions if GAO finds in six years they have resulted in widespread discrimination against U.S. citizens or eligible workers, and if both Houses pass concurrent resolution confirming such findings. (40-51)
	FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, 1984 (H. Con. Res. 91, Action Completed)
70	Baucus, et al, amendment: Increases funding level to partially restore Medicare cuts made by Committee. (45-50)
71	Domenici motion to table Metzenbaum amendment: Increases funding level by $1.9 billion to maintain extended unemployment benefits for 29 States. (63-34)
72	Kennedy-Riegle amendment (as substitute for Dole, et al, modified amendment—Vote No. 73): Increases funding level by $2.7 billion per year for health insurance for unemployed. (36-63)
74	Rudman amendment: Increases funding level for elementary and secondary education programs and student financial assistance by $400 million per year. (50-46)
75	Domenici motion to table Hollings-Stafford, et al. amendment: Increases funding level for education programs by $1.5 billion in 1984, $1.79 billion in 1985, and $1.88 billion in 1986. (46-48)
76	Hollings motion to reconsider Vote No. 75. (42-46)
77	Hollings motion to table Domenici amendment (as substitute for Hollings-Stafford, et al, amendment—Vote Nos. 75 and 76): Increases funding level for education programs by $400 million. (45-43)
78	Hollings, et al, amendment: Increases funding level for education programs by $1 billion per year. (55-32)
79	Domenici motion to table Bradley amendment: States sense of Congress that world economic recovery is being retarded by high U.S. interest rates, and President and representatives of other major industrial countries meeting at Williamsburg should pursue coordinated economic expansion to insure worldwide economic recovery. (47-32)
80	Nunn-Jackson modified amendment: Increases funding level for defense in order to provide for real growth increase in defense spending of 6.5 percent in 1984, 5.5 percent in 1985, and 5 percent in 1986. (48-48)
83	Domenici motion to table Melcher amendment: Transfers $100 million in 1984 outlays from International Affairs to Natural Resources and Environment Function for soil conservation. (56-41)
85	Chiles motion to table Domenici-Baker substitute amendment: Provides for 2-year budget which increases revenues by $2.6 billion in 1984 and $5.7 billion in 1985 (and avoids 1986 revenue figure) and increases defense spending by 7.5 percent in 1984, with projected deficit of $306 billion over 5 years. (52-48)
	IMMIGRATION REFORM (S. 529)
89	Bumpers amendment: Strikes section giving preference to qualified immigrants who invest $250,000 in U.S. enterprise. (51-46)
96	Bradley, et al, amendment: Provides for 100 percent Federal reimbursement for 3 years for State and local costs of public assistance for newly legalized aliens. (37-57)
	FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, 1984 (H. Con. Res. 91, Action completed)
102	Domenici-Baker, et al, modified Committee substitute amendment: Provides for 2-year budget with 7.1 percent real growth in defense in 1984 and 5 percent in 1985 and revenue increases of $3.5 billion in 1984 and $6.4 billion in 1985. (43-56)
103	Gorton-Weicker, et al, substitute amendment: Provides for 6 percent real growth in defense in 1984, 5.5 percent in 1985, and 5 percent in 1986; provides for revenue increases of $9.9 billion in 1984, $13.7 billion in 1985, and $51 billion in 1986; and projects deficits of $178.6 billion in 1984, $167.7 billion in 1985, and $130.1 billion in 1986. (48-52)

Vote No.	Subject
	FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, 1984 (H. Con. Res. 91, Action completed)—Continued
105	Domenici motion to table Melcher-Randolph-Pressler amendment (to further modified Domenici-Baker Committee substitute): Transfers $89 million from International Affairs to Natural Resources and Environment Function for soil conservation programs. (57-43)
107	Domenici-Baker Committee substitute amendment: Provides 2-year budget which contains 7.1 percent real growth in defense in 1984 and 5 percent in 1985; provides for revenue increases of $3.5 billion in 1984 and $6.4 billion in 1985; projects deficits of $193 billion in 1984 and $186 billion in 1985. (43-57)
109	Kennedy motion to table Dole amendment (to Gorton amendment—Vote Nos. 103 and 108): Inserts House-passed resolution, in its entirety, which provides 2.8 percent real growth in defense in 1984, revenue increase of $30 billion in 1984, and domestic spending of $11 billion above Senate resolution. (54-46)
	MX BASING APPROVAL (S. Con. Res. 26, Action completed)
113	Baker motion to table Dixon motion to postpone consideration until President submits report to Congress proposing basing mode and plans for MX missile that is either deceptive or mobile. (59-35)
114	Adoption of resolution approving obligation and expenditure of funds for MX missile procurement and development of basing mode. (59-39)
	PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT (H.R. 2990, P.L. 98-34)
115	Passage of permanent increase to $1.389 billion. (51-41)
	SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1983 (H.R. 3069, P.L. 98-63)
131	Stevens amendment: Appropriates $185 million for multi-year Air Force procurement for B-1 bomber through September 30, 1985. (52-38)
132	Leahy amendment: Reduces foreign aid by $376 million. (39-45)
133	Kennedy-Hollings-Pell, et al, amendment: Appropriates $500,000 for National Summit Conference on Education. (38-48)
138	Bumpers-Jackson amendment (as substitute for Committee amendment): Establishes temporary moratorium on coal leasing until October 1, 1983, in order for Bureau of Land Management to develop criteria for determining "fair market value" of coal leases. (48-51)
140	Cohen motion to table Metzenbaum amendment: Prohibits use of funds by Navy to indemnify lessor of ship to Navy for tax deductions denied by IRS or for attorney fees payment in connection with IRS appeal. (49-50)
	INTEREST AND DIVIDEND WITHHOLDING REPEAL (H.R. 2973, P.L. 98-67)
154	Long motion to table Dole Committee substitute amendment: Repeals 10 percent withholding requirement on interest and dividend income, and substitutes improved information reporting and backup withholding for those who failed to correctly report interest in past; contains modified versions of President's Caribbean Basin initiative and urban enterprise zones; includes text of S. 144, international trade and investment, as passed by Senate; and deletes December 31, 1983, expiration date for mortgage revenue bonds. (46-51)
155	Baker motion to table Pryor amendment (to Dole Committee substitute): Strikes all sections except repeal of withholding on interest and dividend income. (50-40)
156	Dole Committee substitute amendment, as amended: Repeals ten percent withholding requirement on interest and dividend income and substitutes improved information reporting and backup withholding for those who have failed to correctly report interest in past; provides for Caribbean Basin economic recovery, urban enterprise zones, and international trade and investment; and deletes December 31, 1983 expiration date for mortgage revenue bonds. (48-41)
	HUD APPROPRIATIONS, 1984 (H.R. 3133, P.L. 98-45)
165	Garn motion to table Heinz-Riegle amendment: Authorizes $500 million in loan guarantees for mortgage relief program for unemployed homeowners. (55-39)

Vote No.	Subject
	FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, 1984 (H. Con. Res. 91, Action Completed)
171	Dole amendment: Reduces reconciled revenue figure and changes date by which Finance Committee must report revenue reconciliation legislation. (41-51)
	THIRD YEAR TAX CUT (H.R. 1183, Rejected)
174	Amends July 1983 individual tax rate reductions to limit maximum reduction available to taxpayers in 1984 to approximately $700. (45-55)
	DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION (S. 675, P.L. 98-94)
182	Tower amendment: Permits expenditure of funds to build facilities to produce 155mm nuclear shells (neutron bombs) if President certifies their need for national security reasons. (47-42)
184	Tower motion to table Pryor, et al, amendment: Prohibits production of nerve gas. (50-49—with Vice President voting to break tie)
186	Tower motion to table Mitchell, et al, amendment: Extends for two years present prohibition against contracting out firefighting and security functions at military bases. (44-53)
187	Baker motion to table Armstrong motion to waive Budget Act to provide for consideration of Armstrong, et al, amendment: Reestablishes GI Bill effective in fiscal 1987 to provide monthly basic educational assistance benefit of $300. (52-46)
189	Baker motion to table Gorton motion to recommit bill with instructions to report bill back within two days that complies with figures in Budget Resolution. (53-41)
190	Tower motion to table Nunn-Hatch-Johnston, et al, amendment: Shifts $888 million from multi-year procurement of B-1 bomber to finance conventional force modernization. (56-41)
194	Tower motion to table Levin-Nunn, et al, amendment: Restores $582 million in outlays and $2.7 billion in budget authority for readiness and for conventional weapons. (60-34)
	DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS (S. 675, P.L. 98-94)
208	Tower motion to table Stafford, et al, amendment: Extends to May 4, 1986, effective date for transferring administration of DOD dependent education system to Department of Education. (42-50)
209	Quayle amendment (as substitute for Stafford, et al, amendment—Vote No. 208): Prohibits transfer of administration of DOD dependent education system to Department of Education before May 4, 1986, and then only if President or Congress determines it will not be detrimental. (47-46)
214	Baker, et al, cloture motion on Committee substitute. (55-41)
215	Mattingly motion to table Moynihan-Jackson, et al, amendment—Vote No. 216. (46-48)
216	Moynihan-Jackson, et al, amendment: Extends grace period for implementing regulations denying Federal educational assistance to students who have failed to file statement of draft registration compliance. (56-40)
217	Tower motion to table Melcher amendment: Transfers funds from recruiting activities (media and advertising) in order to provide 4% COLA increase for enlisted personnel of Grade E-1 having less than four months service. (56-26)
218	Hart-Hatfield amendment: Prohibits funds for production, procurement, or deployment of MX missile. (41-58)
219	Moynihan amendment: Prohibits funds for deployment of MX missile; states sense of Congress that modernization should be focused on small, single-warhead mobile or deceptive ICBM's. (42-57)
	INTERIOR APPROPRIATIONS, 1984 (H.R. 3363, P.L. 98-146)
241	Chair ruling sustaining Metzenbaum point of order that Committee amendment dealing with restructuring finances and capital assets base of Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) is out of order as legislation on appropriation bill. (40-57)

Vote No.	Subject
	KOREAN AIRLINER DESTRUCTION (H.J. Res. 353, P.L. 98-98)
252	Baker motion to table Huddleston amendment: Reduces number of Soviet officials in U.S. to number of American officials in USSR. (49-45)
	INTERIOR APPROPRIATIONS, 1984 (H.R. 3363, P.L. 98-146)
255	Bradley-Melcher amendment: Appropriates additional $370 million for Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to continue construction of Big Hill Storage Facility (on budget) and additional $988 million (off budget) to increase SPR fill rate to 220,000 barrels per day. (54-43)
	REVENUE SHARING (H.R. 2780, P.L. 98-185)
260	Moynihan, et al, amendment: Increases entitlement authorization for local governments from $4,566,700,000 to $5,017,000,000 for three fiscal years. (30-64)
261	Bradley, et al, amendment: Increases entitlement authorization for local governments from $4,566,700,000 to $4,791,700,000 for three years. (36-58)
	LEBANON MULTINATIONAL FORCE/WAR POWERS (S.J. Res. 159, P.L. 98-119)
269	Baker motion to table Byrd, et al, modified substitute amendment: Requires President to report to Congress on forces in Lebanon as required by War Powers Resolution. (55-45)
270	Baker motion to table Pell-Dixon amendment: Authorizes U.S. troops in Lebanon for 6 rather than 18 months. (62-38)
271	Baker motion to table Tsongas amendment: Modifies Congressional findings regarding U.S. participation in Multinational Force in Lebanon. (56-42)
272	Baker motion to table Levin-Randolph amendment: Includes statement that actual or imminent hostilities involving U.S. forces began August 29, 1983. (54-45)
273	Baker motion to table Eagleton amendment: Substitutes word "defensive" for "protective" regarding functions of U.S. forces in Lebanon. (66-34)
274	Passage. (54-46)
	UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION (FSC) (H.R. 3929, P.L. 98-135)
275	Moynihan-Byrd, et al, substitute amendment: Allows computation of duration of benefits on insured unemployment rate (IUR) or total unemployment rate (TUR); provides benefits for 7, 9, 12, or 14 weeks rather than 6, 8, 10, or 12 weeks; provides additional 4 weeks of benefits for persons whose benefits expired between April and October; and extends program for 9 instead of 18 months. (34-59)
276	Byrd, et al, amendment: Allows unemployed persons, who have exhausted all unemployment benefits since April 1, 1983, to receive up to three-fourths of number of weeks of benefits which new FSC beneficiaries will receive. (37-54)
	LABOR-HHS-EDUCATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1984 (H.R. 3913, P.L. 98-139)
279	Weicker motion to table Huddleston, et al, amendment: Appropriates $50 million for asbestos hazards control loan program to aid schools in removing asbestos from their facilities. (58-35)
280	Weicker motion to table appeal of Chair ruling that Bradley, et al, amendment increasing education appropriations by $559 million is out of order. (50-45)
281	Baker motion to table Quayle, et al, amendment: Increases appropriations by $364 million for programs mostly for disadvantaged youth under Job Training Partnership Act. (50-44)
	SURFACE TRANSPORTATION ACT (H.R. 3103)
313	Metzenbaum-Specter amendment: Deletes language which modifies "Buy American" provisions to exempt projects costing less than $500,000 or for which at least 51 percent of their costs are from American-made supplies. (55-35)
	SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1984 (H.R. 3959, P.L. 98-181)
317	Thurmond motion to table Biden-DeConcini, et al, amendment: Establishes Director of National and International Drug Operations and Policy to coordinate and direct Federal efforts to stop flow of drugs and establishes one year 16-member Commission on Drug Interdiction and Enforcement. (40-53)

Vote No.	Subject
	PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT (H.J. Res. 308, P.L. 98-161)
320	Chiles amendment: Prohibits extension of debt limit ceiling after November 21 unless all committees have submitted their legislative proposals required by reconciliation instructions in First Budget Resolution; and prohibits debt limit ceiling extension after December 21, 1983, or 10 days after sine die adjournment if required reconciliation instructions have not been enacted. (31-53)
326	Kasten amendment: Expresses sense of Senate that no further tax increases should be enacted until Congress fulfills pledge to reduce spending by three dollars for every dollar of revenue raised under TEFRA. (42-55)
327	Dole motion to table Kennedy-Hatfield, et al, amendment: States that U.S. and Soviet Union should pursue immediate and complete halt to nuclear arms race and decide when and how to achieve mutual verifiable freeze on testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear weapons. (58-40)
	DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1984 (H.R. 4185, P.L. 98-212)
332	Stevens amendment: Reduces funding for M-1 tank production by $168.7 million cutting from 840 to 720 tanks as in budget. (45-48)
337	Bumpers, et al, amendment: Deletes $2,102,200,000 for MX missile procurement. (37-56)
339	Kassebaum, et al, amendment: States sense of Senate that President should announce willingness of U.S. to suspend flight testing of new MIRVed ICBM's while strategic arms negotiations proceed, if USSR does same. (42-50)
341	Hatfield motion to table Stevens-Tower-Goldwater modified amendment—Vote No. 342. (46-48)
342	Stevens-Tower-Goldwater modified amendment: Adds $124.4 million for production of binary chemical weapons (nerve gas) and requires destruction of two existing chemical weapons for each new binary weapon. (47-46—with Vice President voting to break tie)
	CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1984 (H.J. Res. 413, P.L. 98-151)
348	Hatfield amendment: Strikes House $954 million education and health package. (53-36)
352	Chair ruling that Riegle, et al, amendment (appropriating $500 million for health care benefits for unemployed) is out of order as legislation on appropriation. (47-36)
353	Chair ruling that Ford amendment (requiring President to submit balanced budget) is out of order as legislation on appropriation. (42-40)
354	Baker motion to table Mathias, et al, amendment: Reduces grant military assistance from $697 million to $421 million. (46-37)
357	Chair ruling that Metzenbaum-Hatfield amendment—Vote No. 356—is out of order as legislation on appropriation. (43-37)
	OLYMPIC DUTY SUSPENSION—PUBLIC DEBT (H.J. Res. 290)
367	Hatfield motion to table Armstrong-Long amendment: Extends debt limit ceiling for one year; provides that $225 billion increase be added on quarterly basis; and gives President impoundment rights if he is unable to keep spending within $55 billion quarterly increase. (49-46)
	SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1984 (H.R. 3959, P.L. 98-181)
375	Garn motion to table Levin-Cohen-Byrd, et al, amendment: Adds Social Security Disability Insurance changes. (49-46)
376	Hatfield motion to table Johnston, et al, amendment (to Johnston amendment): Expresses sense of Senate disapproving previous policies under Secretary James Watt and advising new Secretary to take immediate action to insure Department's policies conform with expressed will of Congress. (48-42)
377	Garn motion to table Metzenbaum amendment: Prohibits funds for Securities Exchange Commission to implement changes in SEC regulations eliminating requirement that corporations disclose executive perquisites to stockholders. (51-40)

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX II

Public Laws--1983 Compared with 1981, 1979, and 1977

A listing of public laws enacted during the first session of the 98th Congress shows that more than half were of a non-substantive or administrative nature. Of the 214 laws enacted, 53 percent fit into this category. Most of these laws commemorate an event or person or dedicate a day, week, or month for some worthwhile cause. This past session compares very unfavorably with the three previous first sessions of Congress:

1977—Out of 223 public laws, 37 or 17% were non-substantive
1979—Out of 187 public laws, 49 or 26% were non-substantive
1981—Out of 145 public laws, 51 or 35% were non-substantive
1983—Out of 215 public laws, 114 or 53% were non-substantive

A look at the bills enacted this year raises the serious question whether Congress is carrying out its legislative responsibilities. Many of the bills enacted were of a cosmetic nature. Debate and passage of separate authorizations for many of our important programs languished on the Senate Calendar or in Committee while some high-sounding proclamation was signed into law. For example, no separate authorization for the wide-reaching housing programs was debated and passed under the normal legislative process. Instead, it was added to the conference report on Supplemental Appropriations at the end of the session. A resolution proclaiming a National Housing Week, however, saw expedited action before the August recess. At the same time the Administration cut education programs severely, it wrote into law a National Historically Black Colleges Day. The same occurred with regard to health programs. While pressing for cuts to public health programs, the President signed the following 23 measures:

S. J. Res. 15	National Eye Donor Month
S. J. Res. 35	National Mental Health Counselors Week
S. J. Res. 32	National Arthritis Month
S. J. Res. 52	National Mental Health Week
S. J. Res. 62	National Parkinson's Disease Week
S. J. Res. 75	National Scleroderma Week
H. J. Res. 234	National Children's Liver Disease Awareness Week

S. J. Res. 34	National Reye's Syndrome Week
H. J. Res. 258	National Paralyzed Veterans Day
S. J. Res. 67	National Respiratory Therapy Week
S. J. Res. 131	National Cystic Fibrosis Week
H. J. Res. 229	National Organ Donation Week
S. J. Res. 82	National Alzheimer's Disease Month
S. J. Res. 119	National Drunk Driving Week
S. J. Res. 140	Myasthenia Gravis Awareness Week
S. J. Res. 102	Lupus Awareness Week
S. J. Res. 57	National Drug Abuse Education Week
S. J. Res. 121	National Diabetes Month
S. J. Res. 122	National Home Care Week
S. J. Res. 188	National Christmas Seal Month
H. J. Res. 383	Florence Crittenton Week
H. J. Res. 324	National Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Week
S. J. Res. 111	Child Health Mortality Reduction

PUBLIC LAWS, 95th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION

37 out of 223 or 17 percent were nonsubstantive or administrative

	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
	95-1	S.J. Res. 12	Secret Service Protection of Former Federal Officials	Jan. 19, 1977
	95-2	S. 474	Natural Gas Emergency	Feb. 2, 1977
	95-3	H.J. Res. 227	Urgent Power Supplemental Appropriations, 1977	Feb. 16, 1977
1	95-4	S. 649	Senate Staff Employees Pay	Do.
	95-5	S.J. Res. 10	American Indian Policy Review Commission	Feb. 17, 1977
	95-6	H.J. Res. 240	Fishery Conservation Zone Transition	Feb. 21, 1977
2	95-7	H.J. Res. 239	President's Joint Economic Report	Feb. 23, 1977
	95-8	H.R. 3753	Fishery Conservation Zone Transition	Mar. 3, 1977
3	95-9	H.J. Res. 132	Marian Anderson Medal	Mar. 9, 1977
	95-10	H.R. 3347	Budget Rescission—Helium Purchases	Mar. 10, 1977
4	95-11	S. 776	William O. Douglas Memorial	Mar. 15, 1977
	95-12	H.R. 1746	Rhodesian Chrome	Mar. 18, 1977
	95-13	H.J. Res. 269	Urgent Disaster Supplemental Appropriations, 1977	Mar. 21, 1977
	95-14	H.R. 2647	Small Business Loan Ceilings	Mar. 24, 1977
	95-15	H.R. 3839	Second Budget Rescission, 1978	Mar. 25, 1977
	95-16	H.J. Res. 351	Continuing Appropriations, 1977	April 1, 1977
	95-17	S. 626	Presidental Reorganization Authority	April 6, 1977
	95-18	S. 925	Drought Emergency Authority	April 7, 1977.
	95-19	H.R. 4800	Emergency Unemployment Compensation	April 12, 1977
	95-20	S. 1025	Securities and Exchange Commission Authorization, 1977	April 13, 1977
	95-21	H.R. 5717	Romanian Earthquake Authorization	April 18, 1977
	95-22	H.R. 3365	Regulation Q—Federal Credit Unions	April 19, 1977
	95-23	S. 489	Portugal—Military Assistance	April 30, 1977
	95-24	H.R. 3843	Supplemental Housing Authorization, 1977	Do.
5	95-25	S. 385	Gerald R. Ford Building	May 4, 1977
	95-26	H.R. 4877	Supplemental Appropriations, 1977	Do.
6	95-27	S.J. Res. 44	Printing Resolution	Do.
	95-28	H.R. 11	Public Works Employment—Water Resource Projects	May 13, 1977
	95-29	H.R. 4876	Economic Stimulus Appropriations, 1977	Do.
	95-30	H.R. 3477	Tax Reduction and Simplification, 1977	May 23, 1977
	95-31	S. 1279	Drought Emergency Relief	Do.
7	95-32	H.R. 5562	Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site	May 26, 1977
	95-33	H.R. 6205	Atlantic Tunas	Do.
	95-34	H.J. Res. 424	Kennedy Presidential Library	Do.
8	95-35	H.R. 3662	Mississippi-Louisiana Bridge Construction Compact	June 1, 1977
	95-36	H.R. 6401	Deepwater Ports	Do.
	95-37	S. 853	Defense Production Extension	Do.
	95-38	S. 1443	Privacy Protection Study Commission Extension	Do.
	95-39	S. 36	ERDA Nonnuclear Authorization—Civilian, 1977	June 3, 1977
	95-40	H.R. 3437	Vocational Education Amendments	Do.
	95-41	H.R. 6752	River Basins	June 6, 1977
	95-42	H.R. 5306	Land and Water Conservation Fund	June 10, 1977
	95-43	H.R. 6774	Higher Education Amendments	June 15, 1977
	95-44	H.R. 2992	CETA	Do.
	95-45	H.R. 5040	State Department Supplemental Authorization, 1977	Do.
	95-46	H.R. 4390	Reclamation Projects	Do.
	95-47	S. 955	Federal Crop Insurance Corporation Capital	July 16, 1977
	95-48	S. 1240	Wheat Referendum	June 17, 1977
	95-49	H.R. 6692	Education of the Handicapped	Do.
	95-50	S. 521	Kennedy Center Authorization, 1978	June 20, 1977

	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
	95-51	H.R. 6197	Disaster Relief Programs	Do.
	95-52	H.R. 5840	Export Administration—Arab Boycott	June 22, 1977
	95-53	H.R. 6206	Commerical Fisheries	Do.
	95-54	H.R. 3416	Tobacco Quotas	June 25, 1977.
9	95-55	H.R. 7606	Bull Run Reserve	Do.
10	95-56	S.J. Res. 63	Federal Home Loan Bank Board Members	June 29, 1977
	95-57	H.R. 583	Military Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonuses	Do.
	95-58	H.R. 4301	Sea Grant Program	Do.
	95-59	H.R. 1404	Smith College Carillon—Social Services Programs Extensions	June 30, 1977
	95-60	H.J. Res. 525	Mortgage Insurance	Do.
	95-61	H.R. 6823	Coast Guard Authorization, 1978	July 1, 1977
	95-62	H.R. 3695	Veterans' Care in State Homes	July 5, 1977
	95-63	H.R. 3849	National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere	Do.
11	95-64	H.J. Res. 539	Indian Claims	July 11, 1977
	95-65	H.R. 6668	Nutrition Programs for the Elderly—Age Discrimination Report	Do.
	95-66	S. 964	Federal Comparability Increases	Do.
	95-67	H.R. 6893	State Taxation of Members of Congress	July 19, 1977
	95-68	H.R. 4992	Indian Business Development Programs	July 20, 1977
	95-69	H.R. 4585	Indian Claims Commission	Do.
	95-70	S. 1468	Federal Energy Administration Authorization, 1978	July 21, 1977.
12	95-71	H.R. 1551	Sabine River Compact	July 23, 1977
13	95-72	H.J. Res. 24	Lupus Week	July 25, 1977
	95-73	H.R. 5638	Fishery Agreement With Canada	July 26, 1977.
	95-74	H.R. 7636	Interior Appropriations, 1978	Do.
	95-75	H.R. 186	Regulations to Prevent Collisions at Sea	July 27, 1977.
	95-76	H.R. 4088	NASA Authorization, 1978	July 30, 1977
	95-77	H.R. 2502	Federal Oil and Gas Leases	Do.
	95-78	H.R. 5864	Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure	Do.
	95-79	H.R. 5970	Military Procurement Authorization, 1978	Do.
	95-80	S. J. Res. 77	Mortgage Insurance	July 31, 1977
	95-81	H.R. 7552	Treasury-Postal Service Appropriations, 1978	Do.
	95-82	S. 1474	Military Construction Authorization, 1978	Aug. 1, 1977
	95-83	H.R. 4975	Public Health Programs—Biomedical Research	Do.
	95-84	H.R. 4746	Water Research and Development—Saline Water Conversion	Aug. 2, 1977
	95-85	H.R. 7557	Transportation Appropriations, 1978	Do.
	95-86	H.R. 7556	State-Justice-Commerce Appropriations, 1978	Do.
	95-87	H.R. 2	Strip Mining Control and Reclamation	Aug. 3, 1977.
	95-88	H.R. 6714	International Development Assistance—Food for Peace	Do.
	95-89	H.R. 692	Small Business Amendments—Disaster Relief Loans	Aug. 4, 1977
	95-90	S.J. Res. 79	Federal Home Loan Bank Board Members	Do.
	95-91	S. 826	Department of Energy	Do.
	95-92	H.R. 6884	International Security Assistance	Do.
	95-93	H.R. 6138	Youth Employment and Training	Aug. 5, 1977
	95-94	H.R. 7932	Legislative Approriations, 1978	Do.
	95-95	H.R. 6161	Clean Air	Aug. 7, 1977
	95-96	H.R. 7553	Public Works—Energy Research Appropriations, 1978	Do.
	95-97	H.R. 7558	Agriculture Appropriations, 1978	Aug. 12, 1977
14	95-98	H.R. 1952	AMVETS	Aug. 15, 1977
	95-99	H.R. 4991	National Science Foundation Authorization, 1978	Do.
15	95-100	H.J. Res. 372	Family Week	Do.
	95-101	H.R. 7589	Military Construction Appropriations, 1978	Do.
	95-102	S. 1235	Peace Corps Authorization, 1978	Do.
16	95-103	S. 1377	Indian Claims	Do.
	95-104	S. 2001	River Basins	Do.
	95-105	H.R. 6689	State Department Authorization, 1978	Aug. 17, 1977
	95-106	H.R. 6370	International Trade Commission Authroziation, 1978	Do.
	95-107	S. 1935	Drought Emergency Authority	Do.
	95-108	H.R. 6179	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	Do.

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	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
	95-109	H.R. 5294	Debt Collection Practices	Sept. 20, 1977
	95-110	S.1153	Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Abolishment	Do.
	95-111	H.R. 7933	Defense Appropriations, 1978	Sept. 21, 1977
	95-112	S. 1752	Elementary and Secondary Education	Sept. 24, 1977
	95-113	S. 275	Omnibus Farm Bill	Sept. 29, 1977
	95-114	S. 1731	Medical Personnel Special Pay	Sept. 30, 1977
	95-115	H.R. 6111	Juvenile Justice	Oct. 30, 1977
17	95-116	H.R. 6502	World War I Veterans Auto Allowance	Do.
	95-117	H.R. 1862	Veterans' Disability Compensation and Survivors Benefits	Do.
	95-118	H.R. 5262	International Financial Institutions	Do.
	95-119	H.R. 7554	HUD Appropriations, 1978	Oct. 4, 1977
	95-120	H.R. 9290	Public Debt Limit	Do.
	95-121	H.R. 6951	Council on Wage and Price Stability	Oct. 6, 1977
	95-122	S. 1322	D.C. Water and Sewer Payment by Federal Government	Do.
	95-123	S. 602	Library Services and Construction	Oct. 7, 1977
	95-124	S. 126	Earthquake Hazards Reduction	Do.
	95-125	S. 213	GAO Audit of IRS and ATF	Do.
	95-126	S. 1307	Vietnam Veterans Discharges and Benefits	Oct. 8, 1977
	95-127	S. 1435	Federal Election Commission Authorization, 1978	Oct. 12, 1977
	95-128	H.R. 6655	Housing and Community Development	Do.
18	95-129	S. 1331	Center for the Book	Oct. 13, 1977.
	95-130	H.J. Res. 626	Continuing Appropriations, 1978	Do.
	95-131	H.R. 6530	D.C. Borrowing Authority	Do.
	95-132	H.R. 5645	Civil Rights Commission Authorization, 1978	Do.
19	95-133	S. 667	Te-Moak Shoshone Land	Oct. 15, 1977
	95-134	H.R. 6550	U.S. Territories	Do.
20	95-135	S.J. Res. 89	Technical Corrections to Enrollment of Public Law 95-134	Do.
	95-136	S. 1522	Marine Mammal Protection	Oct. 18, 1977
	95-137	H.R. 5742	Drug Enforcement Administration	Do.
	95-138	H.R. 9354	Former Presidents' Staff Allowance	Do.
21	95-139	S. 2089	Associate Attorney General	Oct. 19, 1977
22	95-140	S. 1372	Deputy and Under Sercretaries of Defense	Oct. 21, 1977
23	95-141	S. 2169	Hubert H. Humphrey Building	Oct. 23, 1977
	95-142	H.R. 3	Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud	Oct. 25, 1977
	95-143	H.R. 6415	Export-Import Bank	Oct. 26, 1977
	95-144	S. 1682	Prisoner Exchange with Canada and Mexico	Oct. 28, 1977
	95-145	H.R. 7769	Indochina Refugee Assistance	Do.
24	95-146	H.R. 4836	Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works	Do.
	95-147	H.R. 5675	Tax and Loan Accounts—IMF—ESF	Do.
	95-148	H.R. 7797	Foreign Aid Approriations, 1978	Oct. 31, 1977
25	95-149	H.J. Res. 573	General Thaddeus Kosciuszko	Nov. 1, 1977
	95-150	S. 393	Montana Wilderness Area Study	Do.
	95-151	H.R. 3744	Minimum Wage Increase	Do.
	95-152	H.R. 2817	Tinicum National Environmental Center	Nov. 4, 1977
	95-153	H.R. 4297	Ocean Dumping	Do.
	95-154	H.J. Res. 611	Federal Reserve Banks Purchase of U.S. Obligations	Nov. 7, 1977
	95-155	H.R. 5101	EPA Authorization, 1978	Nov. 8, 1977
	95-156	H.R. 9090	Agricultural Disaster Loan Exemptions	Do.
	95-157	S. 2149	Northern Marianas District Court	Do.
	95-158	H.J. Res. 621	Alaska Pipeline (AlCan)	Do.
	95-159	H.R. 3259	Duty Suspension on Horses, Canadian Crude Oil and Doxorubicin Hydrochloride	Do.
	95-160	H.R. 2850	Duty Suspension on Latex Sheets and Synthetic Rutile	Do.
	95-161	H.R. 2982	Duty Suspension on Synthetic Tantalum, Poppy Straw and Bicycle Parts	Do.
	95-162	H.R. 3903	Duty Suspension on Copy Lathes, Wool and Istle Fibre	Do.
	95-163	H.R. 6010	Aircraft Insurance and Other Aviation Amendments	Nov. 9, 1977
	95-164	S. 717	Mine Safety and Health	Do.
	95-165	H.J. Res. 643	Continuing Approprations, 1978	Do.

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	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
	95-166	H.R. 1139	School Lunch and Child Nutrition	Nov. 10. 1977
26	95-167	S. 2208	Big Brothers-Big Sisters of America	Nov. 11, 1977
27	95-168	S. 810	Daughters of the Confederacy Patent Renewal	Do.
28	95-169	H.R. 2527	Land Conveyance—California	Nov. 12, 1977
	95-170	H.R. 2849	Duty Suspension on Mattress Blanks and Bobsleds and Luges; Private Foundations Donations	Do.
	95-171	H.R. 3387	Child Care Program Extension	Do.
	95-172	H.R. 3373	Duty Suspension on Silk Yarns—Communications Excise Tax	Do.
	95-173	S. 1019	Maritime Authorization, 1978	Do.
29	95-174	S. 2118	Land Conveyance—Alaska	Do.
30	95-175	S. 2052	Capitol Police Jurisdiction	Nov. 14, 1977
	95-176	H.R. 4458	Excise Tax on Distilled Spirits	Do.
	95-177	H.R. 7278	National Defense Reserve Fleet	Nov. 15, 1977
	95-178	H.R. 8499	Alaskan Native Claims	Do.
31	95-179	H.R. 8992	Executive Protective Service Name Change	Do.
	95-180	H.R. 9512	Higher Education in the Trust Territory of the Pacific	Do.
	95-181	H.R. 9704	Federal Crop Insurance	Do.
32	95-182	H.R. 9836	Folger Shakespeare Library	Do.
	95-183	S. 1339	ERDA Nuclear Authorization—Military, 1977-78	Do.
	95-184	S. 1863	Military Procurement Supplemental Authorization, 1978	Do.
33	95-185	S. 1062	D.C. Armory Board	Do.
	95-186	H.R. 9019	Third Budget Rescission, 1978	Nov. 16, 1977
	95-187	H.R. 8346	Commuter Rail Services	Do.
	95-188	H.R. 9710	Regulation Q	Do.
	95-189	S. 2281	River Basins	Do.
	95-190	S. 1528	Safe Drinking Water	Do.
34	95-191	H.R. 6348	Ely Indian Land	Nov. 18, 1977
	95-192	S. 106	Land and Water Resources Conservation	Do.
	95-193	H.R. 8777	Appalachian Child Development Programs	Do.
	95-194	S. 1184	Fisherman's Protection Reimbursement Program	Do.
	95-195	S. 1560	Siletz Indian Tribe Restoration	Do.
	95-196	H.R. 2770	Courts of Appeals Judicial Accomodations	Nov. 19, 1977
35	95-197	S.J. Res. 81	Day of Prayer	Nov. 21, 1977
	95-198	H.R. 422	Duty Suspension on Aircraft Engines	Nov. 23, 1977
	95-199	H.R. 4049	Rail Reorganization	Do.
36	95-200	H.R. 7074	Bull Run Reserve	Do.
	95-201	H.R. 8175	Veterans' Physician and Dentist Comparability Pay	Do.
	95-202	H.R. 8701	G.I. Education Benefits	Do.
	95-203	S. 1750	Saccharin Study	Do.
	95-204	H.R. 7345	Veterans' and Survivors' Pension Adjustment	Dec. 2, 1977
	95-205	H.J. Res. 662	Labor-HEW-D.C. Continuing Appropriations, 1978	Dec. 9, 1977
	95-206	H.R. 1904	Duty Suspension on Intravenous Fat Emulsion, Color Couplers and Glasses	Dec. 12, 1977
	95-207	H.R. 7	Career Education Incentives	Dec. 19, 1977
	95-208	H.R. 8159	Safe Container Regulations	Do.
	95-209	S. 1131	Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization, 1978	Do.
	95-210	H.R. 8422	Medicare Coverage for Rural Health Clinics—NIOSH	Do.
	95-211	H.R. 3722	Securities and Exchange Commission Authorization, 1978	Dec. 19, 1977
	95-212	S. 1316	Endangered Speicies	Do.
	95-213	S. 305	Foreign Corporate and Domestic Disclosure	Do.
	95-214	H.R. 9378	Employees Retirement Benefits Plan Insurance	Do.
	95-215	H.R. 9418	Medical School Grants	Do.
	95-216	H.R. 9346	Social Security Financing	Dec. 20, 1977
	95-217	H.R. 3199	Clean Water	Dec. 27, 1977
	95-218	S. 1063	D.C. Bonds	Dec. 28, 1977
	95-219	H.R. 9794	Fishery Agreement with Mexico	Do.
	95-220	S. 904	Federal Assistance Programs Information	Do.
37	95-221	H.R. 674	Convening of Second Session of 95th Congress	Do.
	95-222	H.R: 6666	Legal Services Corporation	Do.
	95-223	H.R. 7738	International Emergency Economic Powers	Do.

PUBLIC LAWS, 96th CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

49 out of 187 or 26 percent were nonsubstantive/administrative

	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
1	96-1	H.J. Res. 1	President's Economic Report	Jan. 22, 1979
2	96-2	H.R. 1902	Carson City Silver Dollars	Mar. 7, 1979
3	96-3	S. 37	Financial Privacy Notification Repeal	Do.
	96-4	H.R. 2301	District Court Realignment	Mar. 30, 1979
	96-5	H.R. 2534	Public Debt Limit Extension—Balanced Budget	Apr. 2, 1979
	96-6	H.R. 1147	Countervailing Duty Extension	Apr. 3, 1979
	96-7	H.R. 2439	First Budget Rescission, 1979	Apr. 9, 1979
	96-8	H.R. 2479	U.S.–Taiwan Relations	Apr. 10, 1979
	96-9	H.J. Res. 283	NATO Support	Apr. 19, 1979
	96-10	H.R. 2283	Council on Wage and Price Stability	May 10, 1979
4	96-11	H.J. Res. 262	Museum Day	May 18, 1979
	96-12	S.J. Res. 80	Three Mile Island Commission	May 23, 1979
5	96-13	S.J. Res. 71	Historic Preservation Week	May 24, 1979
6	96-14	S. 532	President's Commission on Pension Policy	Do.
7	96-15	S. 631	Gold Medal: John Wayne	May 26, 1979
	96-16	H.R. 1787	NASA Supplemental Authorization, 1979	June 4, 1979
	96-17	H.R. 2520	Ocean Pollution Research and Development Authorization, 1980	Do.
	96-18	H.R. 3404	Federal Reserve Bank's Purchase of U.S. Obligations	June 8, 1979
	96-19	H.R. 2805	Ethics in Government Amendments	June 13, 1979
8	96-20	S. 348	Gold Medal: Transatlantic Balloonists	Do.
9	96-21	S. 613	Gold Medal: Hubert H. Humphrey	Do.
	96-22	S. 7	Veterans' Health Care	Do.
	96-23	S. 709	Coast Guard Authorization, 1980	Do.
	96-24	H.R. 3915	Employee Retirement Income Security (ERISA)	June 19, 1979
	96-25	S. 199	Shipping Rebating Practices	Do.
	96-26	H.R. 3577	National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere Authorization, 1980–1981	June 21, 1979
	96-27	H.R. 3879	D.C. Temporary Commission on Financial Oversight	Do.
	96-28	S. 869	Ethics in Government Amendments	June 22, 1979
	96-29	S. 429	Military Procurement Supplemental Authorization, 1979	June 27, 1979
	96-30	S. 1317	Oil Company Participation in IEP	June 30, 1979
	96-31	S. 984	Peanut Marketing Penalty Reduction	July 7, 1979
10	96-32	S.J. Res. 14	Printing Error in Public Law 96-613	July 10, 1979
	96-33	H.R. 4556	State Health Planning Agencies	July 16, 1979
11	96-34	H.J. Res. 353	United States Space Observance	July 17, 1979
	96-35	S. 1007	Mideast Arms Sales	July 20, 1979
	96-36	S. 927	Smithsonian Authorization, 1980	Do.
	96-37	H.R. 3978	Savings and Loan Exemptions from FTC	July 23, 1979
	96-38	H.R. 4289	Supplemental Appropriations, 1979	July 25, 1979
	96-39	H.R. 4537	Multilateral Trade Agreements	July 26, 1979
	96-40	H.R. 3661	Navajo–Hopi Relocation Commission	July 30, 1979
	96-41	H.R. 2154	National Defense Stockpile	Do.
	96-42	H.R. 4712	Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence	July 31, 1979
	96-43	S. 961	Speedy Trials	Aug. 2, 1979
	96-44	H.R. 2729	National Science Foundation Authorization, 1980	Do.
12	96-45	H.J. Res. 373	Polish Resistance During World War II	Aug. 3, 1979
13	96-46	H.R. 4591	Education Technical Amendments	Aug. 6, 1979
	96-47	S. 976	International Affairs of Treasury Authorization, 1980	Aug. 8, 1979
	96-48	H.R. 1786	NASA Authorization, 1980	Do.
	96-49	H.R. 4476	Higher Education Amendments	Aug. 13, 1979

	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
14	96-50	H.J. Res. 19	Lupus Week	Do.
15	96-51	H.J. Res. 209	Diabetes Week	Do.
	96-52	S. 1318	1980 Census	Do.
	96-53	H.R. 3324	Foreign Aid—Development Assistance Authorization, 1980	Aug. 14, 1979
16	96-54	H.R. 4616	Title V–United States Code/Technical and Clerical Changes	Do.
17	96-55	H.R. 4811	Land Conveyance: Nenana, Alaska	Do.
	96-56	H.R. 2807	Bankruptcy Code Treatment of Student Loans	Do.
	96-57	H.R. 3914	District of Columbia Metro Construction	Do.
	96-58	H.R. 4057	Food Stamp Program	Do.
18	96-59	S. 41	Land Conveyance: Bell County, Kentucky	Do.
	96-60	H.R. 3363	State Department Authorization, 1980–1981; Supplemental, 1979	Aug. 15, 1979
	96-61	S. 917	Fishery Conservation and Management Authorization, 1980–1982	Do.
19	96-62	H.J. Res. 244	Grandparents Day	Sep. 6, 1979
	96-63	S. 1146	Safe Drinking Water Authorization, 1980–1982	Do.
	96-64	S. 1646	Foreign Banks Insurance	Sep. 14, 1979
20	96-65	H.J. Res. 367	Meals on Wheels Week	Sep. 19, 1979
	96-66	H.R. 2774	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization, 1980–1981	Sep. 21, 1979
	96-67	S. 1019	Ugandan Aid	Do.
	96-68	H.R. 4392	State–Justice–Commerce Appropriations, 1980	Sep. 24, 1979
	96-69	H.R. 4388	Energy–Water Appropriations, 1980	Sep. 25, 1979
	96-70	H.R. 111	Panama Canal Implementing Legislation	Sep. 27, 1979
	96-71	S.J. Res. 105	Mortgage Insurance Authorities Extension	Sep. 28, 1979
	96-72	S. 737	Export Control	Sep. 29, 1979
	96-73	H.R. 3996	Amtrak Authorization, 1980–1982	Do.
	96-74	H.R. 4393	Treasury-Postal Service Appropriations, 1980	Do.
	96-75	H.R. 5380	Justice Department Authorization Extension, 1980	Do.
	96-76	S. 230	Nurse Training Authorization, 1980	Do.
	96-77	H.J. Res. 406	Defense Production Extension	Do.
	96-78	H.R. 5369	Public Debt Limit Extension	Do.
	96-79	S. 544	Health Planning Authorization, 1980–1982	Oct. 4, 1979
21	96-80	H.J. Res. 303	Port Week	Oct. 6, 1979
	96-81	S. 721	Civil Rights Commission Authorization, 1980	Do.
	96-82	S. 237	U.S. Magistrates Jurisdiction	Oct. 10, 1979
	96-83	S. 756	Federal Procurement Policy Authorization, 1980–1982	Do.
	96-84	H.R. 3920	Unemployment Compensation Commission	Do.
	96-85	S. 233	U.S. Travel Service	Do.
	96-86	H.J. Res. 412	Continuing Appropriations, 1980	Oct. 12, 1979
22	96-87	H.R. 5419	Goodloe Byron Memorial—Frederick Law Olmsted National Historic Site	Do.
	96-88	S. 210	Department of Education	Oct. 17, 1979
	96-89	S. 817	Smithsonian Canal Zone Biological Area	Oct. 19, 1979
	96-90	H.R. 1301	Lottery Export	Oct. 23, 1979
	96-91	S. 567	U.S. Attorney's for Eastern District, New York	Oct. 25, 1979
	96-92	H.R. 3173	Foreign Aid—Security Assistance Authorization, 1980	Oct. 29, 1979
	96-93	H.R. 4580	District of Columbia Appropriations, 1980	Oct. 30, 1979
	96-94	H.R. 5506	Oil Company Participation in IEP	Oct. 31, 1979
	96-95	H.R. 1825	Archaeological Resources Protection	Do.
	96-96	H.R. 5386	Higher Education Amendments	Do.
	96-97	S. 436	Tennessee Valley Authority Debt Limit	Do.
	96-98	H.R. 3923	National Historical Publications and Records Commission	Nov. 1, 1979
23	96-99	H.J. Res. 3	Will Rogers Day	Nov. 2, 1979
	96-100	S. 975	Intelligence Activities Authorization, 1980; Supplemental Authorization, 1979	Do.
	96-101	S. 1905	Milwaukee Railroad	Nov. 4, 1979
	96-102	S. 1030	Emergency Energy Conservation—Gasoline Rationing	Nov. 5, 1979
	96-103	H.R. 4394	HUD Appropriations, 1980	Do.
	96-104	H.R. 2515	Agricultural Loan Limitations	Do.
	96-105	S.J. Res. 117	Mortgage Insurance Authorities Extension	Nov. 8, 1979

	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
	96-106	H.R. 4249	Transportation Laws Amendments—Uranium Mill Tailings	Nov. 9, 1979
	96-107	S. 428	Military Procurement Authorization, 1980	Do.
	96-108	H.R. 4387	Agriculture Appropriations, 1980	Do.
	96-109	H.R. 5218	Caribbean Hurricane Relief Assistance	Do.
	96-110	H.R. 4955	Refugee and Migration Assistance for Southeast Asia	Nov. 13, 1979
	96-111	S. 1281	U.S. Cruise Vessels	Nov. 15, 1979
	96-112	S. 640	Maritime Authorization, 1980	Nov. 16, 1979
24	96-113	H.R. 998	Marketing Quota Penalties Exemption for State Prison Farms	Do.
25	96-114	H.R. 2196	Congressional Award Program	Do.
26	96-115	H.J. Res. 68	Family Week	Do.
27	96-116	H.R. 5279	ICA George Meany Film	Do.
28	96-117	H.J. Res. 199	Technical Correction: Santa Ana Pueblo Indians Land Trust	Do.
	96-118	S. 838	Anadromous Fish Conservation Act Authorization, 1980–1982	Do.
29	96-119	H.J. Res. 428	Child Abuse Prevention Month	Do.
30	96-120	S. 1728	Wood Federal Courthouse	Do.
	96-121	S. 1160	Federal Fire Prevention and Control Authorization	Do.
	96-122	S. 1037	District of Columbia Retirement Reform	Nov. 17, 1979
	96-123	H.J. Res. 440	Continuing Appropriations, 1980	Nov. 20, 1979
	96-124	H.R. 5811	District of Columbia Interest Rates	Do.
	96-125	S. 1319	Military Construction Authorization, 1980	Nov. 26, 1979
	96-126	H.R. 4930	Interior Appropriations, 1980	Nov. 27, 1979
	96-127	H.R. 4167	Milk Price Supports	Nov. 28, 1979
	96-128	H.R. 2282	Veterans' and Survivors 'Benefits	Do.
	96-129	S. 411	Pipeline Safety	Nov. 30, 1979
	96-130	H.R. 4391	Military Construction Appropriations, 1980	Do.
	96-131	H.R. 4440	Transportation Appropriations, 1980	Do.
	96-132	S. 1157	Justice Authorization, 1980	Do.
	96-133	S. 1871	Oil Company Participation in IEP	Do.
31	96-134	S. 1686	Boggs Building	Dec. 5, 1979
	96-135	H.R. 1885	Indian Preference Laws	Do.
32	96-136	H.J. Res. 448	Scouting Recognition Week	Dec. 7, 1979
	96-137	H.R. 3354	Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves	Dec. 12, 1979
33	96-138	H.R. 4259	Gold Medal: American Red Cross	Do.
34	96-139	S. 1491	Parkinson Federal Building	Do.
35	96-140	S. 1535	Keating Federal Building	Do.
36	96-141	S. 1655	Perkins Department of Labor Building	Do.
	96-142	S. 497	Emergency Medical Assistance Authorization, 1980–1982—Sudden Infant Death	Do.
	96-143	S. 239	Domestic Volunteer Services (ACTION)	Dec. 13, 1979
	96-144	H.R. 5871	Interstate System Apportionments	Do.
37	96-145	H.R. 3407	Army Awards	Dec. 14, 1979
38	96-146	H.R. 4732	Architect of the Capitol Pay	Do.
39	96-147	H.J. Res. 458	Unity Day	Dec. 16, 1979
	96-148	S. 901	Industrial Cost Recovery Payment Moratorium	Do.
	96-149	S. 1788	Consumer Cooperative Bank	Do.
40	96-150	H.R. 5163	Naval Vessels Sale	Dec. 20, 1979
	96-151	H.R. 3892	Veterans' Health Resources Programs Extension	Do.
41	96-152	H.R. 5651	Capitol Police Chief	Do.
	96-153	H.R. 3875	Housing and Community Development	Dec. 21, 1979
	96-154	H.R. 5359	Defense Appropriations, 1980	Do.
42	96-155	S. 1874	American Legion Membership	Do.
	96-156	S. 716	Federal Employees Health Benefits	Dec. 27, 1979
	96-157	S. 241	LEAA Authorization, 1980–83	Do.
43	96-158	H.R. 5645	Land Conveyance Little Sisters of the Poor	Do.
	96-159	S. 1143	Endangered Species Authorization, 1980–1982	Dec. 28, 1979
	96-160	H.R. 5537	District of Columbia Borrowing Authority	Do.
	96-161	H.R. 4998	Banking Institutions Authorities—State Usury Laws	Do.

	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
	96-162	S. 585	Yakima River Basin Feasibility Study	Do.
44	96-163	H.R. 4943	Interstate Industrial Development Compact: New York–New Jersey Port Authority	Do.
	96-164	S. 673	Department of Energy Military Authorization, 1980	Dec. 29, 1979
45	96-165	H.R. 600	Federal Charter: United Service Organizations, Inc.	Do.
	96-166	H.R. 5015	Federal Physicians' Comparability Allowance	Do.
	96-167	H.R. 5224	Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits	Do.
46	96-168	H.J. Res. 462	White House Preservation Fund	Do.
45	96-169	H.R. 5079	Energy Expo 1982	Do.
	96-170	H.R. 3343	District of Columbia Civil Suits for Civil Rights Violations	Do.
47	96-171	H.R. 3948	Pilots' Mandatory Age Retirement Study	Do.
48	96-172	H.R. 2771	Lake Texana	Do.
	96-173	H.R. 5025	CHAMPUS	Do.
	96-174	H.R. 5174	White House Fellows and Executive Exchange Programs	Do.
	96-175	H.R. 595	National Defense Stockpile Acquisitions and Disposals: Tin and Industrial Diamonds	Do.
	96-176	H.R. 5523	Extra Long Staple Cotton Loan Levels	Dec. 31, 1979
	96-177	H.R. 2727	Beef and Veal Import Quotas	Do.
	96-178	H.R. 3091	Tax Treatment of State Legislators' Residences–Social Services Amendments	Jan. 2, 1980
	96-179	H.R. 2584	Civil Service Annuities	Do.
	96-180	S. 440	Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention Programs Authorization, 1980–1981	Do.
	96-181	S. 525	Drug Abuse and Treatment Programs Authorization, 1980–1981	Do.
	96-182	H.R. 2043	Waterbank Program Payment Adjustments	Do.
	96-183	H.J. Res. 467	Chrysler Appropriations	Do.
	96-184	H.R. 3951	District of Columbia Metro Construction	Jan. 3, 1980
	96-185	H.R. 5860	Chrysler Loan Guarantee	Jan. 7, 1980
49	96-186	H.J. Res. 468	President's Economic Report	Jan. 8, 1980
	96-187	H.R. 5010	Federal Election Campaign Reform	Do.

PUBLIC LAWS, 97TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

51 out of 145 or 35 percent were nonsubstantive/administrative

	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
1	97-1	S.J. Res. 16	Day of Thanksgiving to Honor Returned Iranian Hostages	Jan. 26, 1981
	97-2	H.R. 1553	Public Debt Limit Increase	Feb. 7, 1981
	97-3	S. 253	Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians	Feb. 10, 1981
2	97-4	S. 272	Joint Committee on Printing Membership Increase	Feb. 17, 1981
	97-5	H.R. 2166	Antitrust Exemption for Oil Company Participation in IEP	Mar. 13, 1981
	97-6	S. 509	Milk Price Supports	Mar. 31, 1981
	97-7	S. 840	Justice Department FY 1981 Authorization	Apr. 9, 1981
3	97-8	S.J. Res. 61	African Refugee Relief Day	Do.
4	97-9	H.J. Res. 182	National Recognition Day for Veterans of the Vietnam Era	Apr. 14, 1981
5	97-10	H.J. Res. 155	Jewish Heritage Week	May 1, 1981
	97-11	S. 730	Crop Insurance	May 22, 1981
	97-12	H.R. 3512	Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions, 1981	June 5, 1981
6	97-13	S.J. Res. 50	POW–MIA Day	June 12, 1981
	97-14	S. 1070	CETA–Youth Employment Demonstration Programs	June 16, 1981
	97-15	H.R. 2156	VA Medical Schools	June 17, 1981
	97-16	S. 1213	Ocean Dumping Authorization, FY 1982	June 23, 1981
7	97-17	H.J. Res. 288	Correcting Public Law 97-12	June 29, 1981
	97-18	H.R. 3991	Food Stamps Authorization Increase, FY 1981	June 30, 1981
8	97-19	S. 1123	Senate Office Equipment	July 6, 1981
9	97-20	S. 1124	Senate Computer Programming Services Contracts	Do.
	97-21	H.J. Res. 238	Virgin Islands Constitution	July 9, 1981
	97-22	H.R. 3807	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act/Technical Corrections	July 10, 1981
	97-23	H.R. 3520	Steelmaking Facilities Compliance with Clean Air Act	July 17, 1981
	97-24	S. 1395	Wheat Marketing Quota	July 23, 1981
	97-25	H.R. 31	Cash Discounts; Credit Card Surcharge Ban	July 27, 1981
	97-26	H.J. Res. 308	Health and Human Services Urgent Supplemental, FY 1981	July 29, 1981
10	97-27	H.J. Res. 84	National Diabetes Week	Aug. 4, 1981
11	97-28	S.J. Res. 28	Women's History Week	Do.
12	97-29	H.J. Res. 191	National Children's Day	Aug. 6, 1981
	97-30	S. 1040	Federal Payment to D.C.	Do.
	97-31	H.R. 4074	Maritime Administration Transfer from Commerce to Transportation Department	Do.
13	97-32	S.J. Res. 64	National Blinded Veterans Recognition Day	Do.
	97-33	S. 1104	International Investment Survey Authorization, FY 1982	Aug. 7, 1981
	97-34	H.R. 4242	Tax Cut (Economic Recovery Tax Act—ERTA)	Aug. 13, 1981
	97-35	H.R. 3982	Omnibus Budget Reconciliation, FY 1981–Spending Committees	Do.
14	97-36	H.J. Res. 141	Schoolbus Safety Week	Aug. 14, 1981
	97-37	H.R. 1100	Prisoners of War Benefits and Health Care Services	Do.
15	97-38	S. 547	Siletz Indians	Do.
	97-39	S. 694	Military Procurement and Construction Supplemental Authorization, FY 1981	Do.
	97-40	S. 640	D.C. Borrowing Authority	Do.
	97-41	S. 875	Palo Verde Irrigation District Diversion Dam	Do.
	97-42	S. 1278	Saccharine Study and Labeling	Do.
16	97-43	S.J. Res. 87	Commodore John Barry Day	Aug. 20, 1981
17	97-44	S.J. Res. 62	Cystic Fibrosis Week	Sept. 17, 1981

Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
97-45	H.R. 2120	Product Liability Risk Retention	Sept. 25, 1981
97-46	H.R. 4416	Emergency Agricultural Assistance	Do.
97-47	H.R 2903	Defense Production Extension	Sept. 30, 1981
97-48	H.J. Res. 266	Public Debt Limit Increase	Do.
97-49	H.J. Res. 265	Public Debt Limit Increase	Do.
97-50	S. 1475	Antitrust Exemption for Oil Company Participation in IEP	Do.
97-51	H.J. Res. 325	Continuing Appropriations, FY 1982	Oct. 1, 1981
18 97-52	S.J. Res. 78	American Enterprise Day	Oct. 2, 1981
19 97-53	S.J. Res. 103	National Port Week	Do.
20 97-54	S.J. Res. 65	Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizenship	Oct. 5, 1981
21 97-55	H.R. 618	Land Conveyance	Oct. 6, 1981
22 97-56	H.R. 2218	Land Conveyance	Do.
23 97-57	H.J. Res. 263	Nurses Recognition Day	Oct. 9, 1981
97-58	H.R. 4084	Marine Mammal Protection	Do.
24 97-59	S. 1033	North and South Carolina Lateral Seaward Boundary Agreement	Do.
97-60	S. 1181	Military Pay Increase	Oct. 14, 1981
25 97-61	S.J. Res. 98	World Food Day	Do.
26 97-62	S. 1712	Wheat Marketing Quota Referendum	Do.
27 97-63	S. 304	National Tourism Policy	Oct. 16, 1981
28 97-64	H.R. 4048	Kansas/Missouri Boundary Agreement	Do.
97-65	H.R. 3136	OPIC Authorization	Do.
97-66	S. 917	Veteran's Disability Compensation, Housing, and Memorial Benefits.	Oct. 17, 1981
97-67	H.R. 4612	Milk Price Supports	Oct. 20, 1981
97-68	S. 1191	Commercial Fishermen Reimbursements	Oct. 26, 1981
97-69	S. 1224	Congressional Franking Law	Do.
29 97-70	S.1687	International Investment Survey Act/Technical Corrections	Do.
30 97-71	H.J. Res. 268	Hungarian Freedom Fighters Day	Do.
97-72	H.R. 3499	Veterans Health Care	Nov. 3, 1981
97-73	S. 1209	Kennedy Center Authorization	Do.
97-74	S. 1000	Transportation Safety Board Authorization, FY 1982-83; Supplemental, FY 1981	Do.
31 97-75	S.J. Res. 4	National Family Week	Do.
97-76	H.R. 4608	Justice Department Authorization, FY 1981	Nov. 5, 1981
97-77	S. 1322	Milk Price Supports; Wheat and Cotton Marketing Quota Referendum Extensions; Robey Wentworth Harned Laboratory	Nov. 13, 1981
97-78	H.R. 3975	Oil Production from Tar Sands	Nov. 16, 1981
97-79	S. 736	Control of Illegally-taken Fish and Wildlife	Do.
97-80	S. 999	Federal Fire Prevention and Control; Earthquake Hazard Reduction; and Multi-Hazard Resources Planning and Mitigation Authorizations, FY 1982	Nov. 20, 1981
97-81	H.R. 4792	Military Justice System Improvement	Do.
32 97-82	H.R. 4734	Italian-American War Veterans Federal Charter	Do.
33 97-83	S. 195	U.S. Submarine Veterans of WW II Federal Charter	Do.
34 97-84	S. 1672	Holocaust Memorial Council	Do.
97-85	H.J. Res. 368	Continuing Appropriations, FY 1982	Nov. 23, 1981
97-86	S. 815	Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1982	Dec. 1, 1981
97-87	S. 1133	National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere Authorization, FY 1982	Do.
97-88	H.R. 4144	Energy-Water Appropriations, FY 1982	Dec. 4, 1981
97-89	H.R. 3454	Intelligence Activities Authorization, FY 1982	Do.
97-90	H.R. 3413	Energy National Security Authorization, FY 1982-83	Do.
97-91	H.R. 4522	D.C. Appropriations, FY 1982	Do.
97-92	H.J. Res. 370	Continuing Appropriations, 1982	Dec. 15, 1981
97-93	S.J. Res. 115	Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System	Do.
97-94	H.R. 4591	Mineral Leasing Laws	Dec. 17, 1981
35 97-95	S.J. Res. 136	San Carlos Indian Tribe of Arizona Judgment Funds	Do.
97-96	S. 1098	NASA Authorization, FY 1982	Dec. 21, 1981

Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
36 97-97	H.R. 4845	Robert V. Denney Federal Building and Courthouse	Do.
97-98	S. 884	Omnibus Farm Bill–Price Supports	Dec. 22, 1981
97-99	H.R. 3455	Military Construction Authorization, FY 1982	Dec. 23, 1981
97-100	H.R. 4035	Interior Appropriations, FY 1982	Do.
97-101	H.R. 4034	HUD Appropriations, FY 1982	Do.
97-102	H.R. 4209	Transportation Appropriations, FY 1982	Do.
97-103	H.R. 4119	Agriculture Appropriations, FY 1982	Do.
37 97-104	H.R. 3484	George Washington Commemorative Coins	Do.
97-105	H.R. 4910	D.C. Bond Authority	Do.
97-106	H.R. 4241	Military Construction Appropriations, FY 1982	Do.
38 97-107	H.R. 5273	George Washington University Revenue Bonds	Do.
97-108	H.R. 1465	CBO Cost Estimates on Reported Legislation Having Economic Consequences on State and Local Governments	Do.
97-109	S. 1003	Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Authorization, FY 1982-83	Dec. 26, 1981
97-110	H.R. 4879	International Banking Facility Deposit Insurance	Do.
97-111	S. 1948	Farm Credit Administration Borrowing Authority	Do.
39 97-112	H.R. 4894	Lac Courte Orielles Indians Trust Funds	Dec. 29, 1981
97-113	S. 1196	Foreign Assistance Authorization, 1982	Do.
97-114	H.R. 4995	Defense Appropriations, FY 1982	Do.
97-115	S. 1086	Older Americans	Do.
97-116	H.R. 4327	Immigration and Nationality Laws	Do.
97-117	H.R. 4503	Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Authorization, FY 1982-85	Do.
40 97-118	H.R. 4506	Melvin Price Lock and Dam	Do.
97-119	H.R. 5159	Black Lung Benefits	Do.
41 97-120	S. 657	Herbert Clark Hoover Department of Commerce Building	Do.
97-121	H.R. 4559	Foreign Aid Appropriations, FY 1982	Do.
42 97-122	H.R. 4431	Michael E. Roll Post Office	Do.
97-123	H.R. 4331	Social Security Minimum Benefits	Do.
97-124	H.R. 3799	National Guard Tort Claims	Do.
97-125	S. 1192	Union Station Redevelopment	Do.
43 97-126	H.R. 2494	John Archibald Campbell U.S. Courthouse	Do.
97-127	S. 1946	Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement	Do.
97-128	S. 1493	Army Corps of Engineers Water Resource Projects Deauthorization	Do.
97-129	S. 1211	Toxic Substances Control Authorization, FY 1982	Do.
97-130	S. 271	International Record Carrier Competition (Western Union)	Do.
44 97-131	S.J. Res. 34	National Patriotism Week	Do.
97-132	S.J. Res. 100	Mideast Peace Treaty International Force	Do.
45 97-133	H.J. Res. 377	Convening of 2nd Session, 97th Congress	Do.
97-134	H.R. 3210	Federal Aid Highway Authorization, FY 1982-85	Do.
46 97-135	S.J. Res. 57	National Schleroderma Week	Do.
97-136	S. 831	Coast Guard Authorization, FY 1982	Do.
97-137	H.R. 2241	Bandon Marsh National Wildlife Refuge, Oregon	Do.
47 97-138	S.J. Res. 84	National Energy Education Day	Do.
48 97-139	S.J. Res. 121	Bicentennial Year of the American Bald Eagle; Bald Eagle Day	Do.
49 97-140	H.R. 779	Benbrook Dam, Texas Municipal Water Storage	Do.
97-141	S. 1551	Physician Comparability Contracts	Do.
97-142	H.R. 4926	Osage Indian Mineral Interests	Do.
50 97-143	S. 1976	U.S. Capitol Grounds Regulations	Do.
51 97-144	S.J. Res. 117	National Jaycees Week	Do.
97-145	H.R. 3567	Export Administration Authorization, FY 1982-83	Do.

PUBLIC LAWS, 98th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION

114 out of 215 or 53 percent were nonsubstantive or administrative

	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
1	98-1	S. 61	Nancy Hanks Center	Feb. 15, 1983
2	98-2	H.J. Res. 60	Lithuanian Independence Day	Feb. 16, 1983
3	98-3	S.J. Res. 37	Women's History Week	Mar. 8 , 1983
	98-4	H.R. 1296	Agricultural Land Diversion Tax Treatment Program (PIK)	Mar. 11, 1983
4	98-5	S.J. Res. 15	National Eye Donor Month	Do.
5	98-6	H.R. 1572	Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA)	Mar. 16, 1983
6	98-7	S.J. Res. 21	National Child Abuse Prevention Month	Do.
	98-8	H.R. 1718	Emergency Jobs/Supplemental Appropriations, FY 1983	Mar. 24, 1983
7	98-9	S.J. Res. 35	National Mental Health Counselors Week	Do.
8	98-10	S.J. Res. 65	Afghanistan Day	Do.
	98-11	S. 271	National Scenic and Historic Trails	Mar. 28, 1983
	98-12	H.R. 2112	Defense Production Act Extension	Mar. 29, 1983
	98-13	H.R. 2369	Federal Unemployment Compensation (FSC)	Do.
	98-14	H.R. 1936	Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonuses Extension	Mar. 30, 1983
9	98-15	S.J. Res. 64	200th Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Sweden and the U.S.	April 4, 1983
10	98-16	H.J. Res. 175	National Amateur Baseball Month	Do.
	98-17	S. 926	Commercial Motor Vehicles Width Limitation	April 5, 1983
11	98-18	S.J. Res. 32	National Arthritis Month	Do.
12	98-19	S.J. Res. 52	National Mental Health Week	April 15, 1983
13	98-20	H.J. Res. 80	Jewish Heritage Week	April 19, 1983
	98-21	H.R. 1900	Social Security Reform	April 20, 1983
	98-22	S. 89	Saccharin Study and Labeling	April 22, 1983
14	98-23	S.J. Res. 53	National Physical Fitness and Sports Month	April 26, 1983
	98-24	S. 126	Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Authorization, FY 1983-84	Do.
15	98-25	S. 304	Burns Paiute Tribe Trust Lands	May 2, 1983
16	98-26	H.J. Res. 245	Enrollment Corrections—Emergency Jobs Appropriations, FY 1983	May 4, 1983
17	98-27	S.J. Res. 62	National Parkinson's Disease Week	Do.
18	98-28	H.R. 2600	Congressman Phillip Burton Golden Gate National Recreation Area	May 10, 1983
	98-29	S. 1011	Federal Deposit Insurance of Income Capital Certificates	May 16, 1983
19	98-30	S.J. Res. 51	Andrei Sakharov Day	May 18, 1983
20	98-31	H.J. Res. 219	Soccer World Cup	May 20, 1983
21	98-32	S. 287	Harry S. Truman National Historic Site, Missouri	May 23, 1983
22	98-33	S. 957	Congressional Award Board Membership Increase	May 25, 1983
	98-34	H.R. 2990	Public Debt Limit Permanent Increase	May 26, 1983
	98-35	H.J. Res. 265	Mortgage Insurance Authorities Extension	Do.
	98-36	S. 653	Foundation for the Advancement of Military Medicine	Do.
	98-37	S. 967	National Transportation Safety Board Authorization, FY 1984-86	June 6, 1983
	98-38	H.R. 2681	Securities Brokers/Dealers Required to Join National Securities Association	Do.
23	98-39	H.J. Res. 201	Baltic Freedom Day	June 13, 1983
24	98-40	S.J. Res. 75	National Scleroderma Week	June 14, 1983
25	98-41	H.J. Res. 234	National Childrens' Liver Disease Awareness Week	June 20, 1983
26	98-42	S.J. Res. 42	Alaska Statehood Day	June 22, 1983
	98-43	S. 639	Lebanon Emergency Development and Military Assistance	June 27, 1983
27	98-44	S. 925	Atlantic Salmon Convention—Technical Corrections	July 12, 1983
	98-45	H.R. 3133	HUD Appropriations, FY 1984	Do.
28	98-46	S. 680	Gladys Noon Spellman Parkway	Do.
	98-47	S. 273	Small Business Administration Pilot Procurement Program Extension	July 13, 1983

	Public Law No.	Bill No.	Title	Approved
	98-48	H.R. 1746	Navajo–Hopi Indian Relocation Commission Authorization, FY 1983-84	Do.
	98-49	H.R. 2713	Public Health Emergencies Revolving Fund	Do.
	98-50	H.R. 3132	Energy-Water Appropriations, FY 1984	July 14, 1983
	98-51	H.R. 3135	Legislative Appropriations, FY 1984	Do.
	98-52	H.R. 2065	NASA Authorization, FY 1984	July 15, 1983
	98-53	H.R. 1271	El Salvador—Presidential Certifications	Do.
29	98-54	S.J. Res. 68	National Atomic Veterans' Day	Do.
30	98-55	S.J. Res. 18	American Business Women's Day	July 19, 1983
31	98-56	S.J. Res. 34	National Reye's Syndrome Week	Do.
	98-57	S. 929	Canal Zone Biological Area Authorization	July 22, 1983
32	98-58	S.J. Res. 96	Helsinki Human Rights Day	July 25, 1983
	98-59	H.R. 3392	Tobacco Price Support Freeze	Do.
33	98-60	S.J. Res. 77	National Animal Agriculture Week	July 27, 1983
34	98-61	S. 459	American Falls Land Relocation	July 28, 1983
35	98-62	H.J. Res. 258	National Paralyzed Veterans Recognition Day	July 29, 1983
	98-63	H.R. 3069	Supplemental Appropriations, FY 1983	July 30, 1983
	98-64	S. 419	Per Capita Payments to Indians	Aug. 2, 1983
	98-65	H.R. 2637	D.C. Federal Payment	Do.
	98-66	H.R. 1935	Matagorda Island National Wildlife Refuge, Texas	Aug. 4, 1983
	98-67	H.R. 2973	Repeal of Withholding on Interest and Dividends—Carribean Basin Initiative	Aug. 5, 1983
36	98-68	S.J. Res. 56	National Child Support Enforcement Month	Do.
37	98-69	S.J. Res. 67	National Respiratory Therapy Week	Aug. 8, 1983
38	98-70	S. 143	Twenty-Nine Palms Band of Luiseno Mission Indian Trust Lands	Do.
39	98-71	H.J. Res. 139	Federal Credit Union Week	Aug. 11, 1983
	98-72	S. 272	Small Business Access to Federal Procurement Information	Do.
40	98-73	S. 930	Smithsonian Institution Land Purchase Authorization	Do.
41	98-74	S. 727	Fort Berthold Reservation Judgement Funds	Do.
42	98-75	H.J. Res. 321	200th Anniversary of the Treaty of Paris National Celebration Day	Do.
	98-76	H.R. 1646	Railroad Retirement Solvency	Aug. 12, 1983
	98-77	H.R. 2355	Veterans' Emergency Job Training	Aug. 15, 1983
	98-78	H.R. 3329	Transportation Appropriations, FY 1984	Do.
	98-79	H.R. 3394	Federal Student Loan Program	Do.
43	98-80	S. 1696	Additional Assistant Administrators, EPA	Aug. 23, 1983
44	98-81	S. 1797	Jack D. Watson Post Office Building, Fort Worth, Texas	Do.
45	98-82	S.J. Res. 85	National Historically Black Colleges Day	Do.
46	98-83	S.J. Res. 98	National Housing Week	Do.
47	98-84	S.J. Res. 116	Youth of America Week	Do.
48	98-85	H.R. 2895	Phillip Burton Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, California	Aug. 26, 1983
49	98-86	H.R. 3232	Payment for Special Agents of Department of Justice	Do.
50	98-87	H.J. Res. 297	Jeannine Smith Clark Appointment to Smithsonian Regents	Do.
	98-88	H.R. 3190	Extra Long Staple Cotton	Do.
	98-89	S. 46	Marine Safety and Seaman's Welfare	Do.
	98-90	H.R. 3677	Medicare Hospice Reimbursement	Aug. 29, 1983
	98-91	H.R. 3549	Bankruptcy Amendments	Aug. 30, 1983
	98-92	H.R. 3409	Federal Unemployment Compensation (FSC)	Sept. 2, 1983
51	98-93	S.J. Res. 131	National Cystic Fibrosis Week	Sept. 20, 1983
	98-94	S. 675	DOD Authorizations, FY 1984	Sept. 24, 1983
	98-95	S. 1872	Challenge Grant Amendments	Sept. 26, 1983
52	98-96	H.J. Res. 132	National Adult Day Care Center Week	Sept. 27, 1983
53	98-97	H.J. Res. 218	National Sewing Month	Do.
	98-98	H.J. Res. 353	Soviet Destruction of Korean Airliner Condemnation	Sept. 28, 1983
54	98-99	H.J. Res. 229	National Organ Donation Awareness Week	Do.
	98-100	H.R. 3914	Crop Wheat and Feed Grain Program Announcement, 1984-85	Sept. 29, 1983
55	98-101	S. 118	Commission on the Bicentennial of the Constitution	Do.
56	98-102	S.J. Res. 82	National Alzheimer's Disease Month	Sept. 30, 1983

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57	98-103	S.J. Res. 119	National Drunk and Drugged Driving Awareness Week	Do.
	98-104	S. 1625	D.C. Retirement Reform	Do.
	98-105	S. 1850	VA Medical Services in Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands	Do.
58	98-106	H.J. Res. 284	Twenty-fifth Anniversary of NASA	Oct. 1, 1983
	98-107	H.J. Res. 368	Continuing Appropriations, FY 1984	Do.
	98-108	H.R. 3962	Export Administration Act Extension	Do.
	98-109	H.J. Res. 366	Mortgage Insurance Authorities Extension	Do.
59	98-110	S.J. Res. 81	World Food Day	Oct. 3, 1983
	98-111	S. 602	Radio Broadcasting to Cuba	Oct. 4, 1983
60	98-112	S.J. Res. 142	National Productivity Improvement Week	Do.
61	98-113	S.J. Res. 140	Myasthenia Gravis Awareness Week	Oct. 5, 1983
62	98-114	H.J. Res. 137	National Schoolbus Safety Week	Oct. 7, 1983
	98-115	H.R. 2972	Military Construction Authorization, FY 1984	Oct. 11, 1983
	98-116	H.R. 3263	Military Construction Appropriations, FY 1984	Do.
	98-117	H.R. 3871	Civil Service Wage Adjustments	Do.
	98-118	H.R. 4101	Federal Unemployment Compensation (FSC)	Do.
	98-119	S.J. Res. 159	Lebanon—Multinational Force, War Powers	Oct. 12, 1983
	98-120	H.R. 3813	International Coffee Agreement Implementation	Do.
63	98-121	S. 1465	Charles A. Halleck Federal Building	Do.
64	98-122	S. 1724	Harold L. Runnels Federal Building	Do.
65	98-123	S. 884	Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians Judgement Funds	Oct. 13, 1983
66	98-124	S. 1148	Assiniboine Tribe, Montana Tribal Funds Distribution	Do.
	98-125	H.R. 3415	D.C. Appropriations, FY 1984	Do.
67	98-126	S.J. Res. 102	Lupus Awareness Week	Do.
	98-127	S. 216	Penalties for Crimes Involving the Tampering with Food, Drug, Cosmetic, and other Products	Do.
68	98-128	H.R. 3379	Edwin D. Eshleman Post Office Building	Oct. 14, 1983
	98-129	H.R. 2840	Federal Management of Pribilof Islands Termination	Do.
69	98-130	S.J. Res. 128	Metropolitan Opera Day	Do.
70	98-131	H.R. 3835	William A. Steiger Post Office Building	Oct. 17, 1983
71	98-132	S. 1894	Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the Advancement of Military Medicine	Do.
72	98-133	H.R. 1556	Conveyance of Liberty Ship John W. Brown to John W. Brown Preservation Project	Oct. 18, 1983
73	98-134	S. 1499	Mashantucket Pequot Indians Claims	Do.
	98-135	H.R. 3929	Federal Unemployment Compensation (FSC)	Oct. 24, 1983
74	98-136	H.R. 3321	Louisiana World Exposition Commemorative Medals	Do.
75	98-137	H.R. 1062	Land Conveyance in Lane County, Oregon	Oct. 25, 1983 (without approval)
76	98-138	H.R. 3044	Connecticut River Atlantic Salmon Agreement	Oct. 28, 1983
	98-139	H.R. 3913	Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations, FY 1984	Oct. 31, 1983
	98-140	S. 96	Lee Metcalf Wilderness Area, Montana	Do.
	98-141	H.R. 1213	Public Lands and National Parks	Do.
77	98-142	S.J. Res. 57	National Drug Abuse Education Week	Nov. 1, 1983
	98-143	S.J. Res. 189	Export-Import Bank Extension	Do.
	98-144	H.R. 3706	Martin Luther King, Jr. Holiday	Nov. 2, 1983
78	98-145	S.J. Res. 121	National Diabetes Month	Nov. 3, 1983
	98-146	H.R. 3363	Interior Appropriations, FY 1984	Nov. 4, 1983
79	98-147	S.J. Res. 45	National Family Week	Do.
80	98-148	S. 552	George W. Whitehurst Federal Court Building	Nov. 7, 1983
81	98-149	S. 1944	Transfer of U.S. Submarine Albacore to Portsmouth Memorial Submarine Association	Do.
	98-150	S. 461	Office of Government Ethics Authorization, FY 1984-89	Nov. 11, 1983
	98-151	H.J. Res. 413	Continuing Appropriations, FY 1984	Nov. 14, 1983
82	98-152	H.J. Res. 283	National Disabled Veterans Week	Nov. 15, 1983
83	98-153	S.J. Res. 122	National Home Care Week	Do.
84	98-154	S.J. Res. 188	National Christmas Seal Month	Nov. 16, 1983

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85	98-155	H.J. Res. 408	Anti-Defamation League Day	Do.
86	98-156	H.J. Res. 383	Florence Crittenton Week	Nov. 17, 1983
87	98-157	S. 448	Belle Fourche Irrigation Project, South Dakota	Do.
88	98-158	S.J. Res. 92	Municipal Clerk's Week	Do.
89	98-159	H.R. 3348	Gold Medal to Family of Congressman Leo J. Ryan	Nov. 18, 1983
	98-160	H.R. 2920	Veterans' Health Care and Programs Improvement	Nov. 21, 1983
	98-161	H.J. Res. 308	Public Debt Limit Permanent Increase	Do.
90	98-162	S.J. Res. 139	Eleanor Roosevelt's Centennial Birthday Commemoration	Do.
91	98-163	H.R. 2910	Pima Maricopa Indian Lands	Nov. 22, 1983
	98-164	H.R. 2915	State Department Authorization, FY 1984-85	Do.
92	98-165	H.R. 3885	Grand Ronde Tribes, Oregon	Do.
	98-166	H.R. 3222	Commerce-Justice-State-Judiciary Appropriations, FY 1984	Nov. 28, 1983
	98-167	S. 376	Debt Collection	Nov. 29, 1983
	98-168	H.R. 2077	Physicians Comparability Allowances—Supplemental Civil Service Retirement for Federal Employees Covered by Social Security	Do.
93	98-169	H.R. 2592	Catalogue of Domestic Assistance Programs, OMB–GSA	Do.
94	98-170	S. 807	Cumberland Island National Seashore Boundaries, Georgia	Do.
	98-171	H.R. 2590	Agricultural Adjustments: Filburts, Hazelnuts, and Potatoes	Do.
95	98-172	H.J. Res. 93	Recognition of the Humanitarian Efforts of Danny Thomas	Do.
96	98-173	S. 1168	Kaw Tribe, Oklahoma Trust Lands	Do.
97	98-174	S. 1837	Henry M. Jackson Memorial Building	Do.
98	98-175	H.R. 24	U.S. Land in New York to Become Part of the Green Mountain National Forest	Do.
99	98-176	H.R. 594	NOAA Claims Settlement Authority	Do.
	98-177	H.R. 4013	Small Business Development Centers	Do.
100	98-178	H.J. Res. 168	National Tourism Week	Do.
101	98-179	H.J. Res. 421	Convening of 98th Congress, 2nd Session, January 23, 1983	Do.
	98-180	H.R. 3385	Dairy and Tobacco Program Adjustments	Do.
	98-181	H.R. 3959	Supplemental Appropriations—IMF, Multilateral Development Banks, Export-Import Bank, and Omnibus Housing Authorizations, FY 1984	Nov. 30, 1983
102	98-182	S.J. Res. 44	National Surveyors Week	Do.
	98-183	H.R. 2230	Civil Rights Commission	Do.
103	98-184	H.R. 2479	Incorporation of D.C. Masonic Mutual Relief Association, Known Now as Acacia Mutual Life Insurance	Do.
	98-185	H.R. 2780	Revenue Sharing	Do.
	98-186	S. 450	Mail Order Consumer Protection Amendments	Do.
104	98-187	S.J. Res. 141	Carrier Alert Week	Do.
105	98-188	H.J. Res. 324	National Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Week	Do.
	98-189	H.R. 2196	National Historical Publications and Records Commission Authorization, FY 1984-88	Do.
106	98-190	H.R. 4294	James Van Zandt Veterans Medical Center and Carl Vinson Veterans Medical Center	Do.
	98-191	H.R. 2293	Office of Federal Procurement Policy	Dec. 1, 1983
	98-192	S. 726	Tribally-Controlled Community Colleges	Do.
	98-193	S. 1046	Product Liability Risk Retention	Do.
	98-194	S. 2129	Animal Health Clinic Reimbursement	Do.
107	98-195	S. 1503	Release of Agricultural Lands in Delaware	Do.
108	98-196	S. 577	Land Conveyance in Idaho	Do.
109	98-197	H.J. Res. 405	Presidential Commission for the German-American Bicentennial	Do.
110	98-198	S.J. Res. 111	Child Health Mortality	Do.
	98-199	S. 1341	Education of the Handicapped Authorization	Dec. 2, 1983
	98-200	H.R. 2395	Migratory Bird Conservation Fund	Do.
	98-201	H.R. 2785	FIFRA	Do.
	98-202	H.R. 2906	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization, FY 1984-85	Do.
111	98-203	H.R. 3765	Las Vegas Pauite Indian Trust Lands	Do.
	98-204	H.R. 4252	Puerto Rico Nutrition	Do.

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112	98-205	S. 505	Juliette Gordon Low Federal Building, Savannah, Georgia	Do.
113	98-206	H.J. Res. 311	National Agriculture Day	Do.
	98-207	H.R. 4476	Export Administration Extension	Dec. 5, 1983
114	98-208	H.J. Res. 381	Samuel Curtis Johnson Appointed to Smithsonian Board of Regents	Do.
	98-209	S. 974	Military Justice System Improvement	Dec. 6, 1983
	98-210	S. 1099	NOAA Marine Fisheries Program Authorization, FY 1984	Do.
	98-211	H.R. 1035	Education Consolidation and Improvement Act Amendments	Dec. 8, 1983
	98-212	H.R. 4185	Department of Defense Appropriations, FY 1984	Do.
	98-213	S. 589	Guam Capital Improvement Projects Authorization, FY 1984	Do.
	98-214	H.R. 2755	Federal Communications Commission Authorization, FY 1984-85	Do.
	98-215	H.R. 2968	Intelligence Authorization, FY 1984	Dec. 9, 1983